

**MODELS OF VOTING
IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS**

The 2000 U.S. Election

**Edited by Herbert F. Weisberg
and Clyde Wilcox**

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7 Partisanship, Party Coalitions, and Group Support, 1952–2000

HAROLD W. STANLEY AND RICHARD G. NIEMI

Over the past few decades there has been a weakening of longtime patterns of party support and the beginnings of new support coalitions. The so-called New Deal coalition, which took shape in the 1930s, referred to broad support of the Democrats by native white Southerners, labor union and working-class households, African Americans, Jews, and to a lesser extent, Catholics. During the 1950s, breaks in this coalition began to appear, as native southern whites supported Republican candidates for the presidency. Yet the coalition remained largely intact for a considerable time. Some further weakening occurred in the ensuing years, but it was not until after the 1992 election that we felt “it is time to declare the New Deal [Democratic] coalition dead” (Stanley and Niemi 1995, 237). Republican control over the House since 1994 and over the Senate after the 2000 and 2002 elections have reinforced that conclusion.

Yet no sooner is one coalition gone than we want to know the shape of that to follow. Is there a consistent pattern of group support since 1994 that defines a new party support structure and suggests what lies ahead? Did the 2000 elections provide further definition to the coalitional structure that gave Republicans the White House and the upper hand in Congress? Or, despite Democratic setbacks in 2000, did Bill Clinton’s presidential victories in 1992 and 1996 reinvigorate elements of the old New Deal coalition, or even spark the dawn of a new Democratic coalition? More specifically, do changing patterns of party support suggest the beginning of a new, long-lasting form of coalitional behavior that will favor either Republicans or Democrats? Or rather do they indicate competitive elections, with the party in the majority shifting from election to election?

The fortunes of the political parties have surged and declined over the 1990s as success, failure, and recovery have characterized both the Repub-

licans' and Democrats' fates. In 1991 Republican President George H. W. Bush set historic records in presidential approval; the following year he could not even secure reelection against Bill Clinton, who campaigned as a "New Democrat" and secured the first Democratic presidential victory since 1976. Clinton's presidential win in 1992 was in turn followed by a resounding victory for Republicans in 1994 when they gained majority control of the House of Representatives for the first time in over forty years. Clinton bounced back to trounce Republican Bob Dole in 1996, but Democrats were unable to retake control of either the House or Senate. Despite presidential impeachment proceedings, the president's party gained House seats in the 1998 midterm elections, the first time this had happened in over a half-century. But two years later, in a climate of economic prosperity and peace that ordinarily helps the incumbent party retain power, partisan contests ended in a virtual tie in the presidential vote and in the composition of the House and Senate, with Republicans (barely) controlling all three.

In this chapter, we look beneath these volatile partisan trends to examine the support base for each party. Gaining an appreciation of the shifting bases of the parties will help us model voting for the 2000 election. We approach the question of partisan trends not by directly analyzing the vote, but by considering expressed loyalties underlying support of the political parties—that is, self-reported partisanship. Of course, partisanship serves as a potent voting cue that encapsulates enduring evaluations of parties, candidates, issues, and events. Overwhelming majorities of partisans almost always back their party's nominees. Yet partisanship is no unmoved mover. Over the years partisanship can itself be changed by the political currents unleashed by these same candidates, issues, and events.

The potential for such changes in partisanship, reflected in the shifting group composition of the party coalitions, motivates this chapter. Here, we will update our over-time analysis of group support, now extending to almost half a century. We are concerned with continuity from past to present, but we are especially interested in the potential for a new group basis for the party coalitions. This new group basis may signal the start of yet another fundamental change in voters' relations with the parties—that is, the rise of a new party system. Thus, while presenting group partisanship figures for all presidential and almost all midterm elections since the 1950s, we will concentrate our analysis on the changing patterns found since 1994.

Analyzing Group Support

Group support can mean a number of different, though related things. In the past, we have looked primarily at what is called party identification—that is, which party people say they "generally support" (Stanley and Niemi 1995, 1999). Political scientists and pollsters use self-reports of this sort to

assess "enduring" or long-term support for the parties, in contrast to the more short-term support gathered by specific candidates.¹ It is now generally conceded that self-reports of party support are not entirely immune from the direction political winds happen to be blowing in response to particular campaigns, partisan scandals, and so on (see, for example, Niemi and Weisberg 2001, part 5). Nevertheless, party identification, or partisanship, is less transient than individuals' voting behavior. This is especially true when one thinks of presidential voting. The presidential election is so visible that all but the most isolated individuals (who are not likely to vote in any event) have heard or read about and probably exchanged thoughts about both candidates. Hence, presidential preferences fluctuate to a degree that partisanship does not. Therefore, it is useful to consider party support in this "generic," more fundamental sense.

Having decided to rely on self-reports of party leanings, there remains the question of how, statistically, we should assess the support of the various groups for each party. We could simply show the raw partisanship of each group—that is, how many native southern whites, females, African Americans, white Protestant fundamentalists, and so on, say they generally support Democrats or Republicans. For some purposes, this approach is exactly what one wants. A problem is that such simple accounts are misleading because the groups are overlapping. For example, many native southern whites are also white Protestant fundamentalists, and vice versa. Thus, if we find that both of these groups tend to support Republicans, there is substantial overlap across the groups. Do both characteristics tend to make people Republican? And if so, by how much? Trying to answer such questions raises several problems, but one is certainly aided by the use of multivariate statistical procedures (i.e., procedures that incorporate multiple variables "all at once" rather than one at a time). In this chapter we use multivariate logit analysis.² Although this technique is complicated, a careful reading of our tables and of the explanations we provide for them should make the results understandable.

The Models

We begin by describing the multivariate models that form the basis of our analysis. In this presentation, we draw on National Election Studies data from twenty-three presidential and congressional elections since 1952. We define four models of party support that collectively cover the 1952–2000 period.³ For comparisons over the entire period, it is important to consider all the models, and we have previously done so. For the present analysis, we emphasize the latest model, which can be estimated virtually without change since 1990. That model incorporates the New Deal elements, gender, church attendance, income, white Protestant fundamentalists, Hispanic ori-

gin, and three birth cohorts: 1943–1958 (baby boomers), 1959–1970 (so-called Generation X), and 1971–1982.⁴ The primary dependent variables to be explained are Democratic identification and Republican identification.⁵

For several reasons, we use separate models for Democratic and Republican identification. First, to the extent that the New Deal coalition has broken up—a position we advanced in the mid-1990s (Stanley and Niemi 1995)—we want to be certain of the continued validity of that judgment, and a model of Democratic identification is most appropriate for that test. More significantly, we want to see the extent to which formerly Democratic groups have moved over into support for the Republican Party (as opposed to becoming independent), so we need to create a model for each party. Finally, for newer groups, we want to see whether hypothesized connections to the Republicans have taken hold. Our focus here is on the continuing nature of the changes as reflected in the 1990s, especially from 1994 on.

Results

The groups of interest are of three kinds. First, some groups have largely retained their traditional levels of allegiance to the Democratic Party despite the decline of the New Deal coalition. Three groups have done this: African Americans, Jews, and members of labor-union households. Second, other groups were part of the New Deal coalition, but their support declined sharply from what it was in the 1950s. Native white southerners, whose political support changed steadily and dramatically, and Catholics, for whom the decline occurred later and less sharply, are two groups of this type.⁶ Finally, some groups have become larger or more politically visible in the past ten to fifteen years. Such groups include women, those who are well off financially, Hispanics, churchgoers in general and Christian fundamentalists in particular, and groups defined by age or “generation.” They represent the greatest possibility of volatile movement or of a slow but systematic shift toward one of the parties.

In examining the support coming from these groups, we consider support for each party separately. Although support that does not go to one party most often goes to the other, voters are more independent than they were prior to the 1960s, so one sometimes finds that neither party receives a boost from a particular group. The top half of Table 7.1 presents the mean predicted probability (based on the results from the logit analysis) that a group member claims Democratic identification in each election year since 1952. Essentially, these numbers are the proportions of Democrats in each group before imposing any controls for other group memberships. Note that Democratic partisanship declined for every group in 1994 except for those born between 1959 and 1970, 1971 and later, and Hispanics. The changes are often small; but recall that partisanship is generally quite stable

in the face of temporary partisan tides. Thus, the force of the Republican tide in 1994 is demonstrated by the fact that virtually all groups were affected. In the case of many of the New Deal groups, this represented the continuation of a change that had been taking place for many years. Note, for example, the continued slide of white Southerners, Catholics, and members of union households. The same was true of support from Christian fundamentalists and of baby boomers (born between 1943 and 1958), where support dropped precipitously in 1994.

The movement away from the Democrats could not be maintained, however. Not only did virtually every group swing back toward the Democratic Party in 1996 (all except union households), but the pattern over the next two elections was mixed. Even if one compares only the presidential years—and whether one concentrates on 1996 and 2000 or all of the presidential years since 1988—there is no uniform movement toward one party or the other. Thus, the initial figures about self-reported loyalties in the 1990s conform to the partisan volatility observed in the vote.

Although the proportion of Democratic supporters within groups changed erratically after 1994, the incremental impact of membership in a particular group, shown in the bottom half of Table 7.1, gives us a different view of group effects. These numbers show how much more likely an individual is to be a Democratic identifier because of membership in a specific group. That is, they consider all of the other group ties of each individual and how likely those other ties are to make the person Democratic. These incremental probabilities show very clearly the continuation of long-term trends. African Americans reported levels of Democratic partisanship—net of other influences—that were as high as or higher than in most previous years. Support for the Democrats among Jews appears to have slipped compared to other recent years, though it was still very high.⁷ Moreover, members of union households reversed a short-term fall and in 2000 expressed Democratic leanings that matched or exceeded most years since 1970.

Long-term trends are also evident in the decline—now in its fifth decade—of the Democratic Party among white southerners. In 2000, for the first time since these measurements started, such individuals were *less* likely to be Democratic than others with similar characteristics. The appointment of so many Southerners to leadership positions in the George W. Bush White House reflects that change but also is likely to encourage still further departures from the Democratic ranks among southern whites.

Current politics are also reflected in the sharp decline in Democrat partisanship among Catholics. President George W. Bush’s appearances with the Catholic hierarchy, his vocal support of faith-based charities, and his careful decision on stem cell research reflect strong efforts to align the Republican Party with this large bloc of voters. In this shift among political elites combined with the observed movements in the electorate, we could be

TABLE 7.1 Mean and incremental probabilities of Democratic identification for members of social groups

Group	'52	'56	'58	'60	'64	'66	'68	'70	'72	'74
<i>Mean Probabilities^a</i>										
African American	.53	.51	.51	.45	.73	.62	.85	.78	.67	.69
Catholic	.56	.52	.57	.64	.59	.54	.53	.53	.50	.51
Jewish	.73	.62	.71	.52	.57	.68	.50	.54	.52	.53
Female	.48	.42	.51	.49	.53	.46	.48	.46	.43	.43
Native southern white ^b	.77	.71	.74	.72	.71	.60	.52	.46	.52	.52
Union household	.54	.51	.59	.57	.64	.56	.50	.55	.46	.47
Regular churchgoer	.50	.46	.47	.49	.53	.48	.47	.46	.44	.40
Income: top third	.43	.40	.46	.44	.42	.42	.39	.39	.34	.31
White Protestant fundamentalist									.46	.43
Hispanic, non-Cuban										
Born 1943-1958										
Born 1959-1970										
Born 1971-										
<i>Incremental Probabilities^c</i>										
African American	.17	.20	.14	.11	.30	.24	.49	.42	.37	.40
Catholic	.21	.20	.20	.30	.19	.16	.18	.16	.20	.22
Jewish	.39	.32	.31	.18	.20	.35	.18	.21	.27	.28
Female	-.01	-.05	.03	.04	.02	.02	.03	.02	.05	.04
Native southern white ^b	.45	.42	.39	.41	.33	.26	.19	.12	.18	.23
Union household	.14	.12	.14	.15	.18	.16	.08	.15	.09	.08
Regular churchgoer	.00	-.02	-.09	-.03	-.01	.01	-.01	.03	.03	-.03
Income: top third	-.07	-.04	-.04	-.06	-.14	-.05	-.06	-.06	-.07	-.11
White Protestant fundamentalist									.08	.03
Hispanic, non-Cuban										
Born 1943-1958										
Born 1959-1970										
Born 1971-										

DATA SOURCE: 1952-2000 National Election Studies.

NOTE: The four models containing the different variables were evaluated through 2000. However, presentation is greatly simplified by showing only the following: 1952-1970 values are based on the model with eight variables; 1972-1978 values are based on the model with nine variables; 1980-1988 entries are based on the model with twelve variables; 1990-2000 entries are based on the model with thirteen variables. Values that can be estimated with more than one model seldom differ by more than .01 from one model to another.

seeing the most important change in the group basis of party support in many years. Note that until the late 1970s, Catholics had an incremental probability of about .20 of supporting the Democratic Party. Support dropped in the 1980s and 1990s, but the increment remained at about .15. As such, it was higher than the push that came from membership in a union household. In the last two election years, however, support of Catholics dropped off

	'76	'78	'80	'82	'84	'86	'88	'90	'92	'94	'96	'98	'00
African American	.72	.64	.73	.81	.62	.72	.63	.64	.64	.61	.66	.72	.64
Catholic	.50	.49	.43	.54	.43	.45	.37	.45	.41	.39	.43	.41	.35
Jewish	.58	.55	.81	.59	.60	.36	.36	.62	.63	.55	.63	.58	.63
Female	.42	.42	.44	.49	.40	.43	.40	.43	.39	.37	.43	.41	.38
Native southern white ^b	.52	.44	.49	.55	.41	.43	.39	.37	.33	.30	.36	.33	.25
Union household	.48	.49	.48	.52	.47	.46	.42	.51	.47	.44	.44	.46	.46
Regular churchgoer	.43	.43	.40	.47	.37	.43	.39	.43	.36	.33	.36	.36	.34
Income: top third	.31	.34	.35	.37	.32	.33	.28	.35	.29	.21	.26	.34	.31
White Protestant fundamentalist	.43	.43	.56	.48	.41	.39	.37	.34	.31	.27	.34	.23	.31
Hispanic, non-Cuban			.56	.57	.45	.53	.45	.46	.43	.44	.51	.58	.40
Born 1943-1958			.39	.43	.34	.36	.34	.43	.37	.30	.37	.39	.38
Born 1959-1970			.32	.35	.32	.35	.27	.30	.30	.31	.36	.33	.30
Born 1971-								.29	.25	.29	.38	.35	.29
African American	.43	.34	.46	.47	.34	.43	.39	.31	.38	.37	.35	.42	.36
Catholic	.22	.20	.14	.20	.14	.15	.09	.12	.15	.16	.13	.06	.05
Jewish	.36	.31	.55	.31	.34	.07	.17	.32	.39	.33	.32	.26	.29
Female	.03	.03	.08	.06	.05	.05	.09	.03	.06	.06	.08	.05	.08
Native southern white ^b	.23	.12	.13	.20	.08	.12	.11	.02	.06	.04	.03	.01	-.05
Union household	.12	.15	.12	.11	.13	.10	.11	.15	.15	.13	.08	.11	.14
Regular churchgoer	.03	.02	-.04	.01	-.04	.00	.02	.02	-.03	-.02	-.07	-.06	-.05
Income: top third	-.11	-.10	-.06	-.11	-.06	-.08	-.06	-.09	-.10	-.16	-.14	-.02	-.04
White Protestant fundamentalist	.05	.11	.25	.07	.10	.05	.07	.01	.04	.03	.04	-.07	.03
Hispanic, non-Cuban			.17	.10	.05	.10	.09	.08	.07	.09	.08	.27	.11
Born 1943-1958			-.09	-.06	-.11	-.11	-.09	-.04	-.05	-.08	-.04	-.08	-.06
Born 1959-1970			-.16	-.18	-.16	-.16	-.19	-.18	-.14	-.11	-.10	-.15	-.15
Born 1971-								-.21	-.22	-.15	-.11	-.15	-.18

^a Cells are the mean of the predicted probabilities of Democratic identification for all group members in each year.

^b Native southern whites, 1952-1988; all southern whites, 1990-2000.

^c Cells are the average of the difference, for each group member, between the individual's predicted probability of Democratic identification (based on all of the other characteristics in the multivariate model) and what the individual's probability would have been without the effect of the group membership.

again, this time to below that of many other groups. If President Bush is successful, Catholics could become the second group in the old Democratic coalition—native southern whites being the first—to lose completely their tendency to be Democratic once other group characteristics are taken into account.

Adding significance to the drop in the marginal Democratic tendencies

of Catholics is the continued movement of regular churchgoers away from the Democrats. The magnitude is not yet great, but it is clearly above the very weak, oscillating tendencies of much of the previous fifty years. Interestingly, white Protestant fundamentalists—seen in previous years as a strong bastion of Republican support (e.g., Wilcox 1996)—have not, except for 1998, been pulled away from the Democrats.

The gender gap, which arose in the early 1980s, continued undiminished into the new century. As we noted previously, neither party can afford to limit its appeal to males or females. Nonetheless, this division is likely to be sustained by Republican support for pro-life policies, their positions on other gender issues (e.g., toward gays and lesbians), and Democratic policies that are seen as more supportive of women (e.g., with respect to equal pay). In contrast, what appeared to be a continuing, perhaps growing partisan gap between rich and poor in the first half of the 1990s shriveled to the low levels of the 1950s.

Republicans have also made concerted, recent efforts to court Hispanic voters. And, indeed, judging by mean probability figures, these efforts at least dented Democratic support among Hispanics, except in 1998. But judging by the incremental probability of supporting Democrats, these efforts have yet to pay off. Indeed, Hispanic support for Democrats spiked in 1998, perhaps energized by Republican sponsorship of restrictionist immigration policies along with Democratic support for more liberal policies (Glastris 1997).

What about the Republican Party? As groups increase or decrease their support for the Democrats, is there compensating movement to the other side? Among southern whites, the answer is clearly yes. Indeed, for three of the past four election years, mean probabilities of partisan identification have been greater for Republicans than Democrats, and incremental probabilities have favored Republicans in the last two (table 7.2). Declining Democratic partisanship among Catholics and regular churchgoers was also matched by increasing identification with Republicans. Incremental probabilities for Catholics are still negative (meaning that, net of other characteristics, Catholics are less likely than non-Catholics to consider themselves Republican), but they are at their lowest levels ever. Correspondingly, the gap between the parties in mean probabilities has narrowed. Among regular churchgoers, small positive incremental probabilities favoring the Republicans have become larger. Mean probabilities, which once favored the Democrats by margins of two to one, are now virtually even.

At the same time, the difficulty the Republicans face of putting together a new coalition is apparent in the receding identification they received from those in the top third of the income distribution. Incremental probabilities, which had inched upward in the early 1990s, dropped in the two most recent elections. Attracting women and even white Protestant fundamentalists also remained a problem. The prospects of a generational appeal—ei-

ther to boomers or to subsequent generations—do not find much support here either. The incremental push from particular generations can be described as an anti-Democratic force but as only a weak and inconsistent pro-Republican force. Both of the age groups in tables 7.1 and 7.2 have consistently high increments in favor of independence (not shown). This reflects the dealigning forces that have characterized American politics since the mid-1960s. It is worth pointing out that even as levels of party identification change among groups defined by ethnicity, religion, and so on, there has been no systematic change in party leanings in the generational groups. Consistent with arguments about the importance of the years in which one enters adulthood, aging by itself has not led to changing party allegiances, in either an absolute (mean probability) or relative (incremental probability) sense.

Republicans' difficulties in attracting Hispanic support, noted earlier, are also evident in the Republican mean and incremental probabilities. The public attention focused on Elian Gonzales, the Cuban boy rescued in the Caribbean and later returned to Cuba, and protests over bombing on the Puerto Rican island of Vieques are reminders of the high-risk stakes for parties as they court ethnic groups and seek to retain other supporters. In any case, Hispanics have not found increasing favor with Republicans during the 1990s. The mean probability has, if anything, declined marginally during the decade. Incremental probabilities have also become less favorably Republican.

The change in group support has been dramatic over the entire period for which we have data. But it has taken the form of a wearing away of an old coalition—the New Deal coalition—rather than the formation of new, distinct group alliances. The change is best described “negatively”—that a given group is no longer part of, or no longer so heavily a part of, the Democratic or Republican coalition. There has been no genuine group realignment, if one means by that changes in which a group that was at one time highly supportive of one party is now highly supportive of the other (or even that a group that was neutral is now highly supportive of one party). Now, decades after the beginning of the breakup of the old, we may finally be seeing the start of a new, “positive” pattern. For the first time in twenty-three surveys stretching over a half century, southern whites in 2000 showed a greater (if still small) affinity with Republicans than with Democrats. Regular churchgoers have shown a growing, decade-long tilt in favor of the Republicans. Catholics show signs of shifting their support as well. African Americans have strongly supported Democrats since the 1960s, but that should not obscure the increased support compared to the 1950s. Women have perhaps supported Democrats in sufficient proportions and for a sufficient length of time to be called a part of their base coalition. And Hispanics, who when we first observed them were not so much an unaligned group as one too small to be of much importance, have remained Democratic sup-

TABLE 7.2 Mean and incremental probabilities of Republican identification for members of social groups

Group	'52	'56	'58	'60	'64	'66	'68	'70	'72	'74
<i>Mean Probabilities^a</i>										
African American	.13	.19	.15	.18	.07	.10	.02	.04	.08	.04
Catholic	.18	.21	.17	.15	.17	.16	.15	.16	.14	.14
Jewish	.00	.11	.12	.08	.06	.05	.05	.05	.09	.12
Female	.29	.32	.28	.30	.25	.25	.23	.25	.24	.23
Native southern white ^b	.09	.12	.12	.11	.08	.11	.09	.14	.15	.12
Union household Regular churchgoer	.28	.29	.31	.30	.26	.25	.24	.26	.26	.25
Income: top third	.31	.34	.33	.30	.32	.25	.28	.29	.30	.29
White Protestant fundamentalist								.21	.17	
Hispanic, non-Cuban										
Born 1943-1958										
Born 1959-1970										
Born 1971-										
<i>Incremental Probabilities^c</i>										
African American	-.27	-.21	-.25	-.26	-.27	-.25	-.34	-.29	-.25	-.29
Catholic	-.24	-.20	-.25	-.28	-.21	-.18	-.22	-.17	-.19	-.18
Jewish	-.41	-.30	-.25	-.31	-.31	-.31	-.32	-.30	-.29	-.23
Female	.03	.07	-.01	.02	.01	-.01	-.02	.01	.01	.01
Native southern white ^b	-.35	-.32	-.32	-.35	-.30	-.27	-.29	-.22	-.17	-.20
Union household Regular churchgoer	.05	.05	.10	.07	.06	.03	.04	.03	.05	.05
Income: top third	.05	.06	.04	.02	.10	-.01	.03	.06	.08	.07
White Protestant fundamentalist								-.05	-.05	
Hispanic, non-Cuban										
Born 1943-1958										
Born 1959-1970										
Born 1971-										

DATA SOURCE: 1952-2000 National Election Studies.

NOTE: The four models containing the different variables were evaluated through 2000. However, presentation is greatly simplified by showing only the following: 1952-1970 values are based on the model with eight variables; 1972-1978 values are based on the model with nine variables; 1980-1988 entries are based on the model with twelve variables; 1990-2000 entries are based on the model with thirteen variables. Values that can be estimated with more than one model seldom differ by more than .01 from one model to another.

porters. Thus, after a long period of breakdown and uncertainty, we may, at last, be seeing the development of a new group profile in party support.

Group Support and the Party Coalitions

So far we have focused on the probability that individuals with a given characteristic identify with one party or the other. Now our attention turns

	'76	'78	'80	'82	'84	'86	'88	'90	'92	'94	'96	'98	'00
African American	.05	.07	.05	.02	.04	.05	.06	.05	.04	.05	.03	.04	.05
Catholic	.16	.13	.19	.17	.20	.22	.27	.23	.19	.25	.24	.25	.23
Jewish	.08	.05	.00	.18	.10	.21	.12	.10	.05	.10	.07	.14	.06
Female	.27	.23	.23	.23	.27	.26	.28	.23	.24	.31	.24	.25	.21
Native southern white ^b	.16	.16	.19	.18	.22	.22	.21	.21	.27	.39	.31	.35	.32
Union household Regular churchgoer	.14	.14	.13	.17	.20	.21	.21	.20	.15	.22	.17	.18	.18
Income: top third	.28	.24	.28	.26	.32	.27	.32	.28	.31	.36	.36	.33	.33
White Protestant fundamentalist	.30	.25	.30	.32	.35	.30	.34	.33	.34	.43	.40	.34	.30
Hispanic, non-Cuban	.21	.18	.16	.20	.22	.26	.26	.28	.32	.40	.34	.41	.30
Born 1943-1958				.13	.10	.11	.18	.15	.14	.14	.18	.13	.12
Born 1959-1970				.21	.20	.28	.24	.26	.24	.27	.35	.30	.26
Born 1971-				.14	.27	.25	.26	.28	.28	.24	.33	.27	.28
Incremental Probabilities ^c								.19	.19	.26	.22	.32	.15
African American	-.28	-.24	-.26	-.30	-.35	-.31	-.34	-.29	-.30	-.36	-.32	-.27	-.22
Catholic	-.18	-.18	-.12	-.17	-.16	-.13	-.08	-.10	-.17	-.17	-.13	-.02	-.04
Jewish	-.28	-.27	-.33	-.20	-.33	-.13	-.31	-.26	-.34	-.32	-.27	-.14	-.18
Female	.05	.02	-.02	-.02	.00	.00	.00	-.04	-.05	-.03	-.08	-.04	-.06
Native southern white ^b	-.16	-.11	-.09	-.14	-.08	-.11	-.15	-.12	-.10	-.01	-.05	.03	.05
Union household Regular churchgoer	-.14	-.11	-.15	-.11	-.11	-.07	-.13	-.11	-.16	-.11	-.17	-.11	-.08
Income: top third	.06	.05	.08	.04	.08	.04	.06	.06	.09	.07	.13	.09	.15
White Protestant fundamentalist	.08	.05	.09	.11	.10	.05	.06	.09	.11	.12	.13	.09	.07
Hispanic, non-Cuban	-.06	-.10	-.13	-.08	-.13	-.05	-.06	-.01	-.02	-.03	-.03	.08	-.01
Born 1943-1958				-.06	-.10	-.11	-.04	-.12	-.09	-.07	-.12	-.12	-.19
Born 1959-1970				-.01	-.06	.03	-.02	-.02	-.02	.00	.04	.00	.01
Born 1971-				-.06	.05	.02	.03	.02	.05	.00	.07	.02	.05
Incremental Probabilities ^c								-.02	-.03	.01	-.01	.11	-.04

^a Cells are the mean of the predicted probabilities of Republican identification for all group members in each year.

^b Native southern whites, 1952-1988; all southern whites, 1990-2000.

^c Cells are the average of the difference, for each group member, between the individual's predicted probability of Republican identification (based on all of the other characteristics in the multivariate model) and what the individual's probability would have been without the effect of the group membership.

to the party coalitions. In the first two sections of tables 7.3 and 7.4 we show the mean predicted probability of Democratic or Republican identification in the United States and, below that, the percentage of each coalition with a given group characteristic. This breakdown of the coalitions is in terms of overlapping groups. The percentages describing the party coalitions thus add to more than one hundred because, for example, an African-American female churchgoer is counted in each of three categories.

TABLE 7.3 Size and composition of the Democratic coalition

Group	'52	'56	'58	'60	'64	'66	'68	'70	'72	'74
<i>Predicted Probability of Democratic Identification in the U.S.^a</i>										
	48	44	49	47	52	46	45	44	41	41
<i>Percentage of Democratic Coalition with a Given Group Characteristic^b</i>										
African American	10	10	9	8	14	14	17	17	17	17
Catholic	27	25	26	29	26	26	26	24	30	30
Jewish	5	5	4	4	3	5	3	4	3	3
Female	55	53	56	59	56	56	58	59	60	63
Native southern white ^c	26	27	26	28	20	19	19	20	21	25
Union household	32	32	30	33	30	34	28	29	30	30
Regular churchgoer	42	45	43	50	44	42	40	40	42	43
Income: top third	37	28	32	39	29	35	27	34	27	23
White Prot. fundament.									17	18
Hispanic, non-Cuban										
Born 1943-1958										
Born 1959-1970										
Born 1971-										
<i>Percentage of Democratic Identifiers in Group Continuing to Claim Democratic Identification</i>										
African American	68	61	73	75	59	61	42	46	44	43
Catholic	62	61	64	52	68	70	67	70	61	57
Jewish	46	48	57	66	65	48	64	60	47	48
Female	102	111	94	91	97	95	93	95	89	90
Native southern white ^c	42	41	47	43	53	56	64	74	64	56
Union household	75	77	76	74	71	71	85	73	81	82
Regular churchgoer	100	104	119	107	102	97	102	94	93	107
Income: top third	117	110	108	115	133	112	116	116	122	137
White Prot. fundament.									82	92
Hispanic, non-Cuban										
Born 1943-1958										
Born 1959-1970										
Born 1971-										
<i>Relative Size (%) of Democratic Coalition After Removing Group Characteristic</i>										
African American	97	96	98	98	94	95	90	91	91	90
Catholic	90	90	91	86	92	92	91	93	88	87
Jewish	97	98	98	99	99	97	99	99	98	98
Female	101	106	97	95	98	97	96	97	93	94
Union household	85	84	86	84	91	92	93	95	92	89
Regular churchgoer	92	93	93	91	91	90	96	92	94	95
Income: top third	100	102	108	103	101	99	101	98	97	103
White Protestant fundamentalist	106	103	103	106	110	104	104	105	106	109
Hispanic, non-Cuban										
Born 1943-1958									97	99
Born 1959-1970										
Born 1971-										

DATA SOURCE: 1952-2000 National Election Studies.

^a These estimates, derived from the model, are virtually identical to the actual percentage of Democratic identifiers.

^b Figures derived from taking the mean predicted probability of Democratic identification for a group in a particular year (table 7.1) multiplied by that group's number of respondents, and dividing this product by the number of Democratic identifiers.

	'76	'78	'80	'82	'84	'86	'88	'90	'92	'94	'96	'98	'00
	40	40	42	46	38	41	36	41	37	34	39	38	35
	19	16	21	21	19	27	25	23	25	23	22	26	22
	32	32	27	29	32	28	26	32	30	33	31	36	25
	4	4	6	3	4	1	1	3	4	4	3	4	4
	60	58	61	60	60	59	65	58	58	60	62	61	60
	20	16	22	22	20	20	23	21	21	24	26	24	18
	28	32	29	25	27	24	24	23	23	23	20	19	19
	44	41	38	44	38	43	42	44	42	44	39	40	37
	29	29	26	29	27	25	26	30	29	20	21	30	28
	15	16	20	18	16	16	19	16	15	15	16	8	12
			5	3	8	7	10	10	9	11	11	16	9
			35	35	34	34	36	34	34	29	29	33	35
			4	7	13	16	16	18	21	26	24	21	24
								2	3	5	8	13	13
<i>After Removing Democratic Tendency of Defining Group Characteristic^d</i>													
	40	47	37	42	45	40	38	52	40	39	47	41	43
	56	59	68	63	68	67	75	73	64	59	69	85	86
	38	44	32	47	43	80	54	48	37	41	49	54	53
	93	93	82	88	87	89	78	93	86	83	82	88	80
	57	73	74	63	81	73	71	94	82	87	92	97	119
	75	70	76	79	72	79	73	71	68	71	81	77	69
	93	95	109	98	111	99	95	96	109	105	119	116	115
	134	130	118	131	119	123	123	127	136	174	154	105	112
	88	75	55	84	75	87	81	97	88	89	87	132	89
			69	83	89	82	80	82	83	81	83	54	74
			122	114	132	132	126	110	114	125	111	121	115
			150	150	151	147	169	158	147	135	128	147	149
								173	185	153	128	145	164
	89	91	87	88	89	84	84	89	85	86	88	85	87
	86	87	91	89	90	91	93	91	89	87	91	95	96
	98	98	96	99	98	100	99	99	98	98	98	98	98
	96	96	89	93	92	93	86	96	92	90	89	93	88
	91	96	94	92	96	94	93	99	96	97	98	99	103
	93	90	93	95	93	95	94	93	93	93	96	96	94
	97	98	104	99	104	100	98	98	104	102	107	106	106
	110	109	105	109	105	106	106	108	110	115	111	101	103
	98	96	91	97	96	98	96	99	98	98	98	103	99
			98	99	99	99	98	98	98	98	98	93	98
			108	105	111	111	109	103	105	107	103	107	105
			102	103	107	107	111	110	110	109	107	110	112
								102	102	103	102	106	108

^c Native southern whites, 1952-1988; all southern whites, 1990-2000.

^d Figures derived by recalculating the probabilities of Democratic identification without the effect of, say, white Protestant fundamentalist identification, then taking the mean of these probabilities for all respondents who were white Protestant fundamentalists. The ratio of this revised mean probability to the mean probability that includes the effect of white Protestant fundamentalism gives the ratio of the hypothetical size to the actual one.

TABLE 7.4 Size and composition of the Republican coalition

Group	'52	'56	'58	'60	'64	'66	'68	'70	'72	'74	'76	'78	'80	'82	'84	'86	'88	'90	'92	'94	'96	'98	'00
<i>Predicted Probability of Republican Identification in the U.S.^a</i>																							
	27	29	28	29	25	24	24	24	24	23	24	21	23	24	27	25	29	25	26	32	29	27	23
<i>Percentage of Republican Coalition with a Given Group Characteristic^b</i>																							
African American	5	6	5	5	3	4	1	2	3	2	2	3	2	1	2	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2
Catholic	15	15	14	10	15	15	14	13	15	15	18	17	21	17	21	22	24	26	20	22	24	31	25
Jewish	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1
Female	57	61	55	55	56	56	53	58	57	61	65	60	57	53	57	58	57	51	49	53	48	52	49
Native southern white ^c	5	7	7	7	5	7	6	11	10	10	10	12	15	14	15	17	15	19	24	33	30	35	34
Union household	22	20	16	15	14	21	20	14	17	16	14	17	14	15	16	17	14	14	10	12	11	10	11
Regular churchgoer	40	43	52	47	46	40	38	40	42	49	47	43	49	46	44	43	43	47	51	50	54	51	53
Income: top third	47	36	41	41	47	39	36	46	41	39	46	40	40	49	40	37	39	44	48	43	43	42	39
White Protestant fundamentalist									13	13	12	12	10	14	12	17	17	21	21	22	21	21	17
Hispanic, non-Cuban													2	1	3	4	4	5	4	5	4	5	4
Born 1943-1958													33	31	38	37	34	30	35	35	33	30	33
Born 1959-1970													3	10	14	19	21	26	24	28	24	26	33
Born 1971-																		2	3	5	6	17	11

DATA SOURCE: 1952-2000 National Election Studies.
^a These estimates, derived from the model, are virtually identical to the actual percentage of Republican identifiers.
^b Figures derived from taking the mean predicted probability of Republican identification for a group in a particular year (Table 7.2) multiplied by that group's number of respondents, and dividing this product by the number of Republican identifiers.
^c Native southern whites, 1952-1988; all southern whites, 1990-2000.

The changing group profiles of the parties can be seen in these figures, though with nuances that distinguish coalition composition from the marginal propensities shown earlier. Beginning with the Republicans, it is apparent in table 7.4 that Catholics, southern whites, and regular churchgoers are now a significant, perhaps dominant part of the party. White Southerners and Catholics, each one-quarter to one-third of the Republican Party's supporters, are now as large a proportion of Republican identifiers as they were of Democratic identifiers in the 1950s. In addition, white Protestant fundamentalists have managed to hold their own at about one-fifth of the party adherents, altogether making a formidable religious force. In contrast, members of union households, who at one time made up one-fifth of the Republican coalition despite their tilt toward the Democrats, make up no more than one-tenth of the Republican Party's supporters.

Given the current party makeup, the emphasis that President George W. Bush has placed on religious issues and organizations is understandable. Still, religious heterogeneity is apparent as well. Relatively speaking, fundamentalists have lost ground to Catholics, and fundamentalists have not always been happy with their influence on Republican Party doctrine. However, in the case of stem cell research, it appears to have been Catholic conservatives who were most unforgiving (Goodstein 2001). Bush's efforts in support of school vouchers are generally applauded by the right, but they could end up providing a substantial boost to Catholic schools, something the Protestant right is not happy about. Maintaining a coalition in which both Protestant fundamentalists and Catholics are major parts will not be easy.

In the Democratic Party, the biggest observable shifts are in the increasing proportions of women and Hispanics. Women, always a majority of the party, are now edging up to over three-fifths of Democratic identifiers. Further growth, if any, is likely to be slow because the group itself is not growing. Hispanics, on the other hand, are an expanding part of the overall population, and Republicans have had difficulty attracting them. This portion of the Democratic coalition is likely to become larger rather quickly unless President Bush is successful in his attempts to draw some of that support to the Republican side.

Democrats continue to be a diverse lot, however. Catholics, for example, continue to make up a substantial fraction of Democratic identifiers, despite the greatly diminished incremental probabilities noted earlier (table 7.3). Indeed, because of other changes in the Democratic coalition—the declining number of white Southerners (who are generally Protestant) and the growing number of Hispanics (who are generally Catholic)—there is a higher proportion of Catholics in the party now than in the 1950s and 1960s (ignoring the anomalous decline in 2000). African Americans, not surprisingly, also are a substantial proportion of Democratic identifiers, though their proportion has remained about the same over the past fifteen years. And members of

union households, although declining among identifiers as union membership falls nationwide, are still about one-fifth of the Democratic following.

What would happen if a party lost its distinctive appeal for various members of its coalition? Because these groups have overlapping membership, at least some members would remain loyal to the party because of another of their group memberships. Here, we show results only for the Democratic coalition (table 7.3, second panel).⁸ These results reinforce the importance of certain group memberships. African-American and Jewish supporters appear the most vulnerable, with members of union households not far behind. If the Democratic Party were to lose its appeal among these groups as such, support from those group members would fall sharply. Among Hispanics, in contrast, other characteristics would keep more of them under the Democratic banner, though the results for the most recent elections suggest that they are becoming a more vulnerable group as well.

Still, because of the diversity of the Democratic coalition, it is relatively resilient, as shown dramatically in the final panel in table 7.3. These figures show the effect that removing each group characteristic has on the size of the Democratic coalition. In recent years, the numbers dip below 90 percent only for African Americans and for women in 1996 and 2000. This suggests that the party would remain close to its current size even if it lost its specific appeal to any one group. Democratic efforts to appeal to a broad range of groups and to avoid being "captured" by any one of them have lessened their vulnerability to any given group. On the other hand, any systematic loss of support would loom large at a time when the party balance is as close as it was in the 2000 election.

Conclusion

From a long-term perspective, changes in the 1990s and the beginning of the twenty-first century could be viewed simply as a continuation of processes that began decades ago. The movement away from the Democratic Party by southern whites, for example, began in the 1960s. Catholics' lesser identification (lower incremental probabilities) with the Democrats began around 1980. The proportion of Democratic identifiers who are members of union households began to fall in the 1970s. And the Hispanic population and its contribution to the Democratic coalition have been on the rise for at least fifteen years.

Yet the changes that we see in the most recent data might well signal the beginning of a distinct new group basis for the party coalitions. Note, first of all, that several watershed changes have occurred very recently. Southern whites, perhaps for the first time ever, had an incremental push favorable to the Republicans in 2000, and in the past two elections they were estimated to be a greater fraction of Republican than of Democratic identifiers.

In 1996, members of union households sank to just one-fifth of all Democratic supporters and dropped a point further in the two subsequent elections. Hispanics, although not increasing their marginal support for the Democrats, are now a much more substantial fraction of the coalition, while the contribution of African Americans to the Democratic coalition has stabilized or is possibly declining.

Significantly, recent changes appear to be defining group support for the Republican Party more sharply than has been the case for many years. Regionally, the party now finds a strong base in the South, which is no longer just "less Democratic." Southern whites lean more toward the Republicans, and they make up a substantial part of the Republican coalition. This is, of course, apparent at the elite as well as the mass level. Even more noteworthy is the strong religious base of Republican identifiers, as Catholics, regular churchgoers, and Protestant fundamentalists have found greater favor with the Republican Party. This is also reflected at the elite level, as President Bush seeks religious support by his behavior and by his policies regarding abortion, faith-based initiatives on social policy, and, most recently, stem cell research.

The Democrats' coalition, in contrast, appears to have lost important group support that has not been replaced by the support of significant new groups. For decades, the party weathered the steady erosion of southern support without losing its majority in the House, though that erosion explains the Democrats' inability to elect more than an occasional president (all of whom since Lyndon Johnson in 1964 were from the South). By 1994, however, the loss of support from other groups, along with still-declining support from the South, left the Democrats unable to maintain their congressional majority. Not even the increased support of women, which had begun in the early 1980s, and the growing Hispanic population were sufficient to offset the loss of Catholic, union households, and regular churchgoing voters. Nor has the party been able to establish a firm partisan base among younger cohorts.

Overall, the problem for the Republicans is to maintain and enhance the coalition they have put together, including a fragile religious combination. A larger, more heterogeneous Republican coalition brings its own strains. Both parties vie for greater support among Hispanics. This group's population growth, and its geographic concentration in states rich with electoral college votes, such as California, Florida, and Texas, highlights the desirability of wooing and winning Hispanics. The problem for the Democrats is that they cannot remain content with their current partisan base. To be competitive and position themselves for electoral victory, Democrats must find new coalition partners or regain support that the party has lost. But how? Which group? An attractive prospect would be the youngest generation among the electorate, as neither party has a hold on this group's loyalties. But captur-

ing the attention and the commitment of the young, though tempting, has proven to be a challenging test for partisans. The likelihood of bringing Catholics or southern whites back into the Democratic fold does not appear promising—and the prospects for recapturing union households or regular churchgoers appear only a tad more favorable.

If neither party gains a more dominant support coalition, the volatility in outcomes typical of the 1990s may continue for some time. Greater voter independence and a close partisan balance may characterize American party politics into the future.