I. Whether the undefined statutory language, “intangible right of honest services,” in 18 U.S.C. § 1846 is unconstitutionally vague.

II. Whether the undefined statutory terms, “fictitious sale” and “not a true and bona fide price,” in 7 U.S.C. § 6e(a) are unconstitutionally vague.

ITI. Whether the government’s criminal prosecution of petitioner for insider-trading under 7 U.S.C. § 9(1) and 17 C.F.R. § 180.1 — the first such prosecution in the United States — violates due process because ordinary people were not on fair notice at the time of the charged offense that § 9(1) and § 180.1 made insider-trading in the commodity futures context a criminal offense.

IV. Whether the criminal prosecution of petitioner under § 9(1) and § 180.1 violates the separation-of-powers doctrine because (1) Congress may not constitutionally delegate to an executive agency the power to define what primary conduct is subject to criminal liability and (2) § 9(1) does not provide an intelligible principle for delegation of legislative authority to define criminal conduct to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

When Congress amended the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FFDCA”) in 2004 to permit emergency use authorization of certain experimental drugs in a declared emergency, they did not forget to include the right of informed consent. However, since 19388, the FDCA has required that all actions under the FDCA shall be in the name of the United States. The Ninth Circuit in this case, and all other courts to have considered the issue, reject private enforcement of an individual right to informed consent for KUA authorized experimental drugs. QUESTION: May an individual bring a lawsuit via 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for violation of his right to informed consent to the administration of an EUA experimental drug or device?

Whether the District Court or the Court of Appeals should have granted a certificate of appealability when the issue in habeas is the ineffectiveness of counsel in failing to contest a search conducted in flagrant violation of this Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, even though the illegality was previously decided in a civil and not criminal context.

1. DESPITE THE RECORD SHOWING THAT PETITIONER IS FACTUALLY INNOCENT OF DISTRIBUTING MORPHINE, DID THE SECOND CIRCUIT ERR IN AFFIRMING THE DISTRICT COURT’S FINAL JUDGMENT: TO DENY PETITIONER’S CLAIM?

2. DID THE SECOND CIRCUIT ERR BY DISCOUNTING PETITIONER’S NEW EVIDENCE OF HIS 2010-DIAGNOSED TRAUMATIC INJURY CALLING INTO QUESTION HIS 1994-1995 MENTAL COMPETENCY WITHOUT AN . EVIDENTIARY HEARING AND INSTEAD AFFIRMING THE DISTRICT COURT*S RULING TO DENY PETITIONER’S CLAIMS BASED ON AN OVERLAPPING 18 YEAR DELAY? | ~

3. DID THE SECOND CIRCUIT ERR BY AFFIRMING THE DISTRICT COURT’S ADVERSE JUDGMENT BASED ON PETITIONER’S 18 YEAR DELAY IN FILING HIS CORAM NOBIS CLAIMS WITHOUT CONSIDERING THAT HIS CHALLENGE TO HIS 1995 DISTRIBUTION OF MORPHINE CONVICTION | COULD NOT HAVE ACCRUED UNTIL 2014 AT WHICH TIME PETITIONER’S DRUG CONSPIRACY :GASE CONVICTION BECAME FINAL AND ONLY THEN COULD PETITIONER SATISFY ALL THREE REQUISITE PRONGS OF THE CORAM NOBIS REMEDY?

4. DID THE SECOND CIRCUIT ERR BY FAILING..TO FULLY ADDRESS OR RESOLVE EACH OF PETITIONER’S RAISED CLAIMS BELOW? |

5. DESPITE PETITIONER HAVING EXPUNGED:HIS PRIOR STATE CONVICTIONS DRASTICALLY REDUCING HIS 1995-IMPOSED MANDATORY GUIDELINES SENTENCE, DID THE SECOND CIRCUIT ERR BY FAILING: TO CONSIDER WHETHER PETITIONER’S SENTENCE SHOULD BE REDUCED?

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1. Procedural due process violation of Hobb‘s administrative review act 28 U.S. Code Chapter 158 — orders of federal Agencies. The third circuit court denied reviewing final order of deportation of the immigration judge that the judge openly used suppression of material evidence submitted to court by a social worker hired by the immigration court. The error was affirmed by the board of Immigration appeal (BIA) without a fair trial of a

| suppressed document in their possession.

2. The third circuit court denied reviewing suppression of material evidence by the immigration judge affirmed by board of Immigration appeal when it is clearly beyond reasonable doubt that the immigration judge used suppression which is inconsistent with supreme court previous decision on suppression of material evidence of a plaintiff. See United States v. Bagley | |

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A jury returned a general verdict finding Tawhyne M. Patterson, Sr., “guilty” of violating 18 U.S.C. §924(o0) where only one of the two predicate offenses alleged to support that firearms conspiracy charge was legally valid. A divided panel of the Eighth Circuit affirmed the conviction, finding the instructional error, though plain, did not affect Patterson’s substantial rights. The question presented is:

Whether the Eighth Circuit erred in determining the two alleged predicate offenses were “so inextricably intertwined that no rational juror could have found Patterson… possessed firearms in relation to one predicate but not the other.”

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Law enforcement officers have long been tasked with learning “what is required of them under Fourth Amendment precedent” and conforming “their conduct to these rules.” Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 241 (2011). This principle undergirds the rule of law and determines when law enforcement may not invoke an exception to the exclusionary rule. But not in Oklahoma.

In 2017, before McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 8. Ct. 2452 (2020), the Tenth Circuit held in a published, binding opinion that the Muscogee (Creek) Nation had not been disestablished and Oklahoma state authorities could not assert jurisdiction over the reservation for murder cases. Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir. 2017). The Circuit nevertheless excused Oklahoma law enforcement’s continued assertion of jurisdiction in a suspected murder on the reservation in 2018. The Circuit found that law enforcement acted in good-faith reliance on its historical assertion of jurisdiction because the Circuit had stayed the mandate in Murphy until 2020.

The questions presented are:

1. Does staying a mandate affect the binding nature of an appellate court’s published opinion that has not been vacated or reversed?

2. Does longstanding law enforcement practice, override binding precedent, and thus receive protection from the good-faith reliance exception to suppression?

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1. Whether the government may deprive citizens of their Second Amendment rights because they were previously convicted of a non-violent crime.

2. Whether the government’s prosecution of petitioner under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) based on his non-violent prior convictions violates the Second Amendment.

3. Whether application of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) to petitioner violated the Commerce Clause where the only proof of a nexus between his firearm possession and interstate commerce consisted of the fact that the firearm had crossed a state line at some point before coming into petitioner’s possession.

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Petitioner Lakeith Lynn Washington was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) to 180 months of imprisonment, despite the fact that the indictment never charged, no jury ever found, and he never admitted that he incurred three qualifying convictions committed on separate occasions. Although this conviction was initially affirmed by the court of appeals, this Court granted Petitioner’s prior petition for certiorari, vacated the prior opinion of the court of appeals, and remanded the case to the court of appeals for reconsideration in light of Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024). On remand, however, the court of appeals applied the harmless error test from Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 25 (1999), and again affirmed.

Mr. Washington asks whether, as several courts of appeal have held, all Apprendi errors including Erlinger violations should be treated as trial errors subject to the harmless-error test from Neder, or, whether, as the Third Circuit has held, at least some Apprendi errors should be treated as sentencing errors and evaluated under the harmless-error test from Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308 (1991)?

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9). Did the litigant here establish the requirements for Equitable Tolling? (1). He | has been pursuing his rights diligently. (2) Some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way and prevented timely filing? _ 3). In Tolling a Statue of Limitation, is it an unreasonable request? Especially, when the untimely filing is no fault or doing of the litigants. | | List of Parties Chat Lowe, Pro Se, Petitioner . V. | Palm Tran et al, Respondents : |

Questions Presented To The Court

Issue 1:

ls A Defendant Considered To Be Given A Full And Fair Consideration Of A 4th Amendment Claim

At Both “Trial” And “Direct Appeal” As Required By Stone V. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) If Trail And

Appellate Counsel Failed To Raise The Issue, Forcing A Defendant To Raise The Issue For The First

Time Pro Se In A Post Appeal Relief From Judgment Motion That Was Ruled On The Merits Only Once

By Trial Court And Then Denied Leave Or Denied A Review Of The Merits In Every Following State | And Federal Court? |

Was There Probable Cause To Arrest The Defendant Without A Warrant; And Was The Identification Evidence And Testimony Given By The Victim Thomas Jackson At Trial Fruits Of A | Poisonous Tree? | | Issue II:

Was The Defendant Denied Effective Assistance Of Counsel When:

Defense Counsel Failed To Move For Suppression Of Pretrial Photographic Identification | From Complainant Thomas Jackson On Grounds Of The Identification Being Direct “Fruit” Of An

Illegal Arrest In Violation Of Defendant’s State And Federal Constitutional Protections? Appellate Counsel Failed To Bring The Above Issues Forth On Direct Appeal; As They Are Stronger Than The Claims Raised? ’ 7 Issue III: Was Petitioner Denied His State And Federal Constitutional Rights To Fair Trial By The Trial Judge, Who Permitted Witness Against Co-defendant Lepper Only To Testify In Tne Presence Of Petitioners Separate Jury?

Dajavan Speaks is a gainfully employed young man with a singular non-violent underlying conviction for gun possession. A victim of a prior drive-by shooting, he had a readily understandable self-defense interest at the time of his arrest for the underlying conviction and his current conviction. His best friend was killed at that time and he and his cousin were injured. He has no juvenile criminal record, no gang affiliation, no drug convictions, was not subject to supervision or a restraining order at the time of his arrest. He had never been charged with using a gun in any way, only with the possession of one. He challenges the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as applied to him, and the questions presented are as follows:

1. Is § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional as applied to an individual when he was a victim of a drive by shooting and has been convicted of a non-violent predicate offense, completed his sentence, and is not under supervision?

2. Whether a certificate of appealability should be issued to examine whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), as applied in this instance, violates the Second Amendment when reasonable jurists could disagree with the District Court’s decision?

RELATED PROCEEDINGS United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania: United States v. Dajavan Speaks, No. 2:22-cr-00154-MAK (Mar. 28, 2024) United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit: United States v. Dajavan Speaks, No. 24-1968 (Feb. 20, 2025) 1

: In Kemp v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 1856 (2022), a “mistake” under Rule 60(b)(1) is held as inclusive of a judge’s errors of law, per the text, structure and history, for relief. The question presented is: .

2. Whether the same Rule 60’s subparagraph (b)(3) also authorizes relief for a district court’s “misrepresentation” or “fraud.” |