The Fourth Circuit refused to compel arbitration because it applied a rule of Maryland law that re- quires arbitration provisions, unlike any other con- tractual term, to contain thelr own unique exchange of consideration. The question presented 1s:

Does the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2, permit courts to apply a heightened consideration standard solely to contractual arbitration provisions?

1. Whether the Indiana courts below violated Peti- tioner’s Fourteenth and Seventh Amendment rights by barring her from pursuing a common law cause of action against third-party tortfea- sors, where the tortfeasors are a separate and 1n- dependent corporation and its employee.

2. Whether the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibits the lower courts from rely- ing upon a judicial fiction in creating “joint em- ployer” status simply because separate and dis- tinct sibling subsidiary entities are owned by the same corporate parent.

1. Did the refusal of the Indiana state courts to enforce the Petitioner’s rights as unambiguously stated in the Settlement Agreement between the parties infringe Petitioner’s rights to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, or the Contract Clause?

2. Did the Indiana Court of Appeals’ application of only an abuse of discretion standard of review to the trial judge’s construction of the parties’ contract further erode the protections afforded by these federal constitutional guarantees?

January 6, 2021. The questions presented are:

(1) Whether compelled public disclosure _ of politically sensitive information, including compelled statements regarding political beliefs, motivations, and associations, in response to public records requests, violates the First Amendment constitutional right to anonymous political expression and association.

(2) Whether Petitioners’ First Amendment interest to proceed in litigation anonymously justifies their use of pseudonyms in a litigation seeking to preserve that very interest in anonymity.

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This Court’s precedent is clear that federal courts “should generally not depart from the usual practice under the Federal Rules on the basis of perceived policy concerns.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212 (2007). May federal courts implement an uncodified special report procedure that divests pro se prisoner litigants of discovery rights afforded them under the Federal Rules and improperly supplants Rule 56 summary judgment procedures in order to manage litigation brought by inmates alleging violations under §1983?

1. Should a writ of habeas corpus issue when a bailiff reinstructed the jury ina criminal trial by directing it to continue deliberating until 1t reached a verdict, and the instruction occurred ex parte outside the presence of the defendant and his lawyer and, therefore, deprived him of counsel at a critical stage of the trial in clear violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, because (1) this Court has repeatedly held that the deprivation of counsel at a critical stage of a trial is presumptively prejudicial, and (2) in Remmer v. United States, this Court concluded that ex parte communication with a jury is presumptively prejudicial and deserves an evidentiary hearing?

2. Should a writ of habeas corpus issue because the Wisconsin Court of Appeals failed to follow Anders v. California and concluded that petitioner did not deserve appointed counsel for his appeal, solely because his appeal “lacked arguable merit,” when Anders and later cases required the Court of Appeals to conclude that the appeal not only had “no merit” but also would be wholly frivolous? Stated another way, though the Wisconsin Court of Appeals never explained its conclusion and, in fact, articulated its conclusion in terms Anders forbid, the Seventh Circuit found this nevertheless met Anders and constitutional standards.

At its base root; this case involves a Real Estate and Bankruptcy Fraud racket OPERATED BY select members of the Pennsylvania judicial elite that includes the State Governor. In order to protect this racket; the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit wildly departed from the accepted and usual course of proceedings from all 13 Federal Appellate Courts, including its own in which Justice Alito ruled on the precedential case as a then- 3 Circuit Judge.

Without the intervention of THIS MOST SUPREME OF COURTS, this

Real Estate and Bankruptcy racket, which has the blatant ability to hide the attempted murders of those exposing it, will continue to operate with impunity against the interests and safety of the Citizens of the United States.

The Question Presented:

Is a Real Estate and Bankruptcy Fraud racket operated by the Pennsylvania Judicial Elite, aided and abetted by the Pennsylvania Federal Middle District and the Federal Third Circuit Court of Appeals, a compelling enough reason for THIS COURT to grant review?

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After Michael Bell’s death warrant was signed, a key witness, Henry Edwards, recanted his trial testimony and admitted that he had not witnessed Bell commit the murders. Then, a second key witness, Charles Jones, recanted his trial testimony and admitted that Bell did not confess to him and that he did not see Bell with the murder weapon. Both witnesses said they lied at Bell’s trial, at the behest of the lead detective and the prosecutor, due to coercion and threats and in exchange for undisclosed leniency. Despite the extreme limitations of the 32-day warrant period, Bell found a number of other trial witnesses who corroborated the recanting witnesses’ claims of coercion and threats by law enforcement and some of these witnesses also changed important parts of their trial testimony. Bell was granted an evidentiary hearing.

At the hearing, the State and judge warned the witnesses that they may be prosecuted for perjury for saying anything that contradicted their trial testimony. Predictably, the witnesses took the 5th. The judge also permitted the witnesses to assert nearly blanket Fifth Amendment privileges when challenged about what they had recently told Bell’s investigators. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that Bell did not prove that his case had been tainted by lying witnesses, witnesses with credibility issues, and police and prosecutorial misconduct. This case presents the following question:

Does the Petitioner’s execution violate the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution when the conduct of the government and the trial court interfered with Petitioner’s ability to present evidence in warrant litigation?

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