INTRODUCTION This case presents a grave and unavoidable question: whether the United States Supreme Court remains committed to enforcing the Constitution as written, or whether constitutional fidelity has been subordinated to political expediency, public policy optics, and undisclosed influences over judicial outcomes. Despite multiple petitions documenting lower courts’ deliberate distortions of controlling Supreme Court precedent — most notably Brushaber! and now Moore? — this Court has repeatedly denied certiorari without explanation. The courts below, emboldened by this silence, continue fabricating doctrines in open defiance of binding Supreme Court authority. At stake is not merely Petitioner’s right to due | process, but the structural integrity of constitutional governance itself. If lower courts may freely misrepresent, invert, or ignore Supreme Court rulings without correction, and if certiorari review is withheld not for want of merit but for fear of political disruption or financial consequences, then constitutional enforcement collapses into a selective, outcome- driven facade. This Petition demands a sober reckoning with these realities. It seeks enforcement of this Court’s own precedents, and an answer to the 1 Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916) | 2? Moore v. United States, No. 22-800 (2024)

In Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 585 U.S. 878 (2018), this Court held that public-sector employees have a First Amendment right to decline to pay dues to public-sector unions. Unions and recalcitrant states have been trying to circumvent that decision even since. This case provides a striking example. Under Washington law, if an employee authorized the state to deduct union dues from her wages in the past, the state must continue deductions unless and until the union informs it that the employee has revoked her authorization. And unions go to great lengths to prevent employees from effectuating such revocations. Here, petitioner mailed revocation forms to unions on behalf of employees, but the unions refused to open mail bearing petitioner’s logo or an associated return address—and continued to ask the state to deduct dues from the nonconsenting employees. Petitioner sued the unions under 42 U.S.C. §1983 to vindicate both the employees’ Janus rights and its own rights to associate with those employees and communicate on their behalf. But the Ninth Circuit held that petitioner has no remedy for those constitutional violations because the unions purportedly did not act “under color of state law” when invoking the state’s aid to seize objecting employees’ wages. That decision renders Janus nugatory, conflicts with this Court’s state-action precedent, and entrenches a circuit split.

The question presented 1s:

Whether public-sector unions that invoke the aid of state officials to deduct union dues from a nonconsenting public-sector employee act “under color of law” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. §1983.

This petition arises from the Ninth Circuit’s ruling on remand from this Court in Slack Technologies, LLC v. Pirani, 598 U.S. 759 (2023). The petition presents two questions. The first is one this Court granted certiorari to decide, but did not resolve, in Slack. The second is a question of surpassing practical importance to the administration of the nation’s securities laws in the aftermath of the Court’s decision in that case and implicates a circuit conflict on the standards for allocation of burdens of proof generally.

1. Whether Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 requires plaintiffs to plead and prove that they bought shares registered in the offering for which the defendant filed a misleading prospectus.

2. Whether courts should apply a_burden- shifting regime to determine whether the shares the plaintiff bought were registered in direct listing cases, where registered and unregistered shares are simultaneously issued to the public pursuant to a single registration statement.

Two Commerce Square 2001 Market Street Suite 3420 Philadelphia, PA 19103 (215) 496-0300

Counsel for Petitioners

Under the general maritime law of maintenance and cure, what standard governs the award of punitive damages where a vessel owner provides maintenance and cure that is later determined to have been insufficient? And, did the Court of Appeals below err in applying that standard?

Did the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit err in overturning the factual findings of the District Court and holding that Petitioner Boat Santa Rita II, Inc. breached its duty to provide cure and acted in a manner warranting punitive damages under the general maritime law?

| violates the Constitution? | 3. Whether there is a deprivation of 14” Amendment equal protection rights when there are State Supreme Court Designated Retired Judges appointed by the State Supreme Court to preside over a Plaintiff’s Circuit Court Case, without the _ consent of the Plaintiff, relative to the issue of equal judicial capability and : competency in judging cases as those Plaintiff’s who have Judges presiding who have been duly appointed by the legislature to currently serve. 4. | Whether judicial immunity covers a judge’s administrative conduct, when the judge’s conduct deprives a Plaintiff of their constitutional rights? | i

1. Whether an individual’s probation or supervised release status categorically strips them of Second Amendment protection under 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢)(1), or whether courts must apply Bruen’s historical analysis to determine if the specific predicate offense historically justified disarmament, as required by the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Diaz?

2. Is the lifetime ban on possession of firearms by all felons, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), plainly unconstitutional on its face under Bruen because it is permanent and applies to all persons convicted of felonies?

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Section 841(a) of Title 21 of the United States Code makes it “unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally–(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.” The question presented is:

Does the simultaneous possession of one type of controlled substance in two different locations constitute a single offense under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)?

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’ References Appellate Case: 24-3437 Date Filed: 12/05/2024 Entry ID: 5463070. Statutory provisions Is the first and the fourteenth Amendment meaningless in the Constitution for a Citizen of United States with Rule 41 argument? Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988);

Spencer v. Doe, 139 F. 3d 107 - Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit 1998; Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 US 136 - Supreme Court 1987. Ts the first and the fourteenth Amendment meaningless in the Constitution for a Citizen of United States? Sherbert v. Verner, 374 US 398 - Supreme Court 1963; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); ; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944). Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 98 (1884); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). Page 2 of 34

Whether the existence of a pre-removal felony conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) 1s an element of an enhanced offense that must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted during a defendant’s guilty plea.

DIRECTLY RELATED PROCEEDINGS United States v. Nunez-Cardenas, No. 2:22-cr-00206-DC-1 (W.D. Tex. April 5, 2024) United States v. Nunez-Cardenas, No. 24-502938 (5th Cir. April 14, 2025) 1

The Confrontation Clause prohibits trial testimony that relays an absent declarant’s out-of-court “inculpating statements.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 65 (2004). When the prosecution asserts that an inculpating statement is being used for a purpose other than its truth and the trial court issues a limiting instruction, the statement remains barred by the Confrontation Clause unless its admission is necessary to the trial’s “truth-seeking function” and there are “no alternatives” to using the inculpating statement. Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 415-17 (1985).

Petitioner Patrick Reed was convicted of drug-possession charges in state court. At trial, a police officer testified that a confidential informant said that “Mr. Reed concealed narcotics” on the roof of a six-person residence. Mr. Reed never had the chance to confront the informant who accused him of committing a crime. But the prosecution asserted that the inculpatory statement was being used to explain the course of the officer’s investigation to the jury, and the trial court issued a limiting instruction to that effect—even though a non-incriminating statement would have equally explained the course of the officer’s investigation. A divided Sixth Circuit panel denied Mr. Reed’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

The question presented is:

Whether, as three circuits hold in conflict with the Sixth Circuit, clearly established law prohibits an officer’s testimony about an absent declarant’s expressly incriminating statements for the asserted reason of providing background context about an investigation.

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Twenty-two-year-old Christopher Spreitz was sentenced to death in 1994 by a trial judge who heard only cursory mitigating evidence and refused to consider or give effect to Mr. Spreitz’s lifelong struggle with alcohol because it lacked a causal relationship to his crime. The Arizona Supreme Court, independently reviewing the sentence, similarly excluded that evidence from its review in agreeing a death sentence was appropriate.

The lawyer appointed to represent Mr. Spreitz in post-conviction review (PCR) identified significant mitigation evidence his trial counsel had failed to discover, including dozens of witnesses, but the PCR Court ruled that none of that evidence would have affected the sentence, largely because it, too, lacked a causal nexus with the crime.

In federal habeas proceedings, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the Arizona Supreme Court had unconstitutionally excluded non-nexus evidence from its review and ordered Arizona to resentence Mr. Spreitz or cure the error. The Arizona Supreme Court undertook to cure the error by itself re-weighing the evidence, but in doing so it restricted itself to the facts and the law in the trial record. While the court recited the rule that mitigating evidence need not be causally connected to the crime, it repeatedly stated that non-nexus evidence was inherently entitled to little weight.

This petition presents the following questions:

1. Whether in conducting independent sentencing review to cure a constitutional error in a capital case, a court must consider all of the evidence in the record in light of contemporary knowledge and standards;

2. Whether the constitution forbids creating categories of mitigating evidence entitled only to minimal weight absent an undefined “causal nexus” to the offense.

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Under Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 9380, 948-44 (2007), the phrase “second- or-successive” as used 1n 28 U.S.C. 2244, does not apply to every habeas petition (in that case, a competency-to-be executed claim) filed after an initial petition. In Tompkins v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 557 F.8d 1257, 1260 (2009), the Eleventh Circuit limited Panetti’s scope only to competency-to-be-executed claims; reasoned that any violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), necessarily ripened at trial regardless of when it was uncovered; and held that a second-in-time Brady claim must therefore be raised 1n a second-or-successive § 2244 petition. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals denied Bell’s Petition for Initial Hearing En Banc to reconsider its decision in Tompkins.

Petitioner’s initial habeas petition was dismissed without a merits ruling. He discovered, through due diligence and after his death warrant was signed, the factual predicate of a Brady/Giglio violation.

The following question is presented:

Where government action prevented Petitioner from bringing his claims

under Brady and Giglio in his initial § 2254 motion, should a second-in-

time motion asserting those claims be deemed non-successive under this

Court’s analysis in Panetti?

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