The First Amendment protects soliciting and contributing funds to support a political candidate based on his or her intended policies. To avoid chilling this core First Amendment activity—or exposing routine campaign donations to selective prosecution— the Government must satisfy a heightened standard when it seeks to treat an otherwise-lawful campaign contribution as an unlawful bribe. It must prove an “explicit” quid pro quo agreement, with an official act conditioned on a campaign contribution. McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991).

The question presented 1s:

When the government alleges bribery based solely on lawful campaign contributions, may the defendant be convicted based on evidence that is ambiguous as to whether the public official conditioned any official act on the campaign contributions?

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) establishes a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In this case, a Maryland appellate court rejected respondent’s postconviction claim that the State suppressed evidence in violation of Brady ov. Maryland, 373 U.S. 88 (1968), holding that there was not a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been different had the suppressed evidence been timely disclosed to the defense consi- dering the strength of other evidence establishing his suilt. A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit concluded that although the state court correctly articulated applicable federal law, the state court’s application of that law was unreasonable because its written analysis of the evidence was, in the Forth Circuit’s view, insufficiently “nuanced” and “exhaustivel[].” App. 28a, 26a (citation omitted). The question presented 1s:

Did the Fourth Circuit violate AEDPA’s deferential standard by overturning a state-court decision based on the supposed lack of “nuance” and “exhaustiveness’ in the court’s written opinion, rather than the reasonableness of its legal conclusion?

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) prohibits federal courts from granting habeas relief on any claim alleged by a habeas petitioner who challenges a state-court conviction unless (1) the state courts have first been afforded a full and fair opportunity to adjudicate the claim; and (2) the state courts’ rejection of the claim is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, federal law as determined by the holdings of this Court. In this case, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit declared that a series of largely unexhausted and unraised errors it perceived in respondent Jeremiah Antoine Sweeney’s trial “t[ook] this case beyond . . . traditional habeas review” and required relief. App. 22a. The questions presented, which warrant summary reversal, are as follows:

1. Did the Fourth Circuit violate the party- presentation principle by granting federal habeas relief based on putative errors in the state trial proceedings that Mr. Sweeney never alleged?

2. Didthe Fourth Circuit improperly circumvent AEDPA’s exhaustion requirement by applying a “special circumstances” exception derived from Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952), and Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129 (1987), that AEDPA eliminated and that has no applicability beyond the unique circumstances of those cases, as other courts of appeals have concluded?

3. Did the Fourth Circuit flout the AEDPA merits standard by granting federal habeas relief in the absence of clearly established federal law as determined by the holdings of this Court?

It is a “rule of federal constitutional law” that in “cases raising First Amendment issues,” appellate courts must “make an independent examination of the whole record in order to make sure that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.” Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984); see also, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 239 (1968).

The question presented 1s:

May state appellate courts refuse to conduct independent First Amendment review based on state- specific appellate practices, as three states have held, or does the independent review obligation supersede such state rules, as other states have held?

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David Lynn Richards, Jr., a business owner and minister who has always maintained his innocence, was wrongfully convicted of sexually abusing one of his adopted children, A.M.R. The trial court described this as a “close case” and found both A.M.R. and Mr. Richards credible, but the jury found him guilty, having heard damning one-sided expert testimony which allowed the State to argue that Mr. Richards’ semen was in A.M.R.’s bedroom and he “wiped” their iPhones to hide evidence. After trial, Mr. Richards retained new counsel who learned the State’s DNA expert resigned in lieu of termination for falsifying records; new counsel also presented experts who explained that Mr. Richards’ semen wasn’t found, the source of the semen could have been canine, his phone was re-set while 1n police custody, A.M.R.’s phone was re-set while she had access to it, and A.M.R. suffered from significant mental health disorders. Tennessee courts denied relief, reasoning that no one claim would have changed the outcome, no “cumulative error” existed because no individual errors were proven, and no greater in camera review of confidential materials was warranted. The issues are: (1) Do Tennessee’s interpretations of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 88 (1968), and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), conflict with this Court’s instruction to conduct holistic reviews? (2) Despite Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 2638 (2014), and Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011), may Tennessee courts defer to counsel’s uninformed decisions? (3) Should the Court clarify when Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 410 U.S. 39 (1987), permits in camera review and disclosure?

After this Court re-interpreted the Aggravated Identity Theft statute in Dubin v. United States, 599 U.S. 110, 132 (2023), Petitioner was factually innocent even though he had pled guilty before Dubin was decided. But the Second Circuit barred Petitioner from appealing the invalid plea, relying on a waiver entered by Petitioner’s /awyer without Petitioner’s knowledge. The Second Circuit opined that waiving the right to challenge guilt under a reinterpreted statute is a strategic and tactical matter within counsel’s discretion.

The first question is whether permitting lawyers to decide for their clients whether to challenge pleas under reinterpreted law contravenes their clients’ due process and Sixth Amendment rights to decide for themselves whether to plead guilty.

The Second Circuit split with the Fourth Circuit, which refuses to enforce appeal waivers if there 1s a colorable claim of actual innocence, applying the principle that it avoids complete miscarriages of justice.

The second question is whether an appeal waiver is enforceable where a defendant did not make a knowing and voluntary choice to plead guilty and where enforcing it will leave someone in jail for a crime that they did not commit.

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I, Whether or not the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has

denied Matthew Phillips procedural due process by denying leave for Phillips to file a second or successive habeas petition when Phillips has no adequate or effective remedy for the protection of a fraudulently suppressed right? | It, Whether or not 28 U.S.C. $ 2244 is denying Phillips equal , protection of the law as 28 U.S.C. § 2255 offers Federal prisoners a gateway for execution of sentence through 28 U.S.C. § 2241, but, Since Phillips is a state prisoner, he is held subject to second or successive bars of 28 U.S.C. § 2244 WHICH DO NOT challenge the conviction NOR the imposed sentence, BUT ONLY the execution of the sentence, to-wit: the way the sentence is being carried out? } IIIT. Whether or not the Respondents have committed Deceptive and Fraudulent Acts on Matthew Phillips, as well as a suspect class of . ALL Alabama prisoners convicted, sentenced, and whose crimes occ- urred between the years 1969 and 2015, by SUBVERTING a State Created Liberty Interest in donating BLOOD to the American Red Cross to recieve a thirty (30) day deduction in the aggregate sentence once yearly, of which Phillips would have done every opportunity HAD THE RESPONDENTS PERFORMED THEIR DUTIES ACCORDINGLY, BUT INSTEAD the Alabama Courts and Officials have protected the Respondents when it is proved they intentioaally and willfully suppressed a state created liberty interest and subverted our Constitutions and Government by BRAINWASHING Phillips to LOOK NO FURTHER THAN THEIR RULES, REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES, thus denying and depriving Phillips of due process by notice to receive good time and now Phillips is receiving ex post facto punishment through no fault of his?

(i)

I, Whether or not the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has

denied Matthew Phillips procedural due process by denying leave

for Phillips to file a second or successive habeas petition when

Phillips has no adequate or effective remedy for the protection )

of a fraudulently suppressed right?

II, Whether or not 28 U.S.C. § $2244 is denying Phillips equal protection of the law as 28 U.S.C. § 2255 offers Federal prisoners a gateway for execution of sentence through 28 U.S.C. § 2241, but, since Phillips is a state prisoner, he is held subject to second or successive bars of 28 U.S.C.$ 2244 WHICH DO NOT challenge the

conviction NOR the imposed sentence, BUT ONLY the execution of the |

sentence, to-wit: the way the sentence is being carried out? ,

III. Whether or not the Respondents have committed Deceptive and

Fraudulent Acts on Matthew Phillips, as well as a suspect class of

ALL Alabama prisoners convicted, sentenced, and whose crimes occ-

urred between the years 1969 and 2015, by SUBVERTING a State Created

Liberty Interest in donating BLOOD to the American Red Cross to

recieve a thirty (30) day deduction in the aggregate sentence

once yearly, of which Phillips would have done every opportunity

HAD THE RESPONDENTS PERFORMED THEIR DUTIES ACCORDINGLY, BUT INSTEAD

the Alabama Gourts and Officials have protected the Respondents

when it is proved they intentioaally and willfully Suppressed a

state creatéd Liberty interest and subverted our Constitutions and

Government by BRAINWASHING Phillips to LOOK NO FURTHER THAN THEIR

RULES, REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES, thus denying and depriving

Phillips of due process by notice to receive good time and now

Phillips is receiving ex post “Gy punishment through no fault of his? : |

: misidentification using an incorrect Social Security Number, and suppression of exculpatory evidence constitute fraud on the court warranting relief under _ Rule 60(b) (4).

4. Whether appellate courts must provide reasoning. when denying review of structural jurisdictional and | } constitutional claims involving dismissal and fraud.

, 8. Whether a district court’s denial of a stayed and never-reopened § 2255 petition violates jurisdictional limits and due process protections under 28 U.S.C. §

2255 and Article III. . .

1. Whether the Bail Reform Act of 1984 (“BRA”) is facially unconstitutional, and/or unconstitutional as-applied to Petitioner in this case based (individually or collectively) on the BRA’s: (a) lack of a maximum duration on pretrial detention which results in arbitrariness and inconsistencies as to pretrial

, release in federal courts throughout the country, (b) lack of any requirements relative to a minimum standard of conditions and amenities to prevent pretrial detainees from being subject to conditions worse than sentenced federal prisoners and thus amounting to pre-conviction punishment, and (c) lack of an unqualified

right of periodic review of whether continued detention is appropriate? , i

1. The question presented is whether the District Court had jurisdiction of this suit under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act.

2. Whether The Attorney General, exercised his discretion under the § 914.22(1)(a) Fla. Stat., to make individualized determinations of inadmissibility under an unconstitutional state statute of conviction, and

3. Whether the Immigration judge and ICE officials exercised this broad discretion under the statutes and regulations under an unconstitutional state statute of conviction no stated in “the Notice to appear” and if it will be remanded to determine whether petitioner was afforded due process.

1. Whether the administrative law principles articulated in Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558 (2019), limit the deference owed to the United States Sentencing Commission’s commentary on the Sentencing Guidelines?

2. Whether Mr. Elwell’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢)(1) 1s plainly unconstitutional under the Second Amendment in light of New York State Rifle Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)?

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In this case, the district court held a hearing at which it revoked Corbett’s term of supervised release and imposed a term of imprisonment as a result. It did not, at the hearing, impose any future term of supervised release. A day later, the district court sua sponte convened a second hearing, explaining that its failure to impose a new term of supervised release had been a mistake and adding a two-year term of supervised release to Corbett’s sentence. The question presented in this Petition is whether Rule 35(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure allowed the district court to reopen its final, imposed sentence in such a manner.

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Violating three EEOC guidelines, the Interim Provost of a large University

categorically denied blatant (audio-taped) disability discrimination that

occurred in the workplace. On that basis he upheld the job consequences that resulted from the disability discrimination to which the Plaintiff was originally subjected.

1. Should an employer at a large institution be allowed to deny, and thereby uphold, disability discrimination that blatantly occurred in the workplace? ,

2. Should an employer be permitted to justify discrimination in the workplace by further imputing false disabilities to an employee?

3. Should an employer at a large institution be exempted from following EEOC guidelines that protect employees from severe discrimination and resulting job consequences?

4. Would not a ruling that exempts employers from their EEOC-mandated responsibility to prevent and correct discrimination in the workplace have nationwide consequences?

Would not such a ruling reduce institutional vigilance regarding occurrences of discrimination, and would it not reduce an institution’s motivation to prevent and respond supportively to victims of discrimination? Would not such a ruling result in discrimination becoming more rampant?

5. Would not a Court ruling that directly contradicts EEOC guidelines seriously undermine the EEOC’s credibility and purpose? Would not such a ruling betray the EEOC’s purpose?

6. Would not a ruling that exempts employers at large institutions from their EEOC-mandated responsibility to prevent and correct discrimination enable employers to more easily cover-up discrimination in order to save their institution from public embarrassment and reductions in federal funding? Should such institutional gain be permitted even when it occurs at the expense of the users of that institution (aka “Institutional Betrayal’)?

7. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit very recently ruled against Dykman. On the other hand, two EEOC investigators supported key tenets of Dykman’s appeal. Can these conflicting decisions be harmonized by the Supreme Court?

8. EEOC-CVG-1999-2 states that an employer is vicariously liable for acts of discrimination committed by lower supervisors. If it takes a year or

In Ruan v. United States, 597 U.S. ___ (2022), this Court answered the question on whether a physician alleged to have prescribed controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice could be convicted of unlawful distribution under 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1) regardless of whether he “reasonably believed” or “subjectively intended” that his prescriptions fell within that course of professional practice. This Court ruled that the crime of prescribing controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1), requires that the defendant “knowingly or intentionally” acted in an unauthorized manner.

The question presented for review in this Petition is whether the Fourth Circuit unconstitutionally applied the plain error standard to affirm Dr. Naum’s conviction where the court admitted and agreed that the jury instructions misstated the law after Ruan v. United States; jury instructions which failed to consider Dr. Naum’s subjective intent. The Fourth Circuit’s ruling completely disregarded the basic tenets and purpose jury instructions. Jury instructions affect juror decision- making by providing guidance on the evidence presented and play a critical role in shaping how jurors evaluate evidence. Nonetheless, the efficacy of jury instructions depends on factors such as timing, content, and jurors’ psychological tendencies. In this case, where the district court precluded the admission of the very evidence to support Dr. Naum’s subjective intent, no “plain error’ can exist when the district court precluded Dr, Naum from introducing the medical standard upon which he based his subjective suboxone prescribing practice.

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