1. Whether the Seventh Amendment and 42 U.S.C. §1981la(c)(1) guarantee a jury trial when a_ plaintiff seeks compensatory or punitive damages for retaliation under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, precluding a district court from striking a timely jury demand and conducting a bench trial.

2. Whether a district court’s grant of summary judgment on ADA _ discrimination and accommodation claims—despite genuine disputes of material fact—and its later factual findings that the employer’s “restriction-free” return-to-work rule violated the ADA, demonstrate the kind of credibility-laden disputes that Rule 56 and the Seventh Amendment reserve for a jury, requiring reversal.

3. Whether the Sixth Circuit violated Federal Rule 52(a)(6) and the Seventh Amendment by affirming a bench judgment that rested on credibility determinations a jury should have made after the district court erroneously denied Petitioner his jury right.

1. This Court has never applied the obvious case exception to qualified immunity’s second prong in the Fourth Amendment context. Although the Court has recognized its potential application, it has repeatedly cautioned against its use on an excessive force claim. Despite this, the Ninth Circuit applied the obvious case exception to reverse the grant of summary judg- ment in Deputy Matthew Farney’s favor on Respond- ent’s Fourth Amendment excessive force claim. Did the Ninth Circuit err in defining the qualified immun- ity right at issue too broadly by holding this was an “obvious” case?

2a. The Ninth Circuit holds that when there is only a single surviving officer witness to a deadly force encounter, it “must also look at the circumstantial evidence that, if believed, would tend to discredit the police officer’s story, and consider whether this evid- ence could convince a rational factfinder that the officer acted unreasonably.” Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994). Did the Ninth Circuit err in requiring a higher degree of scrutiny for a defendant officer’s unopposed sworn testimony at summary judgment when he is the only surviving witness to a deadly force encounter despite the defendant officer not having the burden of proof at trial?

2b. Even assuming a higher degree of scrutiny is appropriate, did the Ninth Circuit err in holding that purported discrepancies in an officer’s testimony cre- ated an issue of material fact sufficient to disregard the officer’s sworn testimony on why force was neces- sary even though those discrepancies did not address the officer’s decision to use deadly force?

(i)

A. QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW Whether this Court should reevaluate its decision in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), and hold that twelve-person juries are constitutionally mandated in criminal felony cases — or at least in cases that involve a_ potential punishment of life

imprisonment.

Title 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) mandates that in imposing sentence, a district court “shall” impose a sentence that is “sufficient but not greater than necessary” to comply with identified sentencing purposes, and that in determining the particular sentence, the court must consider certain enumerated factors including, as relevant here “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). In assessing whether such unwarranted disparities exist, however, courts have largely rejected comparisons grounded in the only evidence readily available to defendants, that is, statistics compiled by the United States Sentencing Commission and written opinions detailing the offense conduct and sentence received by other defendants convicted of similar conduct. Further, several courts have held that if a sentence falls within the advisory guideline range, it by definition avoids unwarranted sentencing disparities. As a result, § 3553(a)(6)’s directive to sentencing courts to avoid unwarranted disparities offers defendants an ulusory guarantee of fairness and appellate oversight.

The questions presented here are:

Is a sentence that falls within the advisory guideline range categorically one that does not create unwarranted disparities among defendants with similar records who have been convicted of similar conduct? As a corollary, what evidence must a court consider 1n reviewing whether a sentence creates unwarranted

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However, how these agreements are interpreted lacks uniformity in the federal

appellate courts. In this case concerning a breach of a plea agreement, the court of

appeals strictly limited its review to the “four corners” of the agreement. This approach departs from those of other courts of appeals who do not so limit their review of the plea agreement and instead consider the parties’ conduct and expectations.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether a court should only look at the “four corners” of the plea agreement language when determining whether a breach of the plea agreement occurred; as opposed to also looking at circumstances and events outside of the four corners that are relevant to the reasonable understanding and expectations of the agreement?

2. Weather the Fifth Circuit’s newly established “four corners” doctrine, led to a deprivation of due process of the Petitioner because a reasonable person in his position would have thought the plea agreement for his drug case covered his conduct surrounding a sex trafficking case?

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Dated: July 16, 2025 Respectfully submitted, s/Tony Faryar Farman Tony Faryar Farman Counsel for Petitioner Marlin L. Royal l

I. Did the Prosecution Proved Beyond a Reasonable Doubt that the Shooter Premeditated and Deliberated an Attempted Murder?

II. Did the Trial Court Deprive Tyler of Due Process and a Fair Trial by Failing to Instruct with the Lesser Included Offense of Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter?

III. Did the Prosecutor Commit Prejudicial Misconduct During Closing Argument; Did Trial and Appellate Counsel Render Ineffective Assistance?

IV. Did Trial and Appellate Counsel Render Ineffective Assistance (Claims I-ITI)?

V. Did the Cumulative Effect of the Errors in Claims I- III Deprive Tyler of Due Process and a Fair Trial?

VI. Did the Trial Court Err by Failing to Sua Sponte Instruct the Jury on the Affirmative Defense of Others?

:

1. The government’s theory was that Holder sold drugs to someone who days later sold drugs to someone who later sold drugs that caused decedent’s death. The question is whether it is inconsistent with Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014) to hold someone responsible for that death pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) who falls anywhere in the chain of distribution.

2. The government charged Holder with conspiring with six named individuals to distribute a counterfeit substance containing fentanyl. The government also charged Holder’ with distribution of fentanyl] resulting in serious bodily injury. Holder was not convicted of those charges. The question is whether the Circuit Court misapplied fundamental constitutional law by