The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Thompson permitted reconsideration of previously settled issues, thereby endorsing the district court’s departure from principles of finality and equitable restraint.

The sole question presented is:

Whether the Sixth Circuit’s decision—issued after the reassignment of the district judge and marked by an egregious misreading of this Court’s holding in Thompson—should be vacated, and the case remanded with instructions to enter judgment in Petitioner’s favor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, consistent © with the district court’s favorable termination finding. :

This Petition raises several questions of federal law:

Where a property owner has its building permits revoked by a government agency on false pretenses and in violation of state Due Process law, is that property owner entitled to have its 42 USC 81988 claim for relief and its claim for relief that its property was an illegal taking in violation of the United States Constitution heard in federal court?

Where a federal district court judge abstains from hearing the matter under the Pullman abstention doctrine, and sends the matter to state court is the plaintiff forever barred from returning to federal court even though it was denied a full and fair hearing in state court judicial proceedings?

Where the state court judge denies a federal plaintiff the right to perform discovery, to admit highly relevant evidence of the government’s wrongful revocation of its building permits does federal law still hold that the plaintiff had a full and fair hearing to deny its right to have its case tried in federal court?

Where very high powered national and local politicians contact the administrative board behind the scenes to revoke the building permits sufficient to prove that the property owner was denied its right to build the property it had earlier been approved to build?

Is the England reservation made by Plaintiff in state court the permissible manner to protect its rights to return to federal court contrary to the Ninth Circuit opinion?

Carolyn Jackson fully completed her sentence of 40 months’ incarceration plus supervised release. More than four and a half years after being released from prison, and a year after completing her sentence in full, she was resentenced to an additional 100 months of incarceration.

The question presented 1s:

May the government, consistent with the Double Jeopardy Clause and Due Process Clause, enlarge a criminal defendant’s sentence and recall her to prison after her initially imposed sentence has been fully served and she has returned to society?

ALLIANCE DEFENDING JAMES A. CAMPBELL

FREEDOM CAROLINE C. LINDSAY

15100 N. 90th Street VINCENT M. WAGNER

Scottsdale, AZ 85260 ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM

Rory T. GRAY 44180 Riverside Pkwy

CHLOE K. JONES Lansdowne, VA 20176

ALLIANCE DEFENDING

FREEDOM

1000 Hurricane Shoals Rd.

NE, Suite D-1100

Lawrenceville, GA 30043

Whether the First, Second, Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth Courts of Appeal have misinterpreted this Court’s opinion in Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 391-92 (1993) by emphasizing one factor—“the reason for the delay”’— over all other factors in contrast to the conclusions of the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh, and DC circuits which disagree with the primacy of that factor, with the result that the notice of appeal filed one day late by a white male police officer who took FMLA to help his father out in his business and who received no remuneration for the same, and who was terminated in retaliation for doing so, was precluded from being heard on the merits by the Fourth Circuit resulting in the affirmation of the summary judgment decision by the district court.

QUESTION PRESENTED Whether it is unlawful for a court to impose sex offender registration as a condition of supervised release for a non-qualifying offense, and to enforce an appellate waiver to bar review—where circuits are divided on whether such waivers preclude challenges to plainly unlawful sentencing conditions—thus allowing the Eleventh Circuit, as an outlier, to shield ultra vires

registration requirements from scrutiny.

An FBI report found that the funds stolen in internet scams were usually “sent directly to a financial institution … which directly contributed to the increase in global exposed losses.” This case involves a question of national importance in which the courts of appeal have diverged: when does a financial institution bear responsibility for the loss when it allows scammers to use a custodial account to abscond with stolen funds. Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Article 4A governs fund transfers. Section 4A-207 imposes liability against a financial institution when it “knows” that an incoming deposit is a misdirected transfer but fails to return it.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether “know” in UCC § 4A-207 imposes a due diligence standard as the Eleventh Circuit and several district courts have held, or whether it requires actual knowledge by an employee, as the Fourth Circuit held below. And if the district court applied the wrong standard, did the Fourth Circuit abuse its discretion by not remanding to allow the district court to apply the correct standard?

2. Whether UCC § 4A-207 allows the defrauded party to file a claim against the financial institution, as at least one district court has held, or whether it imposes a “privity” requirement, as the Fourth Circuit held below. And even if § 4A-207 requires privity, did the Fourth Circuit abuse its discretion by considering a privity argument that was never made in district court or in the appellant’s opening brief, which if timely raised could have been cured by joining the party in privity?

This case presents the same question that 1s before the Court in Rutherford v. United States, No. 24-820 (cert. granted June 6, 2025), and Carter v. United States, No. 24-860 (cert. granted June 6, 2025). For all the reasons set forth in the petitions in Rutherford and Carter, this Court should hold this case pending final resolution of those cases.

The question presented 1s:

Whether, as four circuits permit but six others prohibit, a district court may consider disparities created by the First Step Act’s prospective changes in sentencing law when deciding if “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 8582(c)(1)(A)Q).

Whether a military reservist, who was lawfully ordered to engage in remedial fitness training without pay and points, and suffered injury, was on inactive- duty training status while performing ordered military training within the meaning of 10 U.S.C. $ 101(d)(7)(B) and, therefore, entitled to disability retirement.

Under Sections 9 and 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act, a party may apply to confirm or vacate an arbitra- tion award. But federal courts have limited jurisdiction over Section 9 and 10 applications. In Badgerow v. Wal- ters, 596 U.S. 1, 4, 9-11 (2022), this Court held that a fed- eral court may exercise jurisdiction only if the application establishes diversity or federal-question ju- risdiction on its face. A federal court may not exercise jurisdiction merely on the basis that the underlying dis- pute, save for the arbitration agreement, would have been justiciable in federal court. See id.

But what happens when a court initially exercises ju- risdiction over the underlying dispute, stays the case pending arbitration, and is later faced with an applica- tion to confirm or vacate an arbitration award in the same case? The courts of appeals have sharply divided on the appropriate jurisdictional analysis. Several courts of appeals, including the Second Circuit below, have held that the initial exercise of jurisdiction creates a “jurisdictional anchor” that confers jurisdiction over a subsequent Section 9 or 10 application to confirm or va- cate, even if jurisdiction would otherwise be absent. By contrast, the Fourth Circuit has held that a court must establish an independent basis for jurisdiction over a Section 9 or 10 application to confirm or vacate.

The question presented is:

Whether a federal court that initially exercises juris- diction and stays a case pending arbitration maintains jurisdiction over a post-arbitration Section 9 or 10 appli- cation where jurisdiction would otherwise be lacking.

Circumstances. A federal jury convicted Brock Beeman of mailing three threatening letters to a prosecutor and an investigator who were involved in an earlier criminal proceeding against him, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876(c). Beeman appealed that conviction, challenging, inter alia, the district court’s admission of a subsequently mailed fourth, uncharged, threatening letter under alternative theories of intrinsic res gestae evidence or under Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 404(b). United States v. Beeman, 135 F.4th 139, 143 (4th Cir. 2025). The Fourth Circuit upheld the district court’s determination that the fourth letter was admissible res gestae evidence, and also upheld the district court’s alternative finding that the fourth letter was admissible under FRE 404(b). Despite acknowledging that the fourth letter “escalated the threat to kill others besides the investigator and to blow up all sorts of property” Id. at 146, the Fourth Circuit failed to meaningfully weigh the question of whether its expanded threats were unfairly prejudicial, merely concluding instead that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Jd. at 147-148. This Court should grant certiorari to determine whether some analysis of underlying facts 1s appropriate before an appellate court concludes that there was no abuse of discretion.

Question for Review. Did the Fourth Circuit err in upholding the district court’s conclusion that an uncharged threatening letter was not unfairly prejudicial under an abuse of discretion standard without first evaluating the underlying facts and district court justification, or lack of justification, for its ruling?

1

The questions presented are:

(1) Does the Double Jeopardy Clause prevent a defendant who has fully completed his sentence from being sentenced again to additional punishment for the same crime?

(2) Does the Due Process Clause prevent a defendant who has fully completed his sentence from being sentenced again to additional punishment for the same crime?

QUESTION ONE .

Does the record support the state appellate court’s holding that substantial : evidence supported a finding that petitioner used force to overcome Jane Doe Two’s a will and rape her by repositioning her body and inserting lubricants to maintain her unconscious state? : 7 | | QUESTION TWO a

Does the record support the state appellate court’s holding that substantial evidence supported a finding that appellant used force to continue sodomizing Jane

| Doe One when she woke up while he was sodomizing her in her sleep?

“However, contrary to the district courts determination, “Widmyer [also] could properly challenge the District court’s finding of procedural default in a Rule 60(B) motion. Explaining that a movant Rule 60(B) does not raise “a new habeas corpus claim, or attack [] the federal courts previous denial of the claim on the merits, when he ‘merely asserts that a previous Ruling which precluded a merits determination,” such as” a denial for…procedural default, “was erroneous. Accordingly, the district court erred by declining to consider that argument under Rule 60(B).

2. Is there a Autonomy Right to assert claims in a Habeas proceeding, where under the state habeas statues,! “both” the “habeas petitioner,” and habeas counsel have to raise all claims.

If this is obstructed does this obstruction rebut the presumption of correctness under § 2254 (e) (1)?

• in Losh, it holds that both the Habeas petitioner, and habeas counsel must raise all claims, petitioner asserts, this rebuts the presumption of correctness cumulatively when obstructed by errors in both state court and errors by the Federal Court.