1. This Court holds a defendant’s right to plead : gulty knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently in highest regard and comes back to it once every | decade. Bousley v. US, 523 U.S. 614 (1998) is a monumental case in those series. Yet, district courts and federal circuits are split as to whether a district court has “discretion” to grant, or withhold from, a criminal defendant the very fundamental due process rights discussed in Bous/ey. Does a district court — or any court to that matter — have such discretionary authority?

2. After this Court’s decision in US v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954), the circuits diverge in defining and applying the Coram Nobis_ jurisdictional requirement of “civil disability.” Some circuits say even the need to clear one’s name satisfies this requirement. Others require substantially more. And in some courts, as in this petitioner’s case, the district court acknowledged existence of a genuine on-going “elvil disability” but denied jurisdiction under Coram Nobis per its discretion. Which one of these three approaches is_ correct determination of “civil | disability” for Morgan and Coram Nobis purposes.

3. In Bousley, this Court instructed that in order to show “actual innocence” after a _ retroactive substantive ruling from this Court, a former criminal defendant has to show they are actually innocent of “more serious charges.” Post Bous/ey, the circuits have diverged drastically; some _ circuits have expanded this plain text to both “equally serious” and “more serious’ charges. In some others, such as the petitioner’s case, the district court entirely refused to | take on Bousely’s analysis (comparison of seriousness of forgone charges) and called it discretionary. Which | one of these three approaches is correct application of

| Bousley?

Respondents moved for summary judgment on

_ Petitioner’s claims. Respondents supported some of their factual assertions regarding a debt account with declarations. The declarations were prepared specifically for this lawsuit. The declarations were signed by Respondents’ custodian of records who asserted that her statements were based on her review of Respondents’ business _ records. Respondents did not produce the business records that the custodian of records had supposedly reviewed. Petitioner disputed those facts. The district court accepted Respondent’s declarations under the Federal Rules of Evidence 803(6) and 803(7) exceptions to hearsay for business records, relied on the facts asserted therein, and granted Respondents a summary judgment on Petitioner’s claim. The 7 Seventh circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling.

The Seventh circuit ruling is in conflict with this Court’s holding that “The affidavits do not qualify as traditional official or business records.” Melendez- Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 321 (2009). It is also in conflict with the Tenth circuit ruling in United States v. Harper, 118 F.4th 1288 (10th Cir. 2024) involving a similar situation. 3

The question presented 1s:

Whether the district court erred or abused its discretion when, at summary judgment, it accepted declarations asserting hearsay facts—supposedly derived from business records—under the Federal Rules of Evidence 803(6) and 803(7) exceptions for business records, even though the business records from which the declarant claimed to have derived those facts were never produced and not in evidence.

(“Leviathan”) and both parties alleged that the other

breached the contract. The parties engaged in

arbitration before a single arbitrator in Michigan. The arbitrator issued a Partial Final Award and a Final

Award. The District Court, for the Eastern District of

Michigan (“District Court”), the confirmed the Final

Award, but disregarded the Partial Final Award. The

arbitration Partial Final Award provided that Delco

receive any outstanding deliverables. By entering the

Final Order and disregarding the Partial Final

Award, Delco walked away from the arbitration with

nothing, while the Defendant received its benefit of

the bargain. The questions presented are:

1. Whether the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (“Sixth Circuit”) erred by not remanding to the District Court to order Leviathan to provide all outstanding contract deliverables to Delco; and

2. Whether the Sixth Circuit erred by not remanding to the District Court to order the invalidation of the award of attorney fees, siven that the motion for fees and costs did not comport with Michigan law.

Whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied the wrong standard to the admission of perjured testimony that the government knew to be perjured, when it applied a “reasonable likelihood” standard instead of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard required by this Court in Glossip v. Oklahoma, 145 8. Ct. 612 (20285).

In Agins v. City of Tiburon, this Court suggested in a footnote that “extraordinary delay” plays a central part in temporary takings cases. 447 U.S. 255, 263, n.9 (1980), abrogated on other grounds by Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 529 (2005). The Agins footnote has metastasized into a multifactor test—involving the duration of the delay and the government’s motives—that courts routinely (but inconsistently) apply in temporary takings cases. The decision below deepened a split among state and federal appellate courts on both questions presented:

(1) Whether the extraordinary delay test applies in a retrospectively temporary taking, which involves a once permanent taking that is later cut short by judicial invalidation, legislative repeal, or other events.

(2) Whether the absence of extraordinary delay categorically defeats a takings claim, regardless of other relevant considerations such as impact on economically beneficial use or interference with investment-backed expectations.

The supremacy of federal law and the Supreme Court’s authority in resolving conflicts between federal and state law are well established:

e State courts are subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and _ federal government. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1798).

e “The Supremacy Clause demands that state law yield to federal law…The importance of the Supreme Court’s role as the final arbiter of federal constitutional questions requires that state courts adhere to this Court’s ruling[s].” Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-1041 (1983).

The Appellate Court of Maryland, following binding state law and precedents, affirmed the Baltimore County Circuit Court’s application of heightened pleading standards, that required stating a prima facie case at the pleading stage and dismissed the pro se plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim.

The question 1s:

“Whether a_ state courts application of heightened pleading standards to federal Title VII claims, beyond those required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) and by this Court, violates the Supremacy Clause by undermining the uniform enforcement of federal civil rights and depriving plaintiffs of access to federal remedies based on forum selection.”

This case presents two important questions that impact countless

defendants and have divided circuit judges.

After Gerald Campbell pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a

firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the district court determined, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that his prior offenses qualified as different

occasions under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)

(“ACCA’’), and accordingly sentence him to serve a mandatory minimum

sentence of 15-years’ incarceration.

After Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024), the Sixth Circuit

agreed that the district court erred by making the occasions-different

finding itself, but found the error was harmless by relying upon Shepard’ documents presented at Mr. Campbell’s sentencing.

Multiple judges in the Sixth Circuit have questioned whether applying

harmless-error review to E£rlinger error comports with the Sixth

Amendment. And, the circuits are divided as to the proper analysis in a

guilty plea case, should harmless-error review apply.

The questions presented here are:

(1) Does the unique ACCA occasions-different inquiry, requiring a detailed, multi-factored analysis of the facts surrounding at least three prior offenses—facts which are not intrinsic to the elements of § 922(¢)(1)—tender Erlinger error structural?

(2) If harmless-error review applies to a fully preserved Erlinger error, what is the proper test when the defendant pleads guilty to only the lesser offense under § 922(g)(1)?

These are questions of exceptional importance, and this case presents an

ideal opportunity for the Court to provide much-needed clarity.

’ As defined in Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005). ll