The Fifth Circuit erred when they decided that the United States Government’s failure to take actions outside of the United States did not jeopardize the Petitioner’s Right to a Speedy Trial as guaranteed under the 6th Amendment and the Speedy Trial Act (18 U.S.C. § 3161(b)).

The whistleblower protection provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires courts to apply the two-step burden-shifting framework set forth in the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (““AIR-21”). 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C).

Under AIR-21’s two-step framework, an employee first bears the burden of proving his protected activity “was a contributing factor in the unfavorable personnel action alleged in the complaint.” 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(@1). +~Even if he makes this first-step showing, the employer will not be held lable if it “demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that [it] would have taken the same unfavorable personnel action in the absence of’ the protected activity. 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(Qiv). This second-step showing is known as the employer’s same-action affirmative defense.

In Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC, 601 U.S. 28, 38 (2024), this Court instructed that “[t]he right way to think about” the employer’s same-action affirmative defense is to ask “whether the employer would have retained an otherwise identical employee who had not engaged in the protected activity.” (Citation modified).

The Question Presented is:

Under AIR-21’s two-step framework, can evidence showing an employee’s protected activity was a contributing factor in the unfavorable personnel action at step one discredit the employer’s separate same-action affirmative defense at step two?

In the criminal trial of Jessica Salazar, the prosecutor placed repeated emphasis on Ms. Salazar’s request for a prayer. It was the first line of the prosecution’s opening statement, and it was repeated many times in its closing. The Ninth Circuit held on de novo review this was no error—that prayer is evidence of a suilty mind.

This case presents grave concern regarding an individual’s right to religious freedom: What place, if any, does an individual’s religious belief have in a criminal case? Because the Ninth Circuit diverged from the circuit courts on this important question, this Court should grant certiorari and resolve the issue.

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Section 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) imposes a permanent, lifetime prohibition on possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of any crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year. Petitioner Jessie Bullock had a prior felony conviction from 1992 for which he served at least 15 years in prison. He was charged with violating § 922(¢g)(1) after he possessed a firearm in his home for protection. The question presented is whether the statute comports with the Second Amendment, either facially, or as applied to individuals with decades old prior convictions who have not been shown to be currently dangerous and seek to possess a firearm in the home for self-defense.

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1. Whether a state court’s prolonged failure to rule on timely filed child support modification and enforcement motions—despite irrefutable financial documentation, statutory entitlements, and procedural compliance—constitutes a violation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

2. Whether state court judicial officers and court-appointed agents, who knowingly deny a domestic violence survivor access to her awarded property (home proceeds, retirement, and child support), can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 4983 for actions taken under the color of law.

3. Whether denial of relief based on jurisdictional misstatements by a court commissioner acting without stipulation violates fundamental fairness and justifies a change of venue under federal due process standards. . .

4. Whether the Court should clarify that First Amendment protections prohibit retaliatory labeling of a litigant as “vexatious” for challenging judicial misconduct and requesting enforcement of orders already entered. |

5. Whether California’s Anti-SLAPP statute, CCP § 425.16, and U.S. Supreme Court precedent require priority review of motions designed to protect petitioners from retaliatory litigation when lower courts delay or ignore such motions. 3

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However, how these agreements are interpreted lacks uniformity in the court of appeals. In this case concerning a breach of a plea agreement, the court of appeals strictly limited its review to the “four corners” of the agreement. This approach departs from those of other courts of appeals who do not so limit their review of the plea agreement and instead consider the parties’ conduct and expectations. The questions presented are:

1. Whether construction of a plea agreement’s terms is limited to review of the agreement’s language and cannot take into consideration circumstances, such as the parties’ conduct and expectations, outside the agreement’s terms?

2. Whether the examination of circumstances outside the “four corners’ of the plea agreement should be conducted to establish what a defendants’ reasonable expectation of the scope of the plea agreement’s terms?

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Next Term, this Court will resolve a significant dispute among the federal Circuit Courts of Appeal: “Whether and how courts may consider the cumulative effect of multiple IQ scores in assessing an Atkins claim.” Hamm v. Smith, No. 24- 872, 2025 WL 1603602, at *1 (June 6, 2025) (order granting certiorar1). Byron Black’s IQ scores on gold-standard, individually administered objective measures (57, 67, 69, 73, and 76) all fall within the range of scores that meet the criteria for intellectual disability. Nevertheless, contrary to prevailing clinical standards, lower courts have cherry-picked group-administered tests scores found in his scant two pages of school records to deny him relief. The debate over the proper weight to be accorded to these various test scores gave rise to the decision in Black v. Carpenter, 866 F.3d 734 (6th Cir. 2017). This 2017 decision in Mr. Black’s case is in direct tension with the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Hamm. The Petitioner in Hamm relied on Mr. Black’s case to demonstrate the cert-worthiness of his question. Meanwhile, Mr. Black obtained new evidence proving that prior decisions rejecting his Atkins claim are legally and factually erroneous—including the fact that the state’s key expert now admits that Mr. Black meets current medical standards for the diagnosis of intellectual disability.

Tennessee law provides an avenue to correct such errors via a motion to recall the mandate. Mr. Black attempted to avail himself of this state-created right to establish his ineligibility for the death penalty. The Tennessee Supreme Court refused to permit him access to this process by relying on decisions which are premised on legal analysis that conflicts with this Court’s decisions in Hall v. Florida; 572 U.S. 701 (2014), Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 805 (2015), and Moore v. Texas, 586 U.S. 1838 (2019).

The Question Presented is:

May a lower court deprive a death-sentenced prisoner his liberty

interest to access a state-created procedure designed to correct injustice

by refusing to apply controlling federal precedent?