This case implicates multiple acknowledged circuit splits as to how the categorical approach should apply to 18 U.S.C. § 21138, the federal bank robbery statute. Petitioner was convicted of one count under § 2113(d), based on an attempt to commit a violation of § 21138(a), and a second count under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The first paragraph of § 2113(a) provides that, “[w]hoever by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take, from the person or presence of another, or obtains or attempts to obtain by extortion any property or money’ belonging to a bank, shall be cullty of a crime. The circuits have split 5-1 as to whether this provision is divisible. And the circuits have further split 4-3 as to whether attempted bank robbery is a crime of violence under § 924(c). Section 2113(d) complicates things even more. It punishes anyone who, “in attempting to commit, any offense defined in subsection[] (a)… assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device.” The circuits have divided over the elements necessary to sustain a conviction under this subsection as well.

The question presented 1s:

Whether attempted armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2118(d) and the first paragraph of § 2113(a) involves the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of force” in all possible hypothetical circumstances, such that it qualifies as a crime of violence under § 924(c).

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3588(d), a district court must impose mandatory conditions of supervised release and may impose additional conditions so long as they are (1) “reasonably related” to the sentencing goals of deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation and (2) “involve[] no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for those goals. The U.S. Sentencing Commission recommends several “standard” conditions that are routinely imposed on all federal defendants who are placed on supervised release. U.S.8.G. § 5D1.3(c). The standard conditions include a ban on communicating or interacting with anyone the defendant knows is currently “engaged in criminal activity.” Jd. at (c)(8). But they also include a ban on associating with anyone the defendant knows “has been convicted of a felony’—no matter what the felony or how long ago it was committed—unless permission is granted by the probation officer. Id. This ban covers between 20 and 25 million people in the United States with past felony convictions who work, parent, caregive, hold public office, vote, serve on juries, and contribute to our society every day. And for many defendants, like petitioner Dahryl Reynolds, the ban includes family members, friends, neighbors, mentors, and casual acquaintances they interact with every day. Violating the ban can lead to reincarceration.

The question presented is: Whether the standard condition banning association with all past felons is “reasonably related” to the goals of deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation, and “involves no greater deprivation of liberty than 1s reasonably necessary” for those goals as required by § 35838(d).

1