This case presents a question that the Closing Orders for Dow Corning breast implant Settlement Facility and its Program, issued by the District Court and affirmed by the Sixth Circuit, and the Respondent’s Motion to terminate funding and to terminate the Settlement Facility without a proper notice to the foreign claimants including the Korean claimants is such constitutional that those were not a violation of due process. The foreign claimants including the Korean claimants have not received any notice of the Closing Orders when each Order was issued and further did not receive a notice of status of their claims when the Order granting the Motion to Terminate was issued. Whether the District Court can approve the bankruptcy chapter 11 debtor, Dow Corning Corporation’s Motion to terminate funding and to terminate the Settlement Facility without paying to the Korean claimants without proper notice is a question.

This case presents a question that when the foreign claimants participated in a United States class action, the class action was developed into a chapter 11 bankruptcy, and the foreign claimants decided to participate into the settlement program under the Reorganization Plan, the foreign claimants must follow the address update and confirmation requirement which was never provisioned in the Plan documents but established by the District Court’ Orders regarding their address update and confirmation requirement pursuant to the debtor’s mere request. The Korean claimants rather followed the address update and confirmation requirement and submitted their address updates but the Settlement Facility denied them in accordance with its internal rules. The postal service of

The Federal Trade Commission’s (F’TC’s) Telemar- keting Sales Rule (TSR) makes it an “abusive telemarket- ing act or practice” for a telemarketer to “[iJnitiatle] any outbound telephone call” to a person whose number ap- pears on the National Do Not Call Registry. 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)Gii)(B). The TSR defines “outbound tele- phone call” to mean “a telephone call initiated by a tele- marketer to induce the purchase of goods or services or to solicit a charitable contribution.” Jd. § 310.2(x). Viola- tions of the TSR give rise to substantial civil monetary penalties.

In this case, petitioners were held liable for millions of violations of the TSR, and jointly and severally hit with a $28.7 million civil penalty, for allegedly initiating “out- bound telephone calls” to individuals on the National Do Not Call Registry. It is undisputed that the accused phone calls were not initiated to induce the recipients to purchase any goods or services or solicit any charitable contributions. The Seventh Circuit agreed with the FTC, however, that the relevant regulatory definition’s express limitation to calls “to induce the purchase of goods or ser- vices or to solicit a charitable contribution” could be dis- regarded. The court of appeals instead held that, despite the regulatory definition, the calls at issue were “out- bound telephone calls,” and thus violations of the TSR, be- cause they were phone calls placed by telemarketers.

The question presented is:

Whether a telephone call by a telemarketer that is not initiated to induce the purchase of goods or services or so- licit a charitable contribution is an “outbound telephone call” for purposes of the TSR.

I. Canadistrict court properly deny a motion under Rule 60(b)(4), F.R.Civ.P., to vacate a criminal conviction where the motion shows the conviction is void for failure of the indictment to allege all the component essential elements of the offense, and/or void for the failure to instruct the jury on all the component essential elements of the crime charged?

II. Can a district court’s finding of “arguable-basis” jurisdiction overcome a Rule 60(b)(4) Motion showing that a criminal judgment under 26 U.S.C. § 6672 is void for lack of 722 personam or subject-matter jurisdiction?

III. Can the United States pursue a civil action to recover “trust fund recovery penalties” under 26 U.S.C. § 6672 that arose from a criminal conviction where the sentencing court found no actual tax loss and awarded no restitution under 26 U.S.C. § 7202?

IV. Does the Constitutional bar against double jeopardy preclude the United States from pursuing a trust fund recovery penalty under 26 U.S.C. § 6672 if the same actions were already punished under 26 U.S.C. § 7202 and there is no showing that the civil penalty is remedial?

V. Does the five-year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2462 bar the United States from pursuing a trust fund recovery penalty under 26 U.S.C. § 6672 if the alleged trust fund violations accrued over nine years earlier?

All fifty states, the District of Columbia, and federal law make it a crime for a prison official to engage 1n sexual conduct with an incarcerated person, deeming consent legally irrelevant. The question presented is:

Whether the Eighth Amendment, which is interpreted according to “evolving standards of decency,” permits a contrary rule that treats an incarcerated person as capable of giving legally effective consent to sexual conduct with a prison official.

CHRISTOPHER D. WIEST FIRST LIBERTY INSTITUTE CHRIS WIEST, ATTORNEY AT 1331 Pennsylvania Ave. NW

LAW, PLLC Suite 1410 50 East Rivercenter Blvd. Washington, DC 20004 Suite 1280 Covington, KY 41011

Counsel for Petitioners

Whether, after a state supreme court expressly acknowledging that admitting surrogate DNA-analyst testimony violated the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process, that court should not affirm a conviction on the rationale that the error was harmless because the case “turned entirely on the victim’s credibility’—a method of review that (1) conflicts with this Court’s requirement that harmless-error analysis ask whether a rational JURY, not an appellate court, could have reached a different verdict; and (2) 1s outcome-determinative in this and many similar prosecutions that rely on forensic certificates.

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