1. Why didn’t Michigan check into the allegation of intimidation against me by the court officer?

2. How can a judge ignore an objection made by a defendant and then use the basis of this objection to rule against him while in fact violating three amendments.

3. Why wasn’t fraud considered and reviewed by the court?

4. The Supremacy Clause states that federal law supersedes state and local laws. How can Michigan courts use their statues or codes supersede Federal Court case law when the U.S Supreme Court states that statues and codes are not laws?

5S. How can a judge be allowed to violate your constitutional and civil rights?

6. How can Family Court make a ruling on child support when the agency didn’t have jurisdiction?

7. Why did the Michigan courts ignore my right to challenge jurisdiction?

1. Whether state courts may disregard the Americans with Disabilities Act when | adjudicating defamation claims involving disability-related conduct, in violation of the Supremacy Clause?

2. Whether courts and enforcement agencies violate the Equal Protection Clause by failing to recognize or enforce ADA discrimination claims brought by White male plaintiffs, particularly in the context of so-called “tester” litigation. See Ames v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servus., 602 U.S. (2025)

3. Whether employers may use opaque or AI- driven systems to deny effective accommodations under the ADA, or prevent disabled applicants and employees from using advanced technologies, including AI, as a form of accommodation? .

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Senior Airman (SrA) Jaden T. Floyd pleaded guilty to and was convicted of one charge and specification of larceny of military property. The trial lasted one day. SrA Floyd was sentenced the day of his conviction, December 18, 2023. The sentence included a punitive separation, triggering automatic review by the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (Air Force Court). Despite the short nature of the proceedings and knowing the case had to be forwarded to the Air Force Court for review, the Government created a presumptively unreasonable pre-docketing delay on appeal.

During this period of pre-docketing delay, SrA Floyd developed neurological symptoms associated with multiple sclerosis. By the time the Government docketed his case, he was experiencing deficits in memory, had tremors in and spasticity of his upper and lower extremity muscles, and developed scanning speech with dysphonia. SrA Floyd’s ability to assist in his appeal was limited by these symptoms.

SrA Floyd’s first opportunity to demand speedy appellate review with the Air Force Court was at docketing. Although he later asked for additional time post-docketing to finalize his brief to the Air Force Court, SrA Floyd did not contribute in any manner to the pre-docketing delay.

The question presented 1s:

Whether, in evaluating a claim for a pre-docketing due process violation, a court can effectively require an appellant to assert the right to speedy appellate review prior to the docketing of his case on appeal and find no prejudice if an appellant requested and received a post-docketing delay.

In its coming Term, this Court will address occupational speech issues in the pending matter of Chiles v. Salazar (No. 24-539), cert. granted, 145 8. Ct. 13828 (2025).

Meanwhile, at least three other certiorari petitions in cases involving occupational speech are being held pending the decision in Chiles Gncluding Crownholm v. Moore (No. 24-276), 360 Virtual Drone Servs. LLC v. Ritter (No. 24-279), and Hines v. Pardue (No. 24- 920)).

In this case raising similar legal issues as Chiles, the question presented is: whether a_ state occupational licensing board is entitled to apply a lower standard of constitutional scrutiny to speech that is neither commercial nor incidental to conduct simply because the speaker was_ subject to professional licensure.

1. Novel Issue: Is the Actual Innocence Exception to a procedural bar limited t cases | where petitioners are convicted, but actually innocent of crimes that are defined as | offenses by existing statutes; or does the Actual Innocence Exception also apply to cases where petitioners are convicted of innocent acts that are not defined as offenses by statutes that existing at the time the acts were performed, and where there are no statutory “crimes” for which such petitioners could be said to be guilty?

2. Novel Issue: Is a judgment of a State court that is void and non-final, and never | becomes final as a matter of State and Federal Law for want of subject matter jurisdiction, sufficient to trigger the AEDPA deadline for filing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Petitions set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), where the plain language of 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d) specifically bases its one-year limitation on the finality of state-court | judgments? 7 7

3. Apparent Novel Issue: Can the presumption of innocence that extends to every element of an offense, as set out in Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), be rebutted and overcome by the presentation of evidence in a trial resulting in a jury verdict of guilty, despite the fact that there was no crime or offense defined by statute at the time the targeted acts were performed, and thus, no elements upon which to apply the presumption of innocence; or does the presumption of innocence for the non- criminalized acts remain? |

4. Is it repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, and/or laws of the United States for a State to charge and convict a United States citizen, and deprive him of liberty and property, for acts that no statute within the state proscribed the acts for which he was charged, convicted, and deprived of liberty and property, until after the acts were

performed? _ me re

5. Is it a direct or constructive violation of Article I, § 10, Cause 1, of the United States | Constitution, for a State to arrest and indict United States citizens for acts that were innocent when performed for want of statutory proscription, then later try them under one or more newly amended or enacted prospective statutory provisions that criminalize the same acts after they were performed? | |

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1.) Does the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment require public universities to allow accused students a meaningful opportunity to cross examine adverse witnesses when the credibility is central to the outcome, as held by Sixth Circuit, or may universities deny that opportunity to cross examine without violating due process, as held by Third Circuit in this case at hand? .

2.) Are the federal circuit courts split on the proper application of the forfeiture doctrine, with some circuits (including 3rd circuit) strictly barring appellate review of improperly

| preserved constitutional issues, but other circuits allowing flexibility when fundamental rights, constitutional issues and/or plain error are involved?

3.) Does the strict application of the forfeiture doctrine by 3rd Circuit in this case at hand, where 3rd circuit completely barred issues regarding constitutional issues and fundamental rights raised on appeal because the issues were not clearly stated at district court level, conflict with other circuits that allow review of constitutional arguments on appeal that weren’t perfectly preserved? | |

4.) Does the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment require appellate courts to review the denial of judicial recusal where a judge granted summary judgment in favor of a party with whom the judge has a close personal connection, and where other circuits would have required recusal and/or vacated the judgment under similar circumstances?

5.) In cases where the judge’s failure to recuse himself from a case involving a party which he has substantial ongoing ties to, which violates 28 U.S.C 455(a) and litigants 14th

| Amendment Due Process rights, are circuit courts required to bypass forfeiture doctrine and impose sanctions when brought to circuit court’s attention, like many circuits do, or Williams 1

1. Whether the failure of the Tenth Circuit to apply the rule of lenity to 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2)(A) resulted in an interpretation of ambiguous language in the statute that denied Petitioner his right to due process under the 5th Amendment. The statute prohibits engaging in a sexual act with a person incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct, and the phrase “incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct” is ambiguous, as evidenced by different interpretations of similar language in sex abuse statutes from different states. The Tenth Circuit interpretated the ambiguous language broadly and expanded the scope of potential victims to include those who lack the ability to consider the implications of their conduct on others. In so doing, the Tenth Circuit added language not contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2)(A).

1

If a Trial Court admitted into evidence inculpatory statements made by a defendant during the post-interview portion of a polygraph examination, but excluded all evidence relating to the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s inculpatory statements, wouldn’t that deprive a defendant of his fundamental Constitutional right to a fair opportunity to present a defense, both under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and under the Compulsory Process and Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment?

Reynaldo Alberto Pefia Petition for Writ of Certiorari ii

Under Graham v. Florida, the Eighth Amendment “prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sen- tence on a juvenile offender who did not commit hom- icide.” 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010). And Miller v. Ala- bama held that, even in homicide cases, “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that man- dates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” 567 U.S. 460, 479-80 (2012) (emphasis added). The question presented is:

Whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits consecu- tive term-of-years sentences—either mandatory or discretionary—that guarantee a juvenile’ non- homicide offender will die in prison.

(1)

In United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019), a 4-1-4 decision, this Court left undecided the question of how the Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial right applied in federal supervised-release proceedings. Justice Gorsuch, writing for the plurality, recognized that traditional parole and probations systems (where a defendant owes time remaining on a sentence) was fundamentally different from supervised release (where a defendant owes no time)—and that “structural difference bears constitutional consequences.” In dissent, Justice Alito highlighted the unresolved question left in Haymonds wake: whether “the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial applies to any supervised release revocation proceeding.”

That 1s the issue presented here.

_ji-

The supervised-release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), lists factors from 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) for a court to consider when sentencing a person for violating a supervised-release condition. In that list, Congress omitted the factors set forth in § 3553(a)(2)(A)—the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment for the offense. As a result, this Court recently held that courts cannot rely on those § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors when revoking supervised release. See Esteras v. United States, 145 S.Ct. 2031 (June 20, 2025).

The question presented in this case 1s closely related:

Whether courts may rely on the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors when

determining the length and conditions of additional supervision following a

supervised release revocation?

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