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Our American Flag and The Uniform of America’s Police Officers are neutral and impartial visual symbols of blind-justice and equal protection under the law for all people in The United States of America. Never in American History has The Uniform of America’s Police Officers ever been officially desecrated with visible bias, and the last time that uniformed executive officers in America raised a flag against our American Flag, it resulted in the American Civil War.

In consideration of the Respondents’ recent and unprecedented desecration of The Uniform of America’s Police Officers with visible “Lesbian, Gay, Bi-sexual, Transgender, and Queer pride” speech and visible bias, preference, favoritism, prejudice, and segregationist intent; and the related implementation of segregated policing in America; specifically and only for and in favor of those who identify as “Lesbian, Gay, Bi-sexual, Transgender, and Queer” with the explicit exclusion of at least “hetero-sexuals” in particular; can the government deny the plain-text right to “the equal protection of the laws”, as is carried out and executed by the police at all times, seemingly in direct violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of The Constitution of The United States of America?

Can The Uniform of America’s Police Officers be misappropriated and used as a personal billboard and interactive “forum” for biased ideological and

This Court has held for over a century that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right of parents to control and direct the education of their children. But other than protecting the decision to choose private educational options for a child, the Court has not determined what it means to “direct” the education of one’s child. Importantly, this Court has yet to answer directly whether the right to educate one’s child is fulfilled by the choosing of a public or private school—a question over which the circuit courts are split. This case therefore presents two interconnected questions, including one involving a circuit split:

1. Whether the fundamental constitutional right of parents to control their children’s education is limited to the right to select a school—as the court below held—or whether parents continue exercising that right even once they have chosen to send their child to a public school, as the Third Circuit has held.

2. Whether there should be a more generalized clearly established requirement for government employees who have plenty of time to reflect on the constitutionality of their actions than the clearly established requirement that applies to cases involving law enforcement officers making split-second, life-or-death decisions.

1. Whether the Federal Circuit improperly considered government developments that postdate a trademark applicant’s filing to support a refusal under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, despite the applicant’s statutory right to constructive use based on the application’s filing date.

2. Whether the Federal Circuit improperly deferred to the USPTO’s statutory interpretation of Section 2(a) after this Court’s ruling in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, which reaffirmed the judiciary’ duty to independently interpret the law under the Administrative Procedure Act.

3. Whether Section 2(a)’s prohibition against marks that “falsely suggest a connection” is unconstitutionally vague as applied to an intent-to-use trademark application which the USPTO claims references a fictionalized entity that did not exist at the time of filing.

The Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA) preempts state laws related to mo- tor carrier and broker prices, routes, and services. 49 U.S.C. 14501(e)(1). Another provision—commonly known as the “safety exception”—preserves the “safety regula- tory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(2)(A). The question presented is:

Whether a common-law negligence claim alleged against a freight broker, based on the broker’s selection of a motor carrier to provide transportation of cargo, is preempted because it does not fall within the safety ex- ception in Section 14501(¢)(2)(A).

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When applying the plain language of a broadly worded federal criminal statue would intrude on an area historically left to the states, must a court apply the plain language without consideration of the context in which the statute was enacted or the presumption that if Congress intends to usurp authority previously left to the states it must say so explicitly?

This Court has recognized that “li]n the constitutional sense, trial by jury in a criminal case necessarily implies at the very least that the ‘evidence developed’ against a defendant shall come from the witness stand in a public courtroom where there is full judicial protection of the defendant’s right of confrontation, of cross- examination, and of counsel.” Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73 (1965). In Sam Fields’s federal habeas case, a panel of the Sixth Circuit found Gn unison with the Sixth Circuit’s prior decisions) that this Court’s general rule, as stated in Turner and other cases of this Court, qualified as clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) “AEDPA”). Accordingly, Fields was entitled to a determination of whether the state court’s decision in his case—regarding the jury’s consideration of physical evidence that did not come from the courtroom—was an unreasonable application of this general rule.

But during en banc review, a majority determined that this Court “abrogated” the prior Sixth Circuit decisions by subsequently interpreting § 2254(d)(1) to exclude general or abstract rules from qualifying as clearly established Supreme Court law. The majority further concluded that the rule was not a holding of Turner or any other Supreme Court case for the purposes of AEDPA. As a result, Fields no longer was entitled to a determination of whether the state-court decision unreasonably applied this Court’s rule.

This Court subsequently issued Andrew v. White, 145 S. Ct. 75, 78 (2025), in which this Court ruled that a similar circuit court decision finding that the general or abstract rule at issue there could not satisfy AEDPA’s “clearly established law” requirement was “wrong.” The Court ruled that § 2254(d)(1) does not exclude abstract or general principles from qualifying as clearly established law, and when this Court relies on a legal rule or principle to decide a case, that principle is a holding of this Court for purposes of AEDPA. This Court remanded the case to the circuit court for a determination of whether the state-court decision unreasonably applied this Court’s general rule.

Less than 30 days after this Court decided Andrew, Fields requested the Sixth Circuit to recall its mandate on the ground that Andrew created an exceptional circumstance warranting the recall. In a divided decision, the Sixth Circuit denied the motion. This case thus presents the following questions:

May a subsequent decision of this Court calling into question the correctness

and integrity of a circuit court’s judgment qualify as an exceptional

circumstance justifying a recall of the circuit court’s mandate, and if so, did

the lower court err in denying the motion to recall?

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| 1. The petitioner, Eddie Mekasha, was terminated by Tyson Fresh Meats on } | June 1, 2021, for a misdemeanor related to COVID-19 complications, Oe despite having a history of excellent performance and no prior offenses. d Meanwhile, a coworker with a felony record was rehired. This raises the

question of whether Tyson Fresh Meats’ actions violated the Equal

: | Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) rule against workplace

discrimination under Article 915.002, which prohibits such disparate treatment based on similar circumstances.

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indigent litigants in violation of the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I § 16 of the California Constitution, and of | California’s own other statutory and case law? |

2. May a California appellate court in its final

. decision suddenly, in violation of California law,

: infer waiver of jury trial, a new issue not previously raised by either party or any Court and not allowed to be inferred under California law? 2

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