Harrington v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 603 U.S. 204, 227 (2024) makes clear that: “the bankruptcy code does not authorize a release and injunction that, as part of a [chapter 11] plan … effectively seeks to discharge claims against a nondebtor without the consent of affected claimants.” In this case, the Third Circuit held the opposite: the bankruptcy code does authorize nonconsensual third-party releases as part of a plan insofar as the plan makes the releases an integral part of a 11 U.S.C. §363(b)-authorized asset sale immunized by 11 U.S.C. §363(m). But §3638(m) does not immunize ‘terms of sale’ under ‘a plan’—only “a sale” in fact made “under subsection (b) or (c)” of §363. Other circuits respect these limits.

Judge Rendell condemned the Third Circuit’s decision as a “dangerous transactional precedent.” Judge Rendell would have resolved the case through “equitable mootness’: a problematic judge-invented abdication of jurisdiction unanimously embraced by the circuits but never once reviewed by the Supreme Court despite over 40 years of percolation.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether 11 U.S.C. §363(m) applies to asset sales under reorganization plans—and if so, whether §363(m) 1mmunizes Purdue-forbidden releases.

2. Whether “equitable mootness” exists—and if so, whether it shields unauthorized practices.

Under Ex parte Young, sovereign immunity poses no barrier to suits against state officials when a plaintiff “al- leges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective. Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (cita- tion omitted). The circuits have split on the recurring question whether a suit to restore property unlawfully withheld by the state seeks prospective relief to redress an ongoing violation of the law, or whether such a suit seeks retrospective relief to remedy a past violation. Over a dis- sent by Chief Judge Colloton, a divided Eighth Circuit panel below embraced the minority view that a suit seeking to restore unlawfully withheld property is barred by sover- eign immunity, bringing the split in the circuit courts to six to two. The question presented is:

When a suit alleges that state officials are depriving a plaintiff of property in violation of due process, does the suit allege an ongoing violation of the law for which pro- spective relief is available under Ex parte Young?

(i)

Whether evidence was sufficient to justify the district court denial of Rule 29 of the Fed. R. Crim. P. Whether the district court committed reversible error by imposing a procedurally unreasonable sentence

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS The Parties to the Instant Proceedings Are Contained in the Caption of the Case.

The Court has made clear that the district courts have wide discretion to manage their dockets and case load, to schedule trials, and grant or deny continuances. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11, 103 S. Ct. 1610 (1983). But a denial of a request for more time to defend a case can violate the Fifth Amendment rights to due process and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S. Ct. 841 (1964); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446, 60 S. Ct. 321 (1940).

The Court’s precedent establishes that both defendants and the public have an interest 1n a speedy trial. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972). But the Court is equally clear that both defendants and the public have an interest 1n a system that is fair and reliable, which must often come at the expense of haste. Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 89, 129 S. Ct. 1283 (2009); Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 86, 25 S. Ct. 573 (1905). In short, reliability and fairness are more important than the efficiency of a District Court’s docket.

In this case, the District Court gave Petitioner a notice allowing him only 15 days to file pretrial motions. Petitioner’s first counsel filed no pretrial motions in that time. The District Court appointed Petitioner new counsel. Thus, new counsel entered the case after the District Court’s period for filing pretrial motions had already expired. Despite several motions for continuances from both parties, at no time did the District Court allow any additional time for defense motions to be filed. The Government took substantial time to provide new counsel with the discovery that showed grounds for a fourth amendment challenge. But with the pretrial motion already in the rearview mirror, new counsel focused on attempting to resolve the matter through plea negotiations. Only once the plea negotiations surprisingly broke down did Petitioner’s new counsel file a motion for continuance and motion for leave to file a single suppression motion based on a viable fourth amendment challenge.

The circuit majority recognized and listed several of Petitioner’s grounds for seeking leave to file a suppression motion. Nevertheless, the Majority blamed appellate counsel for failing to develop an argument that Petitioner had good cause to file an untimely motion. Pet. App. 8. The Majority reached the merits anyway, putting on blinders to ignore all other factors, and distilling Petitioner’ several good causes down to one—that second counsel “consciously decided” to not file a pretrial motion by the deadline in an attempt to curry favor with the prosecution in plea negotiations.” Pet. App. 8. But no attorney for Petitioner consciously decided against filing a motion by any deadline. First counsel had just 15 days. The District Court refused to extend that deadline. The District Court appointed second counsel after the deadline passed. Moreover, here 1n a system of pleas, rather than trials, the District Court ruling discourages plea negotiation and invites the filing of needless pretrial motions.

The questions for the Court are whether, under these circumstances, the District Court erred in refusing to grant a continuance of trial and leave to file a single suppression motion and whether the Sixth Circuit Majority erred in affirming that decision.

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When performing a comparative analysis to determine whether an alternative means of execution would significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe physical and psychological pain, should the comparison focus only on fear and anxiety experienced after the introduction of the fatal stimulus, such as the years, months, weeks, days, or hours during which an inmate knows that their death will happen?

Does the State of Alabama’s nitrogen hypoxia execution protocol, which causes a human to consciously experience symptoms of asphyxiation (air hunger, shortness of breath, aching lungs, elevated heart rate, blood pounding in the ears, the feeling of conscious suffocation or of being trapped deep underwater) for two to seven minutes, constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment where a feasible and readily implemented alternative exists and where that alternative causes a rapid death in which the inmate feels an impact, shock, and numbness, but not pain?

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