In Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., this Court held that the statutory grounds expressly enumerated in 9 U.S.C. § 10 are the Federal Arbitration Act’s “exclusive grounds” for vacating an arbitration decision. 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008). Two years later, in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., this Court did “not decide whether ‘manifest disregard’ survives our decision 1n Hall Street Associates …as an independent ground for revlew or as a judicial gloss on the enumerated erounds for vacatur set forth at 9 U.S.C. § 10.” 559 U.S. 662, 672 n.3 (2010). Since then, the lower courts have sharply divided on the question this Court left open in Stolt-Nielsen, with six circuits and three state supreme courts holding that manifest disregard remains a valid basis for vacatur and three circuits and two state supreme courts holding that it does not.

In the decision below, the Eighth Circuit ordered an arbitration decision vacated based on the “extra- statutory standard|]” that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law. Pet. App. 12a, 16a.

The question presented 1s:

Whether the Federal Arbitration Act allows a court to vacate an arbitration decision on the ground that the decision was based on a manifest disregard of the law.

Section 101 of the Patent Act provides that “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter” is eligible for a patent. This Court has created judicial exceptions that exclude “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” from the scope of patent-eligible subject matter. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int, 573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014). Relying on these judicial exceptions, the Federal Circuit held Recentive Analytics, Inc.’s patent claims for dynamically generating and updating network maps and event schedules using iteratively trained machine-learning models are directed to unpatentable abstract ideas.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether the Federal Circuit’s approach to patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 flouts this Court’s instruction to consider preemption, as dis- cussed in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International and Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.

2. Whether the Federal Circuit erred in holding that claims directed to the application of machine- learning techniques to new data environments are categorically ineligible for patent protection under Section 101, absent a showing of improvement to the underlying machine-learning model itself.

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1. Whether the Due Process’ Clause requires California appellate courts to review punitive damages awards de novo, as this Court held in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001), or permits review under a deferential “substantial evidence” standard.

2. Whether the Due Process Clause is violated when a court upholds a punitive damages award based solely on statutory “malice” in a case involving purely economic harm, where the award is disproportionate to both the reduced compensatory award and comparable statutory penalties.

| Whether due process is violated when courts treat electronic docket entries as sufficient notice to non-ECF participants, allowing dispositive orders — including a

Chapter 7 trustee’s discharge — to issue without actual notice.

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1. While presided the case in the U. S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, Respondent in a particular Order knowingly, willfully made, created false writing statement, : committed federal crime in order to fault the Plaintiff as Petitioner.

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1001(a)(3), is making, creating false writing statement to fault a

party of a case, any case, as such as Respondent did to Petitioner, not a federal crime?

2. Accordingly and undeniably, Respondent is guilty of a federal crime against Petitioner. However, instead of entitling Petitioner to seek relief in the Court, the Chief judge in the proceedings of the case deprived of the Petitioner’s such right and the right to having the “egual protection of the laws” violating the Fourteenth Amendment? App. 60a. While on the other hand, the Chief Judge inserted various unjust reasons to dismiss case, knowingly not bring the crime

. Respondent committed into consideration. WHY? 3. What was the reason, and why was the Chief Judge of the related U. S. District Court | _ who presided the case complicit with the identified federal criminal as Respondent; silenced Respondent, not removed, not terminated Respondent as the identified federal criminal from the jury of the case, from Office while Petitioner had so requested (see App. 49a, first paragraph) but | still retained the criminal as a judge against Petitioner, placed Petitioner under the authority of that criminal and forced Petitioner to withstand the affects and the unbearable mentality pressures to date? 4. Petitioner in the Notice of Appeal had made known to the Eighth Circuit Court that:

1. When does a record show “that the district court thought the sentence it chose was appropriate irrespective of the guidelines” within the meaning of Molina- Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189, 198, 200 (2016)?

2. Does Anderson’s 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) conviction violate the Second Amend- ment?

3. May Congress criminalize intrastate firearm possession based solely on the fact that the firearm crossed state lines at some point before the defendant possessed it?

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I. In Taylor v. United States, this Court announced a categorical approach to recidivism enhancements in federal sentencing. See 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990). The basic analysis requires an elements-to-elements comparison between a defendant’s prior convictions and the generic offense or offenses singled out for special treatment by a sentencing statute or the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual. Since the test focuses on substance, not labels, “minor variations in terminology” cannot overcome actual correspondence between elements. See id. at 599. Here, the Fifth Circuit relied on Taylor’s minor-variation-in- terminology language to declare irrelevant a substantive difference between Texas robbery and the new Hobbs Act- inspired “robbery” definition from the Guidelines. In Texas, a thief becomes a robber by causing injury to a random passerby during an escape from the scene of an ordinary theft, but the same after-the-fact injury would be insufficient to prove a taking “by means of’ force as required by the Hobbs Act and the Guidelines. To date, no other Court of Appeals has misapplied Taylor’s minor-variation-in-terminology caveat to paper over a substantive mismatch between corresponding elements reaching different types of conduct. The question presented is this: did the Fifth Circuit misapply the categorical approach by dismissing an elemental mismatch as a mere variation in terminology?

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