Petitioners brought this case to challenge the validity of the Court’s ruling in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), that Congress may prohibit the purely local production, distribution, and possession of marijuana that is authorized by state law. A narrow majority held that the Court “need not determine whether” those “activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding,” id. at 22, and that Congress could rationally conclude that those activities would frustrate its goal of eliminating interstate marijuana. Multiple developments have undermined Raich’s rationale and outcome. Following Raich, the Court has applied a more rigorous standard to Congress’s regulation of traditionally local concerns. See, e.g., Natl Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 560 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (holding that the individual mandate was not incidental to interstate regulation). Technological advances have made state-regulated marijuana distinguishable from interstate marijuana, and Congress and the Executive Branch have embraced that distinction with legislation and policies against prosecuting state- regulated marijuana activities. Dozens more states— 38 total—have enacted marijuana programs, and

interstate commerce 1n marijuana has dropped. Question 1: Should the Court overrule Raich’s holding that Congress can regulate purely local economic activity if there is any “rational basis” that

After remand from this Court, Petitioner Efrain Lora was resentenced to thirty years in confinement because he supposedly directed a murder. But the Government conceded that there was in fact no evidence that Mr. Lora directed it, which was carried out by four other individuals sentenced to five, ten, and fifteen years sentences. This case concerns whether a fact conceded by the government can be found by a sentencing judge by a preponderance of the evidence.

The Constitution requires that facts used in sentencing be found by specific actors under specific standards of proof depending on the circumstances to satisfy due process. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 489 (2000); United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156 (1997). And there are serious due process concerns in situations like Mr. Lora’s. See, e.g., McClinton v. United States, 143 8. Ct. 2400 (2023) (mem) (Sotomayor, J., respecting the denial of certiorar1) (discussing acquitted conduct sentencing).

Indeed, the circuits are in conflict over the proper response to facts conceded by the government at sentencing. While the Fifth and Eighth Circuits require sentencing courts to accept those concessions under certain circumstances, the Second Circuit below joined the Eleventh Circuit to hold that courts have no such obligation. The sentencing court below rejected a conceded fact by finding a contrary proposition by a mere preponderance of the evidence.

The question presented is:

Whether a sentencing court must find a_ fact conceded by the government to be untrue by more than a preponderance of the evidence.

In an Assault on an Officer prosecution brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 111, is a mistake of fact jury instruction warranted by virtue of United States v. Feola where an accused is aware of the identity of federal law enforcement officers but where federal law enforcement officers fail to identify their purpose, misrepresent their purpose, attempt to enter a domicile without announcing their purpose, and the accused uses force to prevent an entry into the accused’s domicile?

Whether evidence was sufficient to justify the district court denial of Rule 29 of the Fed. R. Crim. P. Whether the district court committed reversible error by imposing a procedurally unreasonable sentence

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS The Parties to the Instant Proceedings Are Contained in the Caption of the Case.