In McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. 550 (2016), this Court set very clear prosecutorial and judicial standards in criminal proceedings involving bribery associated with an official act. The D.C. Circuit, in its precedential ruling in United States v. Paitsel, 147 F.4th 1010 (CADC 2025), ignored those standards set forth in McDonnell by this Court and therefore created very ambiguous boundaries in this type of matter.

Did the D.C. Circuit err and therefore set forth a dangerous precedent?

Did the D.C. Circuit, through its errors, thereby create a judicial crisis and a dangerous situation within the D.C. Circuit, in addition to a negative influence upon other United States courts of appeals?

Criminal defendants are guaranteed “a meaning- ful opportunity to present a complete defense.” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 689-90 (1986). Yet the states maintain “broad latitude under the Constitu- tion to establish rules excluding evidence from crim1- nal trials.” United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 308, 308 (1998). That latitude 1s curtailed only if the rules are “arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve,” Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55— 56 (1987), or if they “infringe[ ] upon a weighty interest of the accused,” Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308. “Only rarely ha[s] [this Court] held that the right to present a de- fense was violated by the exclusion of defense evidence under a state rule of law.” Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U.S. 505, 509 (2013). And when, as here, the right is impli- cated in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition, the state court’s application of this Court’s precedents must be given “substantial deference.” Jackson, 569 U.S. at 512. The questions presented are:

1. Do this Court’s precedents prohibiting the ap- plication of arbitrary rules to exclude evidence “clearly establish,” under § 2254(d)(1), that a state court’s mis- application of a valid state rule can rise to a federal constitutional violation?

2. Do this Court’s precedents, which generally have found that a defendant has a weighty interest in presenting “ ‘facts’ about the alleged crime at hand,” Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 316-17 n.138, clearly establish that a defendant also has a weighty interest in pre- senting extrinsic credibility evidence unrelated to the facts of the underlying crime?

Section 15(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“SEA”) provides that it is wnlawful for an unregistered securities dealer “to effect any transactions in… any security.” 15 U.S.C. § 780 (a) (emphasis added).

Although parties may not bring direct suit to enforce §15(a), the Second Circuit agrees that a violation of §15(a) can serve as the basis for a contract-rescission claim under § 29(b) of the SEA, 15 U.S.C. § 78ec(b). Section 29(b) provides a private right of action to void or rescind every contract “made in violation” or obligating “performance” that violates any provision of the SEA, including § 15(a). Id.

Questions Presented:

(a) Where a party has attained “unregistered dealer” status at the time of the contract, may that party enter a contract effecting the purchase of a convertible promissory note (a security) without violating § 15(a)?

(b) Does the answer to question (a) change in any way if the unregistered dealer purchased the convertible note (a security) in a transaction deemed exempt from registration under Section 4(a) of the Securities Act of 1933?

Despite the plain language of § 15(a) and ignoring direct precedent in the Eleventh Circuit, the Second Circuit held: a contract effecting a securities purchase by an unregistered dealer is lawful under §15(a) if it does not obligate the unregistered dealer to “act as a dealer in violation of the [SEA].” Pet. App. 3a.

The Constitution protects incarcerated persons from deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs, but this Court has made clear that liability arises only when a defendant actually knows of and disregards a substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). As this Court recognized in Farmer, “prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted,” and courts must consider the “difficult problems of prison administration” and the need for deference to officials making medical and custodial judgments in that environment. Consistent with those principles, most circuits require proof that jail medical staff had subjective awareness of an imminent risk—and that their response was objectively unreasonable—before denying qualified immunity.

In this case, an inmate was booked into the Lake County, Ohio jail and reported taking several medications, though he identified only one by name (Metformin, a medication used to treat diabetes). Petitioner Nurse Watson reviewed the intake form, ordered Metformin, arranged a diabetic diet, and scheduled a follow-up appointment for the following week to address the inmate’s other concerns. Petitioner Nurse Snow never interacted with or even knew of the inmate, yet the courts below inferred—without evidentiary support and contrary to her sworn testimony—that she must have reviewed his screening form. Days later, the inmate died from issues allegedly related to hypertension. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit nevertheless held that both nurses could be personally liable under § 1983 for not acting on information that merely suggested the inmate would need additional medication at some point in the future, and further concluded that their actions—ordering medication,

Whether, pursuant to Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 133 S.Ct 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013) and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), the district court erred in finding that the Appellant was subject to an enhanced statutory maximum of life imprisonment, eather than a maximum sentence of 20 years imprisonment, on a conviction for RICO conspiracy when the indictment did not charge an enhanced sentencing provision under 18 U.S.C. § 1963.

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1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢)(8), the federal statute that prohibits firearm possession by a person who “is an unlawful user of … any controlled substance,” violates the Second Amendment elther facially or as applied to an individual who was under the influence of marijuana at the time of possession.

2. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢)(38)’s ban on firearm possession by “an unlawful user” of a controlled substance—a term not defined in the statute—is unconstitutionally vague.

In 2018, Congress enacted the Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act, which established a mandatory minimum restitution amount of $3,000 per victim for certain child exploitation offenses. See 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(2)(B).

As this Court has repeatedly held, the Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to have a jury find all the facts necessary to criminal punishment. Thus, a jury must find any fact that increases the statutory maximum penalty, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), as well as any fact that increases the mandatory minimum, Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013). This bedrock constitutional rule applies “broadly” to all forms of criminal punishment, including monetary penalties like fines. Southern Union Co. v. United States, 567 U.S. 348, 350 (2012).

The question presented is: Does the Sixth Amendment require a jury to find the facts needed to justify a restitution order meeting or exceeding § 2259(b)(2)(B)’s $38,000 mandatory minimum?

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