The Spending Clause grants Congress the power “to pay the Debts and provide for the … general Welfare of the United States.” U.S. Const., Art. I, $8, cl. 1. That power allows Congress to pass legislation incentivizing certain behavior from private parties or States in exchange for federal funds. But this Court has repeatedly noted that the Spending Clause power is _ limited, operating “much in the nature of a contract: in exchange for federal funds, [the recipients of the funds] agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).

Pursuant to a delegation of Spending Clause power, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) issued a final rule revising the requirements that long- term care facilities must meet to participate in Medicare and Medicaid. The new rule prohibits those facilities from requiring residents to sign pre-dispute arbitration agreements as a condition of admission. The Arkansas Court of Appeals held that an arbitration agreement obtained in violation of the CMS rule is “illegal.” A divided Arkansas Supreme Court denied review, with the dissenting justices acknowledging that this ruling directly conflicts with precedent in the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stating that a Spending Clause rule only creates a condition for the receipt of federal funds.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power makes private conduct illegal absent a clear statement that Congress intended to do more than place conditions on the receipt of federal funds.

2. If so, whether CMS may make the use of arbitration agreements by recipients of federal Medicare and Medicaid funds illegal, notwithstanding the Federal Arbitration Act.

(i)

In an eminent domain proceding in state court involving non-residents, does a failure to cite or follow that state’s own clear statutory and decisional authority concerning issuance of a Summons in an eminent domain proceeding cause that interlocutory judgment authorizing the taking to fail to pass muster under the Due Process Clause under the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and be subject to U S Supreme Court review when that state’s supreme court refuses to grant discretionary review when such facts and authority are presented and the case has not proceeded beyond a special appearance contesting jurisdiction?

Does a state’s highest court’s failure to grant discretionary review of one of its state’s intermediate appellate court’s basic reiteration of an earlier depublished opinion which fails to mention or review under that state’s supreme court controlling decisional authority, constitute an impermissible abuse of discretion and thereby deny an adversely impacted litigant Due Process of Law under the 14th Amendment of the U. S. Constitution?

1. Whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit violated Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment right to due process by denying his motion to amend his informal opening brief, thereby foreclosing appellate review of substantial legal and factual issues, in contravention of this Court’s holding in Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962).

2. Whether the Fourth Circuit erred in affirming the district court’s grant of summary | judgment on Petitioner’s Maryland False Claims Act (MFCA) retaliation claim, where state and federal courts interpret the MFCA and federal False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h), in pari materia, and whether the decision creates a circuit split by departing from Simmons v. United States, 279 F.2d 345 (4th Cir. 1960), and Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC, 601 U.S. (2024).

3. Whether the trial court’s exclusion of critical evidence and issuance of flawed jury instructions deprived Petitioner of a fair trial under the Due Process Clause, where evidentiary and instructional errors cumulatively undermined Petitioner’s statutory protections under the FCA and violated clearly established standards set forth in Sanjour v. EPA, 56 F.3d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1995), and Grant v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.4th 138 (4th Cir. 2023).

Il. OPINIONS BELOW The unpublished per curiam opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, affirming the judgment of the district court, is reproduced in Appendix A. The district court’s memorandum opinion and order granting partial summary judgment in favor of Respondent is reproduced in Appendix B, and the district court’s final judgment following a jury trial is reproduced in Appendix C. Il. JURISDICTION On September 16”, 2024, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit entered judgment in Case No. 22-2198. Petitioner timely filed a petition for rehearing en banc on September 30, 2024, which was denied on October 16, 2024. In accordance with Supreme Court Rule 13.1, this petition is filed within 90 days of the final judgment. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1), which authorizes review of decisions of the courts of appeals by writ of certiorari. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 208—09 (2007) (holding that timely filing is a jurisdictional prerequisite); Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527 (2003) (reiterating the 90-day window under Supreme Court Rules).

1

1. Whether the denial of in forma pauperis status to an indigent litigant raising substantial constitutional claims — including violations of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Supremacy Clause — violates the Due Process and Equal Protection principles recognized in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), and M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. | 102 (1996).

2. Whether an appellate court may deny IFP status without explanation when the effect is to prevent review of systemic constitutional violations and jurisdictional defects, thereby closing the courthouse doors to an indigent appellant. |

3. Whether judicial participation in a case without lawful designation under 28 U.S.C. §§ 291-296 constitutes structural error requiring appellate review regardless of a litigant’s financial status.

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