Petitioner Dr. Pierson was acutely stricken by the emergent development of an acute life threatening cardiac condition which required immediate hospi- talization for an emergency cardiac surgery procedure at the Stanford University Medical Center. Despite having been presented with the evidence of Dr. Pierson’s life-threatening cardiac condition requiring emergency cardiac surgical intervention and having been provided with the opportunity to speak with Dr. Pierson’s Stanford Cardiac physicians, the Amador County trial court concluded that Dr. Pierson’s absence was “willful” and the trial court proceeded to dismiss the case.

The underlying matter involves Phyliss Rushing

driving her car into and destroying Dr. Pierson’s med- ical office. The insurer, CSAA Insurances Services et al. refused to settle. Pierson sought to bring suit against the insurance company; however the trial court only permitted the case to be styled with Rushing as the Defendant, contrary to Cal. Code. Civ. P. 1559 which states “A contract, made expressly for the benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him at any time before the parties thereto rescind it.” Well-estab- lished early Court precedents [Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 118 U.S. 394, Hn. 4 (1886) and Gulf, C. & S.F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897)] recognized that “corporations are persons within the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.” THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED ARE:

Question 1

la.Isn’t it true that under the Fifth and Four- teenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, that Dr. Pierson, a self-represented party without alternative

1. Whether a federal court exceeds its “judicial power” under Article III and Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood when the federal court unilaterally imposes a constitutional avoidance narrowing construction on a state law, which contains direct extraterritorial regulation of out-of-state economic activities—in a situation where the state’s highest court has not narrowed the statute in the first instance—and when the federal court rewrites the state law, under a severability analysis, contradicting the state law’s meaning for it to apply extraterritorially, creating a genuine circuit split regarding the scope of a federal court’s Article III judicial power to modify or amend state laws.

2. Whether following this Court’s decision in National Pork Producers Council v. Ross, the Dormant Commerce Clause and equal sovereignty principles constitutionally limit the reach of a state’s economic regulatory scheme, which mandates that once an out-of- state bullion trader does the minimum amount of $25,000 of business within the State of Minnesota, all of the bullion trader’s out-of- state and global employees, dealers, contractors, agents, and dealer representatives must be screened, registered and pay a registration fee as if doing business in the state even though they are not doing so—or is the Eighth Circuit correct, such a state lawisa permissible cost of transacting in Minnesota, not an extraterritorial regulation.

1. Did both the United States District Court and Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal 3-judge panel fail to properly execercise its permissible authority to amend and apply a variety of statutory vehicles (ie: | §1B1.13(b)(5), 28 U.S.C. $2255, or Rule 60(b)(1)-(6)) to Petitioner’s extraordinary and compelling claim(s) of his actual/factual inno- cence, or to facially order an investigatory evidentiary hearing on the newly removed threats upon his::life, and the lives of his family in Mexico; and

2. Did the lower courts fail to deem the death threats against the petitioner and his family in Mexico that forced his plea of guilty in this matter by the now defunct and eliminated Puebla Cartel “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for a Sentence Reduction; or

3. Did the lower courts fail to interpret the Petitioner’s Motion For A Reduction of Sentence under 18 U.S.C. §$3582,et.seq. and a re-

• sultant return to his family in Mexico an attempt under 28 U.S.C. §2255 to vacate his guilty plea or sentence (See: Doc. #401); and

4. Did the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals prejudice the Appellant’s appeal rights by failing to place petitioner’s case in abeyance

. by the court in light of the United States Supreme Courts accep= tance of certiorari in:

a) U.S. v. Bricker, No. 24-3286, 2025 WL 116016 at 1. (6th Cir.) b) Rutherford v. United States, 2025 U.S. LEXIS 36620, (6th Cir.) c) Carter v. United States, No. 24-860: (S.Ct. Cert.) d) U.S. vw. McCall, 56 F.4th 1048 (6th Cir. 2022)

LV

Mr. Nathan was sixteen years old at the time of his crimes. He was certified as an adult and tried for first degree murder and related offenses. He was initially sentenced to life in prison without parole as then required by Missouri law for the offense of first-degree murder. While his case was pending on appeal, this Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) holding that mandatory sentences of life without parole violate the Eighth Amendment when imposed against a juvenile offender. Mr. Nathan was then resentenced. On jury resentencing he received multiple concurrent life sentences!, which would have the effect of life in prison without parole. After affirmance on appeal, and denial of post-conviction relief, he filed a petition for federal habeas corpus. Relief and a certificate of appealability were denied. The case thus presents the following questions.

I. Whether a certificate of appealability should be issued to review the decision of the U.S. District Court that Mr. Nathan was not entitled toa jury trial under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), with respect to the issue of whether he should be certified for trial as an adult?

II. Whether a certificate of appealability should be issued to review the decision of the U.S. District Court that imposition of multiple consecutive sentences on a sixteen year old defendant involving one criminal event

1 The jury was unable to agree ona sentence of life without parole. 1