1. Whether the district court had exceeded its subject-matter jurisdiction when it exercised ancillary supplemental jurisdiction over a_ third- party complaint without stating or applying any tests in determining the common nucleus of operative fact?

2. Whether the test for common nucleus of operative fact for ancillary jurisdiction is the same as the pendent jurisdiction test stated in Gibbs or the ancillary jurisdiction test articulated in Aroger, Kokkonen, or Peacock?

3. Has the codification of § 13867 eviscerated a hundred years of case law and mandates that the courts start from scratch?

4, Whether the district court had exceeded its subject-matter jurisdiction when supplemental jurisdiction was based on Appellee’s RICO claim that lacked standing on the face of complaint and by applying a loose factual test when finding a common nucleus?

5. Whether the district court may deny a Rule 60 motion by ignoring the submitted declarations that are relevant and material to the issues and failing to consider mistakes of law or fact by the district judge? See Kemp v. United States, 596 U.S. 528, 534-535 (2022)

6. Whether the Second Circuit committed an error in denying review under its mandamus power when the issue is whether the district court has exceeded its federal jurisdiction in applying no test to exercise ancillary jurisdiction?

1. Whether governmental obligations to attempt further notice under the Mullane standard can only be triggered if the government has “actual knowledge” that notice was not successful, as the Ninth Circuit held below, or is also triggered by “good reasons to suspect’ that notice was not successful, as stated in Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006), and echoed by other Circuits and apex State courts.

2. Whether, prior to seizing private vehicles in non- exigent circumstances, a city has any duty under the Mullane standard, as elaborated upon in Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 794 (1983), to make any attempt to check for contact information in obvious places that the city knows will have contact information, such as DMV vehicle-registration records or the city’s own smartphone parking app.

3. Whether a government can rely solely on posting to attempt notice under the Mullane standard, despite Mennonite and Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982), where piled-up infraction notices indicated (accurately) that postings hadn’t been seen and hadn’t been received.

4, Whether to grant, vacate, and remand in light of Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982).

5. Whether to grant, vacate, and remand in light of City of L.A. v. David, 538 U.S. 715 (2008).

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Whether, in an enforcement action under 28 U.S.C. § 2467, (A) a claimant who presents direct and circumstantial evidence that assets were derived from property stolen from the claimant has Article III standing, or whether courts may dismiss for lack of standing absent precise forensic tracing of the assets, and (B) what state or nation’s law applies in determining whether an interest in property exists.

Whether Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 24 permits denial of intervention to an non-party with its own claimed property interest in forfeited assets, on the basis that the non-entity is “affiliated” with another non-party, and where the affiliated non-party was dismissed for lack of standing.

(1)

“A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction” of a United States court where “the action is brought … to confirm an award made pursuant to … an agreement to arbitrate,” and such agreement was “made by the foreign state with or for the benefit of a private party to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between the parties with respect to a defined legal relationship.” 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(6).

The question presented 1s:

Whether §1605(a)(6) allows a United States court to exercise jurisdiction without first determining whether the foreign-state defendant agreed to arbitrate “differences … between” itself and the plaintiff.

In Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993), this Court held that commentary by the United States Sentencing Commission interpreting or explaining the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines is subject to Seminole Rock deference, now known as Auer deference. Jd. at 38. In Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558 (2019), this Court identified strict limits on the Seminole Rock and Auer deference upon which Stinson is based, confirming that courts should defer only to reasonable interpretations of regulations that are “genuinely ambiguous.” Jd. at 576. The federal circuits are now split as to whether Kisor’s clarifications of Auer deference apply to Stinson and the Sentencing Guidelines. Some apply the rules articulated in Kisor, while others apply “Stinson deference” and ignore Kisor.

The questions presented are:

1. Pursuant to Kisor, are courts obligated first to determine whether a sentencing guideline is ambiguous before affording deference to the Sentencing Commission’s commentary interpreting the guideline?

2. When calculating Daniel Stewart’s guideline range, did the courts below err by relying on the Sentencing Commission’s commentary to interpret § 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, instead of § 4B1.1’s plain text?

1. May a state court that reaches and decides an asserted violation of the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial that has not been waived or forfeited under state law nevertheless affirm under a heightened, state-law harm standard because trial counsel did not object, rather than applying Chapman’s harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard?

2. Does petitioner’s conviction violate the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments because the jury was authorized to convict without being instructed to find every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt?

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I. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 2251 authorizes conviction upon proof that materials used to produce child pornography once crossed state lines at an unspecified prior occasion, when there is no evidence that the production or possession of child pornography itself caused such movement?

IT. Whether Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution permits Con- eress to impose criminal sanctions for all conduct undertaken using materials that have moved in interstate commerce, however remotely, whether or not the criminal conduct caused such movement?

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