Sockwell’s Batson claim was rejected four times before the Eleventh Circuit re-read a single phrase in the 1990 trial transcript to infer discrimination. But the panel majority was not free to find its own facts unless Sockwell satisfied 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(2), (e)(1). He did not. He offered the same reading of the frozen cold voir dire transcript already rejected by the state courts, whose findings must be presumed correct, App.55a.n2 (Luck, J., dissenting). Nor did the court require that Sockwell prove clear error, the appellate standard for Batson claims. Review of this pure issue of fact, credibility, and demeanor should have been highly deferential, but the panel majority “refuse[d]” to defer, App.58a (Luck, J., dissenting). This Court should summarily reverse on this question presented:

1. Whether the Eleventh Circuit violated 28

U.S.C. §2254.

The writ of habeas corpus is an equitable remedy, and federal courts must issue the writ only “as law and justice require.” Brown v. Davenport, 596 U.S. 118, 312 (2022) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §2243). Addressing the State’s argument that Sockwell’s guilt should count against releasing him, the Eleventh Circuit held that habeas relief is automatic for any Batson viola- tion identified on collateral review; no equitable analysis 1s required. The second question presented 1s:

2. Whether a federal court may grant habeas

relief to a guilty state prisoner upon identifying a Batson violation but without determining that “law and justice” require such relief.

In a landmark decision, this Court held in United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 182 (1918) (Spearin), that the federal government impliedly warrants to bidding contractors that a government- furnished design is free from defects.

The questions presented are:

1. Does the government impliedly warrant under Spearin that a government-furnished concept design for a design-build project is free from defects?

2. If the Spearin implied warranty applies, was it breached when a design feature in the gsovernment-furnished design that the government accepted and upon which the contractor relied during bidding turned out to be erroneous?

In 2014, this Court expanded Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 801(d)(1)(B) to allow the admission of prior consistent statements when a_ witness’s credibility is attacked on any ground. This expansion includes attacks based on incapacity—such as faulty memory. Before the 2014 change, this Court noted a temporal requirement: that to be admissible, the common law required a prior consistent statement to be made before the onset of the incapacity. Tome uv. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 156 (1995). Seven federal appeals courts have disparately analyzed whether that temporal requirement applies to the expanded Federal Rule of Evidence, some noting that it is an “open question” and “unclear.” This Court has not yet considered this issue.

Here, the trial court admitted a statement even though it was made after the onset of the incapacity. The Defense attacked a witness’s capacity to testify accurately due to her severe intoxication. The Government rehabilitated her credibility with a statement she made about the events during her intoxication. The lower court sided with the Eighth Circuit and declined to apply the temporal requirement.

The question presented is:

Does the common law temporal requirement apply to Military/Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B)(11)?

1. Whether, in a class of one Equal Protection claim, three distinct offenses (being simultaneously appealed) should be combined for purposes of defining the class of those similarly situated.

2. Whether a homeowner may be ordered to take action that would force their property into noncompliance with local law.

3. Whether fines (and liens) may properly be imposed when there is no alleged harm caused by an offense.

4. Whether a never-ending daily fine is grossly disproportionate to a malum prohibitum one-time act.

Mr. Jennings was deprived of counsel for three years before his death warrant was signed. On the day his death warrant was signed, the State requested that he be appointed counsel completely unfamiliar with him or his case. Newly appointed counsel had but seven days to investigate and prepare a final appeal for Mr. Jennings. The first and second questions presented are:

1. When the plain meaning of a statute or rule guarantees

continuous state postconviction counsel to a capitally sentenced

defendant, but fails to provide a remedy when a defendant is deprived

of such counsel, does the State violate the Fourteenth Amendment in

depriving the defendant due process and meaningful access to the courts

because newly appointed counsel cannot meaningfully represent the defendant in his truncated under-warrant litigation?

2. Does Florida’s mandatory statutory language requiring a capital

defendant to be continuously represented in all state postconviction

proceedings create a protected property interest?

In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), this Court invalidated the death penalty because it was imposed arbitrarily and without meaningful guidance; in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 158 (1976), this Court upheld new death penalty statutes that introduced reliability, proportionality review, and guided discretion. Florida’s system has since dismantled those very safeguards, eliminating proportionality review, restoring non-unanimous jury recommendations, adding aggravators and death-eligible crimes, and conducting clemency and the choice of who receives a death warrant 1n secrecy. The third question presented 1s:

3. Whether this systemic regression violates the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments by abandoning the evolving standards of

decency and reliability that Furman and Gregg established as

prerequisites for the fair and consistent imposition of capital punishment? ial

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢g)(1) violates the Second Amendment when applied to individuals based on their past conviction for a non-violent offense.

2. Whether application of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violated the Commerce Clause where the only proof of a nexus between the individual’s firearm possession and interstate commerce consisted of the fact that the firearm had crossed a state line at some point before coming into their possession.

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1. Is the lifetime ban on possession of firearms by all felons, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢)(1), plainly unconstitutional on its face under New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), because it is permanent and applies to all persons convicted of felonies?

2. Is the lifetime ban on possession of firearms by all felons, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢)(1), unconstitutional as applied to individuals with decades-old prior convictions from their youth who have not been shown to be currently dangerous and seek to possess a firearm for self-defense?

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