The William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-288, § 542(b), 1384 Stat. 3388, 3611 (2021), added a new subsection to Article 67(c), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 867(c). The new language incorporated factual sufficiency review—an authority that was previously held exclusively by military Courts of Criminal Appeals—ainto the portion of the statute pertaining to the review authority of the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF). In United States v. Csiti, 85 M.J. 414 (C.A.A.F. 2025), the CAAF, relying on an older portion of Article 67(c), UCM, concluded that the new language added under the FY 2021 NDAA did not expand factual sufficiency review to the CAAF.

The question presented:

Whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has statutory authority to hold that a conviction is factually insufficient under 10 U.S.C. § 867(c)(1)(C).

A. Whether first offender Rosario’s 23-year prison sentence, that resulted from a 104.4% upward variance, 1s unreasonable because it was grounded on the fact that the victim was kind to Rosario.

B. Whether first offender Rosario’ 23-year prison sentence, that resulted from a 104.4% upward variance, 1s unreasonable as the DC gave significant weight to facts that were not supported by the record, or that were erroneous, or speculative: that the crime resulted in death.

C. Whether first offender Rosario’s 23-year prison sentence, that resulted from a 104.4% upward variance, 1s unreasonable because it almost reaches the 25-year maximum statutory sentence, which is the sentence that he would have received if he had murdered the victim, when he did not commit murder.

2

1. Is the lifetime ban on firearms possession by all felons, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), unconstitutional on its face, because it 1s permanent and applies to all persons convicted of felonies, even those who are not violent and pose no risk to the public?

2. Is this lifetime ban unconstitutional as applied to Petitioner?

3. Is federal bank robbery in 18 U.S.C. § 21138(a) indivisible, such that no form of bank robbery qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the federal sentencing gsuldelines?

4. If the statute is divisible, did the Eleventh Circuit err in holding that attempted federal bank robbery necessarily includes “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force,” such that it qualifies as a “crime of violence” for purposes of the sentencing guidelines?