This criminal case involves allegations of insider trading. The Constitution, the U.S. Code, and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure all require that a criminal defendant be tried where his crime was (al- legedly) committed. In the modern era of electronic trading, trades are no longer executed on physical trading floors, but are instead processed on computer servers that may be located anywhere. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has nonetheless dou- bled down on its outdated precedent holding that a stock exchange’s brick-and-mortar headquarters in Manhattan suffices to establish venue for an insider- trading offense in the Southern District of New York, regardless of where the trades 1n question actually ex- ecuted. This rule effectively grants the U.S. Attor- ney’s Office for the Southern District of New York carte blanche to prosecute virtually all insider-trad- ing cases, an outcome fundamentally at odds with the Founders’ “deep and abiding antipathy to letting the government arbitrarily choose a venue in criminal prosecutions.” United States v. Fortenberry, 89 F.4th 702, 712 (9th Cir. 2023).

The question presented is whether a stock trading on an exchange whose physical headquarters is lo- cated in Manhattan suffices to establish venue in the Southern District of New York for insider-trading charges related to that stock.

During the summer of 2020, the term “BIPOC’— “Black, Indigenous, and People of Color”—emerged as the preferred moniker for the theory that all non-white people share certain common experiences as a result of their non- whiteness. Relying on these supposed shared experiences, the County of San Diego Independent Redistricting Commission intentionally created a coalition-minority supervisorial district to unify the BIPOC community of interest.

To do so, the Commission chose to exacerbate the population deviation between two supervisorial districts on the explicit basis that a discrete African American population needed to be included in the BIPOC district. Yet the lower courts held that the Commission’s discussions of creating a BIPOC district did not show that race was the predominant consideration in the design of the district as a whole, and that the far more explicit discussion of the African American population of a discrete geographic area was inadequate to show that race predominated with respect to the design of the BIPOC district as a whole.

The question presented is:

Is the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment violated when the explicit basis for the placement of a geographic area in one district over another, exacerbating the population deviation between the two districts, is the racial composition of that area?

Whether the Speedy Trial Act’s “ends of justice” provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), permits open-ended continuances that lack a definite termination date, like in the First, Third, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits, or instead requires any ends-of- justice continuance to exclude time only for a specifically bounded period supported by contemporaneous findings, as the Second and Ninth Circuit hold.

List of Parties All parties to the proceedings are listing in the caption of the case. i

1. Do convicted felons have a Second Amendment right, or do only law-abiding persons enjoy this right?

2. Does 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) withstand Second Amendment scrutiny in all of its applications, or is it unconstitutional as applied to some felons?

1

Whether Barker v. Wingo’s rejection of fixed time periods in defining the scope of the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause has been abrogated and replaced by a requirement that a delay must be at least a year long to trigger Barker review?

Whether pretrial delay-related prejudice to an incarcerated defendant’s liberty interests 1s negated solely because he was unlikely to be released on bond during the delay and was credited for the time 1n custody after he was convicted and sentenced?

1

A witness who testifies as a lay witness offering either factual testimony and/or lay opinion testimony and also testifies as an expert offering expert opinion testimony provides what is known as “dual role testimony.” The question presented 1s:

Must a district court exercising its “gatekeeping role’ under Rule

702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence in some instances exclude dual

role testimony under Rule 702 as not helpful to the trier of fact and/or

under Rule 403 as evidence whose probative value 1s outweighed by its

prejudicial effect in misleading and confusing the jury?

1

This case presents two important repeatedly occurring criminal-law questions that affect many defendants and have divided judges within the same circuit and divided other circuits as well.

Nathaniel Durham was found guilty by a jury of being in possession of a firearm as proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court had denied the Government’s pretrial motion to bifurcate the Armed Career Criminal Act charge (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)) and sentenced him to the mandatory 15-year sentence of incarceration.

After Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024), the Sixth Circuit agreed that it was error for the district court find that Mr. Durham’s qualifying prior felonies were committed on different occasions by relying upon Shepard’ documents introduced by the United States at his sentencing hearing, as well as the information about his prior criminal history in his Presentence Investigation report.

The questions presented are the following:

(1) Does the ACCA occasions-different determination, requiring a multi- factored analysis of the factual circumstances involving at least three prior qualifying offenses, make the error in Erlinger structural?

| Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005). 1