Under the law of Mississippi, in all civil cases, a judge performs the gatekeeping function of determining the reliability of scientific evidence before that evidence can be presented to a jury. In this criminal case, however, the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld Petitioner Joshua Clark’s conviction for murder and forty (40) year mandatory sentence, even though the trial judge had expressly declined to perform this gatekeeping function and had ruled that the issue of reliability of scientific evidence was a question for the jury.

The Mississippi Supreme Court refused to hear Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment challenge to this discrimination. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi held habeas corpus relief is not available for such a claim. A single judge on the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied a Certificate of Appealability without giving a reason.

The Question Presented is as follows:

Did the Court of Appeals erroneously deny Petitioner Joshua Clark a Certificate of Appealability on his Fourteenth Amendment claims even though Petitioner established that: (a) in all civil cases, a trial judge is required to act as a gatekeeper to determine the reliability of scientific evidence before that evidence can be received; (b) in Joshua Clark’s criminal case, the trial judge refused to determine reliability of scientific evidence; and (c) the evidence in Joshua Clark’s criminal case was uncontradicted that Shaken Baby Syndrome is not a scientifically reliable diagnosis?

The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901 et seqg., is a comprehensive en- vironmental statute providing for cradle-to-grave regu- lation of hazardous waste through a scheme of coopera- tive federalism. Under RCRA, the United States Envi- ronmental Protection Agency may authorize state and territorial regulators to administer permitting programs for hazardous-waste-treatment facilities in their respec- tive jurisdictions, including facilities operated by the fed- eral government. The questions presented are as follows:

1. Whether the federal government’s submission to a state or territorial regulator of an application to renew a RCRA permit is “final agency action” that is immedi- ately reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 704.

2. Whether the federal government must comply with the general environmental-review procedures of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., before submitting a permit-renewal appli- cation under RCRA, which sets forth its own specific procedures to review environmental impacts in the con- text of hazardous-waste treatment.

(I)

Petitioner established below, and the Eleventh Circuit agreed, that petitioner’s capital murder trial was tainted by a Giglio violation. Ordinarily, a petitioner who makes such an extraordinary showing of prosecutorial misconduct would be entitled to habeas relief under 28 U.S.C, § 2254.

But the Eleventh Circuit deemed the violation immaterial. The Eleventh Circuit held that the Florida Supreme Court reasonably concluded that, even without the Gvglio-tainted testimony, the evidence against petitioner was “overwhelming.” The Eleventh Circuit reached that determination almost entirely on the basis of evidence that Florida developed a decade after petitioner’s trial and that flatly contradicted unrebutted evidence presented by the defense at the actual trial.

The decision below opens a direct circuit split with the Second, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits, United States v. Jean- Baptiste, 166 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 1999); Apanovitch v. Bobby, 648 F.3d 434 (6th Cir. 2011); Browning v. Trammell, 717 F.3d 1092 (10th Cir. 2013), and the North Carolina Supreme Court, State v. Best, 376 N.C. 340, 852 S.E.2d 191 (2020), on a question of exceptional importance. It is also in deep tension with this Court’s recent decision in Glossip v. Oklahoma, 604 U.S. 226 (2025).

The questions presented are:

1. Whether in determining whether a constitutional error had a prejudicial effect on the outcome of a trial a court must consider only that evidence that was presented to the jury at the trial.

2. Whether the prejudice from the Giglio violation in this case met the standards for relief under Giglio and Brecht.

(1)

Colorado’s so-called universal preschool program pays for families to send their children to the preschool of their choice, public or private. To participate, pre- schools must ensure all families have an “equal oppor- tunity” to enroll regardless of, inter alia, race, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, gender identity, income level, or disability. Colorado nonetheless permits nu- merous exemptions from this requirement, both cate- gorical and discretionary, allowing preschools to admit only “children of color,” “gender-nonconforming chil- dren,” “the LGBTQ community,” low-income families, and children with disabilities. But Colorado excludes Catholic preschools because they admit only families who support Catholic beliefs, including on sex and gen- der.

The Tenth Circuit upheld Colorado’s decision to ex- clude Catholic preschools. Applying Employment Divi- ston v. Smith, it held that Colorado’s secular exemp- tions and discretion did not undermine general ap- plicability. In so doing, the court sided with the minor- ity position in an entrenched and acknowledged 7-4 split over what kinds of exemptions and discretion un- dermine general applicability. The court also es- chewed Carson v. Makin, concluding that its rule was inapplicable because Colorado’s exclusion was not “on the explicit basis” of religion.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether proving a lack of general applicability under Employment Division v. Smith requires show- ing unfettered discretion or categorical exemptions for identical secular conduct.

The State of Michigan revoked and terminated an easement that had permitted pipelines to occupy sov- ereign lands beneath navigable waters. The private easement holder sued state officials in federal court, and the Sixth Circuit allowed the suit to proceed under kx parte Young on the view that state sovereign 1m- munity does not apply unless the requested relief would divest the State of full ownership and eliminate all regulatory power over the submerged lands—lands that this Court has recognized as implicating “special sovereignty interests.” Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 281 (1997) (principal opinion); see id. at 289 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and con- curring in the judgment). The question presented 1s:

Whether a State is the real party in interest, and therefore entitled to sovereign immunity, where a pr1- vate plaintiff sues state officials in federal court for re- hef that would diminish, but not necessarily extin- guish, the State’s ownership and control of its sover- eign lands.

To justify a law-enforcement stop under Terry, officers must gather specific, articulable facts showing that crime is afoot. In this case, while working an internet-sting operation, officers stopped a white truck that circled a public park because they believed it was a sexual predator meeting an undercover officer for sex. Despite having no matching description of the suspect or suspect’s vehicle, and despite committing no traffic violations, officers stopped Petitioner’s truck because it circled the expected crime scene. The question presented is this:

Whether lawful, commonplace conduct that law- abiding citizens routinely engage in can establish reasonable suspicion because it occurs near an expected crime scene.

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Sim’s petition for writ of habeas corpus finding, in part, that the Missouri Court of Appeals reasonably interpreted and applied the rule set out in Setser v. United States, 566 U.S. 231 (2012). The question presented 1s:

Whether this Court should revisit Setser and affirmatively hold that once a federal court runs a future state court sentence concurrently to a defendant’s federal sentence, the state court is bond to run its sentence concurrently?

-ij-

1. Whether Florida violated the Supremacy Clause by constructing a system of post-conviction litigation that provides no avenue for the assertion of applicable rules of federal constitutional law.

2. Whether Florida denied Mr. Randolph minimal due process involving clemency.

1

(1) Should this Court summarily vacate Petitioner’s judgment in light of Esteras v. United States, 666 U.S. 185 (2025), because the district court based its upward variance sentence on the 18 U.S.C. § 35538(a)(2)(A) factor, and the Fifth Circuit relied on since-abrogated circuit precedent holding that such consideration is permissible as long as it was not a “dominant factor”?

(2) Does the fugitive-tolling doctrine apply in the context of supervised release? Petitioner notes that this question 1s identical to the question for which this Court eranted certiorari in Rico v. United States, No. 24-1056 (cert. granted June 30, 2025). The Court has therefore already determined that this question meets the criteria set forth in Supreme Court Rule 10.

ia

This is a felony-murder case that divided the Georgia Supreme Court with respect to the proper application of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 807 (1979). Three justices stated that the evidence against Petitioner Sonya Fuller was insufficient to support her conviction. Two additional justices stated that the evidence “just barely” passed constitutional muster. Even the majority opinion recognized that “the evidence of Fuller’s guilt was not strong.” App. 38a.

It was undisputed at trial that Petitioner Fuller did not kill the decedent. Instead, Fuller’s son killed the decedent by shooting him, and the State’s theory was that Fuller aided and abetted in the shooting—an aggravated assault that could support a conviction for felony murder. However, as the dissent below noted, “The State presented no evidence that Fuller planned, knew about, participated in, or even encouraged [the] shooting.” App. 5a (Warren, Pinson, Bethel, JJ., dissenting). Nevertheless, Fuller was convicted of felony murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.

Fuller’s son, the shooter, has since won reversal of his conviction and entered a new guilty plea for a sentence of 25 years. Meanwhile, Fuller remains 1n prison on her sentence of life without parole.

The question presented is this:

Whether a conviction for felony murder is permissible under Jackson

where the prosecution presented no evidence that the defendant

planned, knew about, participated in, or encouraged the felony? 1

Petitioner is serving a sentence for an offense that was later declared unconstitutional by this Court in United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019), and sought post-conviction relief to vacate that now unconstitutional sentence. The district court denied relief based on the wording of the appeal and collateral-review waiver contained in petitioner’s plea agreement. The Fifth Circuit, both in this appeal and in a related appeal, affirmed the denial of relief in a 2-1 decision in both cases, holding that even though petitioner is serving prison time for an offense that was declared unconstitutional by this Court, he cannot have this unconstitutional sentence vacated because he waived that right in his plea agreement’s collateral-review waiver. Other circuits would grant relief in similar circumstances and vacate this unconstitutional sentence even when there is a valid appeal or collateral-review waiver in the plea agreement. This Court will resolve this circuit split in Hunter v. United States, Sup. Ct. No. 24-1063 (cert. granted Oct. 10, 2025).

The questions presented in the underlying appeal on which a certificate of appealability was granted were: (1) whether the appellate- review waiver 1n petitioner’s plea agreement bars his Davis claim; and (2) whether petitioner’s appellate-review waiver is unenforceable under the miscarriage-of-justice exception. Stated another way, the question presented in this certiorari petition is whether it violates federal constitutional due process for a defendant who pleads guilty and waives the right to appeal or seek collateral-review for a conviction that 1s later found to be unconstitutional by this Court, to then be forced to serve the unconstitutional sentence because of the prior plea agreement’s waiver of appeal or collateral-review?

1

1. Whether 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B), which mandates that reasonable efforts “shall be made’ to reunify families, requires state courts to ensure that child welfare agencies made reasonable efforts toward reunification before terminating parental rights based solely on parents’ failure to remedy the conditions that led to removal.

2. Whether the Due Process Clause requires a court-approved case plan providing parents with fair notice of what they must do to avert termination and preserve their fundamental right to parent their children.

1

I. If a court of appeals recognizes a sentencing error and remands for resentencing, does the mandate rule bar the district court from considering a defendant’s subsequently filed motion to withdraw his guilty plea that raises matters not considered or decided by the court of appeals?

II. As in Hunter v. United States, No. 24-1063, in which this Court recently eranted certiorari, should this Court likewise grant certiorari to address the Fourth Circuit’s enforcement of a written appeal waiver in Mr. Martin’s plea agreement where the sentencing judge advised him that he had a right to appeal and the government did not object?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING Petitioner, defendant-appellant below, is John Elwood Tyrone Martin. Respondent, appellee, below, is the United States of America.