The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) “requires courts to place arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other contracts.” Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 581 U.S. 246, 248 (2017). This Court has repeatedly applied that principle to invalidate state court rules that “apply only to arbitration,” 2d. at 251, or that allow parties to an arbitration agreement to “abrogate that agreement after the fact.” Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, 596 U.S. 639, 650 (2022).

In Bickerstaff v. Suntrust Bank, 788 8.E.2d 787 (2016) (Bickerstaff ID), the Georgia Supreme Court nulli- fied a provision in SunTrust’s deposit agreement requir- ing individual customers to provide timely and particular- ized written notice to opt out of arbitration. The court held that by filing a class-action lawsuit, the plaintiff had effectively opted out of arbitration not only for himself, but for thousands of unnamed class members. Federal courts have declined to endorse that reasoning, recogniz- ing that “[al|n arbitration-specific rule, such as the one set forth in Bickerstaff, would be preempted by the FAA.” O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 904 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 2018). But in the decision below, the Georgia Court of Appeals doubled down, broadening Bickerstaff IT to reach even those class members whose agreements ex- pressly prohibit opting out via lawsuit. The Georgia Su- preme Court subsequently denied review.

The question presented is:

Whether the FAA preempts a state court rule per- mitting a proposed class representative to effectively opt out of arbitration on behalf of all unnamed class members notwithstanding contrary, express requirements in the arbitration agreement.

(I)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the United States Postal Service violated Petitioner’s Due Process Rights pursuant to the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution by terminating Petitioner’s employment, and depriving Petitioner of a protected property interest, without conducting a full, fair and impartial investigation and hearing?
2. Whether the Merit System Protections Board decision, premised on multiple factual errors, was arbitrary and capricious in violation of 5 U.S.C. §7703 (c)(3), thereby warranting review by this Court?
3. Whether the Merit System Protections Board abused its discretion by failing to consider and apply all the Alonzo factors in determining whether good cause existed for the appellant’s untimely filing in violation of 5 U.S.C. §7708 (c)(1)?

Below, Petitioner Marco Antonio Sanchez challenged the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢g)(1), which makes it a crime for a person convicted of a felony to possess a firearm. He argued that § 922(¢g)(1)’s permanent disarmament violates the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms both facially and as applied to him. The court of appeals affirmed. The questions presented are:

1. Does § 922(g)(1) violate the Second Amendment facially?

2. Does § 922(g)(1) violate the Second Amendment as applied to individuals with convictions for offenses that did not involve the misuse of firearms or establish a credible threat of such misuse?