In the uniquely pro-claimant veterans-benefits system, Congress has provided that an otherwise- final agency decision is subject to revision if that de- cislon was based on “clear and unmistakable error,” or “CUE.” Regulations and longstanding agency practice dictate that CUE 1s “the kind of error, of fact or of law, that when called to the attention of later reviewers compels the conclusion, to which reasona- ble minds could not differ, that the result would have been manifestly different but for the error.” 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.105(a)(1)Q), 20.1403(a), (c). And, as this Court confirmed in George v. McDonough, 596 U.S. 740 (2022), the error must be based on the law that applied at the time of the original decision, not a lat- er change in law or interpretation.

In the decision below, the Federal Circuit mis- read George to require more. It held that a CUE claimant must show not only that a legal error hada clear effect on the outcome of a benefits decision, but also that the law itself was undebatably clear at the time of the prior decision.

The question presented is: To establish “clear and unmistakable error” based on legal error, must a veteran show that there was an error of law at the time of the challenged decision which undebatably altered the outcome of the benefits decision, as the regulatory text provides, or must a veteran also show that the meaning of the law itself was unde- batable, as the Federal Circuit held?

1. Whether entry of default based on defective service of process, which failed to provide defendant with actual notice of the action, violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of notice and an opportunity to be heard?

2. Whether the Superior Court’s denial of equit- able relief from a default judgment, where the defendant lacked proper notice and opportunity to present his objections, violates the Fourteenth Amendment?

3. Whether the Court of Appeal’s refusal to rein- state an appeal, in light of alleged due process violations in the underlying judgment, violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of a meaningful opportunity to be heard?

1. Sheriff’s deputies suspected a driver had drugs, stopped him, and wanted to search his car to find them. Only when their attempt to establish probable cause for the search failed did they decide to impound the car. Does the Fourth Amendment forbid an impound (and resulting inventory search) primarily motivated by an investigative purpose?

2. Although a sheriff’s policy did not authorize deputies to impound a car from private property, the deputies did so purportedly to protect it from vandalism and theft. Does the Fourth Amendment forbid the impound and the resulting inventory search?

(I)

I. SHOULD THIS COURT RECONSIDER ITS DECISION IN MANRIQUE V. UNITED STATES, 581 U.S. 116, 122-23 (2017), HOLDING THAT A DISTRICT COURT’S INITIAL JUDGMENT AND ITS SUBSEQUENT RESTITUTION ORDER CONSTITUTE SEPARATE JUDGMENTS AND A DEFENDANT’S NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT DOES NOT FUNCTION AS A NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM THE RESTITUTION ORDER ?

Il. DID THE DISTRICT COURT PLAINLY AND REVERSIBLY ERR WHEN IT ORDERED MR. HOWARD TO PAY RESTITUTION ?

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