1. Whether a civil action is “commenced” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 when a complaint is electronically delivered and date-stamped by the court’s filing system or only when the filing fee is paid or leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted—an issue that has created a circuit split and affects thousands of cases each year.

2. Whether the district court’s dismissal of an employment discrimination complaint for failure to plead a prima facie case under Rule 12(b)(6) conflicts with Rule 8 and this Court’s decision 1n Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), particularly where the Sixth Circuit declined to consider the issue.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS Chen v. Michigan State University, No. 1:24-cv-254 (W.D. Mich.), judgment entered Nov. 20, 2024. Chen v. Michigan State University, No. 24-2076 (6th Cir.), judgment entered Aug. 13, 2025. There are no other proceedings in any court that are directly related to this case.

Whether the Due Process was given in the lawsuit under the 5“ and 14% Amendment. Specifically Points A, B, C, D and E.

Point A.

Whether Derivative Action Lawsuits Require Notice prior to dismissal as required under Oklahoma Statutes Title §12-2023.1. - Derivative actions by shareholders and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure23.1.

Point B

Whether Determining who is Representing the Party’s Interests is Required in a Law Suit.

Point C.

Whether a conflict between the State OCPA law and this Court’s rulings and other State High Court rulings on anti SLAPP laws, is present when the a defendant’s ultra vires acts in have no connection with a public issue or legal right of action.

Point D.

Whether there is a conflict between the lower court ruling on judicial bias or lack of same and the previous rulings of this Court’s and other state high court decisions.

1. Whether a federal appellate court may deem constitutional arguments waived when a pro se appellant, entitled to liberal construction under Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), raised the substance of those arguments, Ex parte Young doctrine, but did not use the precise legal terminology (“sovereign immunity,” “Eleventh Amendment,” or “judicial immunity”) in his opening brief.

2. Whether the Ex parte Young doctrine, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), allows a pro se litigant to pursue prospective declaratory and injunctive relief against state judicial officers engaged in ongoing constitutional violations, notwithstanding Eleventh Amendment immunity.

3. Whether judicial immunity extends. to ministerial and administrative acts, such as excluding members of the public from open judicial proceedings, that violate the First Amendment right of access.

In McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414 (2018), this Court held that the Sixth Amendment protects a de- fendant’s “right to insist that counsel refrain from ad- mitting guilt, even when counsel’s experienced-based view is that confessing guilt offers the defendant the best chance” to obtain a less severe sentence. Id. at 417. The McCoy dissent observed that the majority opinion left open “a related—and difficult—question’: “When guilt is the sole issue for the jury, 1s 1t ever per- missible for counsel to make the unilateral decision to concede an element of the offense charged?” Id. at 435 (Alito, J., dissenting). The question presented is:

Whether defense counsel may concede an element of an offense over the defendant’s objection, where the concession is reasonably designed to advance the de- fendant’s objective of obtaining an acquittal.

(1)

The Bankruptcy Code excepts from discharge any debt “for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). In Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998), this Court unanimously held that this exception covers only acts done with the actual intent to cause injury, anchoring its analysis in the law of intentional torts. The Restatement (Second) of Torts distinguishes “injury,” the invasion of a legally protected interest, from “harm,” the existence of loss or detriment in fact. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 71) & emt. a (1965). By using the terms interchangeably, the federal courts of appeals have fractured into distinct camps regarding the meaning of “injury” and whether a debtor’s subjective belief that his conduct was lawful negates the intent to injure.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether the term “injury” in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) denotes mere “harm” (detriment in fact), as the Eleventh Circuit held, or requires the intent to invade a legally protected interest (legal injury), such that a debtor who intentionally causes harm under a genuine but mistaken belief of legal justification has not inflicted a “willful” injury.

2. Whether a debt arising from the intentional tort of false imprisonment is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) when the debtor held a subjective, genuine belief that confinement would be lawful and justified, or whether a court may obviate that subjective belief by defining the “injury” as the confinement itself and implying malice from the objective “excessiveness” of the debtor’s conduct.