This term the Court will decide whether an order denying a government contractor’s claim of derivative sovereign immunity is immediately appealable in federal court under the collateral-order doctrine. The GHO Grp., Ine. v. Menocal, No. 24-758.

This petition presents a closely related question: Whether an order denying a local official’s claim of state- law immunity is Immediately appealable in federal court under the collateral-order doctrine.

In GEO Group, the answer is likely to turn on whether Years/ey immunity is an immunity from suit or a defense to liability. In this case, however, petitioner admits that state law categorizes the immunity in question as an im- munity from suit. But, as Judge Oldham explained in his concurrence below, even if a state-law immunity is one from suit, it does not “rise to the level of importance needed for recognition under § 1291.” Pet.App. 20a. Be- sides, “the rulemaking process” is now “the way” for iden- tifying immediately appealable orders. Swint v. Cham- bers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 48 (1995).

The questions presented are:

Whether an order denying a local official’s claim of state-law immunity is immediately appealable in federal court under the collateral-order doctrine, and

Whether, if this Court in GH’O Group holds that the collateral-order doctrine may not extend to orders not in- volving federal constitutional or statutory concerns ab- sent rulemaking, this Court should grant, vacate, and re- mand for further consideration in light of that decision.

The Questions Presented For Consideration By This Court Are Presented As Follows:

1, Whether, under the circumstances presented hear, petitioner’s constitutional right to a fair trial due to insufficient identification evidence claim was procedurally barred for failure to comply with State procedural rules governing motions for trial orders of dismissal of indictment that were adequate to support the denial of relief, and if so, whether he has shown ‘L cause’R and ‘Lprejudice’Rto excuse the default.

2. Whether the lower Courts erred in deciding that Petitioner’s Fifth claim was procedurally barred for failure to sufficiency alert the State Court of Appeals to the Constitutional nature of his claim. ,

3. Whether the lower Courts erred in deciding that Petitioner’s Third, Fourth, and Sixth claims, were procedurally barred, for failure to exhaust them before the State’s highest Court of Appeals.

| 4. Whether the lower Courts erred when it applied Stone v. Powell to bar petitioner (Sua Ponte), from rasing claim that the State erred in deciding that a good faith exception disqualified Petitioner from the application of newly declared Constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct review, regarding C.S.LL information.::And if so, was the District Court denial of claim, in error of clearly established law, when it failed to provide petitioner with an opportunity to be heard as to why this claim should not be barred by Stone v. Powell under the Fourth Amendment.