1. A Texas justice of the peace ordered the wrongful arrests of her political rivals while conducting the “plainly administrative’ act of qualifying a venire by confirming the age, literacy, citizenship, criminal history, and residency of prospective jurors. Should such conduct be

shielded by absolute judicial immunity?

1. Pet. App. 21a (Ho, J., dissenting).

The decision below contravenes the Second Amendment right to “keep and bear arms,” and the Fourth Amendment prohibition “against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amen. II and IV. In Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11, 1058S. Ct. 1694, 1701, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985), the Court held that the use of deadly force “to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the circumstances, 1s constitution- ally unreasonable.”

The below decision also conflicts with all other Circuit Court precedent, and applicable Iowa law affirming the right to openly carry firearms. I.C.A. §§ 724.5 and 704.2(2) . Prior to the panel’s decision it was clearly established that deadly force may not be used on a person “in possession of a gun” unless the gun is “point[ed] at another or wield[ed] in an otherwise menacing fashion.” Cole ex rel. Est. of Richards v. Hutchins, 959 F.8d 1127, 1134 (8th Cir. 2020). The decision below violates that precedent by conceding the gun Klum held to his own head never moved, but authorizing deadly force because Klum allegedly turned to walk in the general direction of bystanders located a half a block away. The decision below also disregards the requirement to provide a warning before using deadly force.

Whether the Second and Fourth Amendments to the United States Constitution forbid police from using deadly force against a suspect exclusively for holding a gun to his own head?

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq., provides that foreign states are presumptively immune from suit, subject to enumerated exceptions. The “noncommercial tort” exception removes immunity for personal injury occurring in the United States caused by the tortious act or omission of a foreign state or its employees within the scope of employment, but it expressly excludes “any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function regardless of whether the discretion be abused.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A). The questions presented are:

Whether the FSIA’s discretionary-function exclusion, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A), denies federal subject matter jurisdiction for a tort claim that alleges a mandatory foreign government policy or regulation that involves no judgment or choice, but the tortious act or omission arose from an official or employee’s compliance with that mandatory policy or regulation rather than its violation.

Whether a foreign state’s mandatory policy or regulation that foreseeably enables and supports the sexual abuse of children may be susceptible to policy analysis or grounded in policy considerations such that it falls within the FSIA’s discretionary function exclusion.

This section 1983 civil rights case arises from the devastating consequences of medical and investigative errors in a child protection proceeding. After a two- month-old infant suffered severe brain damage during a botched intubation at a local hospital—an event witnessed by his mother, Dr. Erika Mabes, a surgeon—a child abuse pediatrician and Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) workers refused to investigate or even consider the medical records documenting these iatrogenic injuries, 2.e., injuries caused by medical care. Instead, they immediately concluded the infant had been abused, blamed Dr. Mabes simply because she was “the mother”, seized all three children without a warrant or court order, and pursued administrative charges for over two years until DCS finally conceded it lacked evidence to support any allegations against Dr. Mabes. The district court denied qualified immunity, finding genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Respondents engaged in a Sham investigation by ignoring the exculpatory evidence and whether there was an emergency justifying the warrantless removal of the children. The Seventh Circuit reversed by disputing the district court’s factual findings and requiring precedent so specific that no constitutional violation could ever be clearly established.

The questions presented are:

1. Did the Seventh Circuit lack jurisdiction under Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 804 (1995), to deny qualified immunity on summary judgment by rewriting the factual record to deny that there was a sham investigation and to create an “emergency” excusing Respondents’ refusal to

I, CONSTITUTIONAL RIPENESS Whether the Supreme Court, in this age of equality, should consider gender-based servi- | tude ripe for correction.

II. UNCONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE Whether a court of first instance’s failure to assemble a jury for Thirteenth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. §1584 Sale into involuntary servitude protection, once a demand for trial by jury is made, establishes Unconstitution- al Avoidance.

III. ADOPTING A JUDICIAL TEST Whether the Supreme Court should require the application of a judicial test for determin- ing when color-of-law actors have used Un- constitutional Avoidance to violate a citi- zen’s constitutional rights.

IV. THE RIGHT TO A GRAND JURY Whether victims have the right to demand a grand jury when color-of-law actors are found to have used Unconstitutional Avoidance to violate the protection of 18 U.S.C. §1584 Sale into involuntary servitude “in any way.

Whether the “new” evidence required to make an actual-innocence claim under Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), includes only newly discovered evidence that was not available at the time of trial or broadly includes all evidence that was not presented to the factfinder during trial.

In United States v. Moreno, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that military appellants are entitled to speedy post-trial processing under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 63 M.J. 129, 135 (C.A.A.F. 2006). This is distinct from a military appellant’s statutory right to speedy post-trial processing. United States v. Tardif, 57 M.J. 219, 222 (C.A.A.F. 2002). Recently, Congress codified the Tardif holding in Article 66(d)(2), Uniform Code of Military Justice. 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(2) (permitting military courts to grant sentencing relief for excessive post-trial delay).

Neither the text of this new statute, nor military precedent, requires an appellant to prove a due process violation before being entitled to relief for excessive post-trial delay. Nevertheless, the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals required Petitioner to prove a due process violation to obtain relief.

The question presented 1s:

Did the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals err when it held there was “no basis for relief’ under 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(2) merely because there was not a due process violation?

The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of In- ternational Child Abduction generally requires the re- turn of a child to his or her country of habitual resi- dence. But when a Hague Convention petition 1s brought more than a year after the child’s removal, a court need not return the child if “it 1s demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment” (the “well settled” defense). Hague Convention, art. 12. In determining whether a child is sufficiently set- tled for the purposes of the “well settled” defense, a trial court considers the totality of the circumstances, including factors like the child’s age, the stability and duration of the child’s residence in the new environ- ment, the child’s school attendance, and the extent of the child’s participation 1n his or her new community. After considering and weighing all the facts, the trial court must then decide whether the child has become sufficiently settled in the new environment.

The question presented is:

Is a trial court’s determination that a child is “well settled” subject to de novo review, or is it reviewed for clear error?

(1)

In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, this Court recognized the risk of allowing antitrust claims to proceed past the pleading stage in the absence of a “plausible entitlement to relief.” 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007). That risk is particularly acute when a court relies on novel and vague theories of antitrust law. The Ninth Circuit’s decision raises precisely that concern: the court reversed the grant of a motion to dismiss based on two theories that provide no plausible entitlement to relief under the Sherman Act or this Court’s case law—and that have given rise to conflict and confusion among the courts of appeals. The questions presented are:

1. Whether a “de facto” exclusive dealing claim is cognizable under the Sherman Act in the absence of exclusive contractual terms, programs, or policies.

2. Whether a refusal-to-deal claim prohibited by Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004), 1s cognizable if the plaintiff calls it something else.

1. ‘Does a U.S. Magistrate Judge have the authority under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) to supersede an Order of the Article III U:S.-District Court Judge that denied the Defendants Motion to Dismiss under F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) because the Plaintiff did not provide specific facts to show defendant/s personal involvement, with an Order grdnting defendant’s motion to dismiss because the Plaintiff did not provide specific facts to show defendant/s person involvement? |

2. Did the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals err in affirming the © District Court’s denial of Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel. Dis- covery that was past due according to the Scheduling Order that would have provided the necessary facts to show personal in- volement of the defendant’s before dimissing the case?

3. Did the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals err in affirming the District Court’s denial to Plaintiff’s request’for service on |. the additional defendant’s after permission to proceed informa- pauperis was granted? |

4. Did the lower courts err by holding the plaintiff to a higher standard of pleading to survive a F.R.Civ.P. Rule: 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss than is required by U.S. Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent case-law? > |

1. Does Congress’s power “[t]o define and punish .. . Felonies committed on the high Seas,” authorize the United States to impose its laws upon foreign nationals for wholly foreign crimes committed in a foreign nation’s Exclusive Economic Zone (KEZ)?

2. Is the United States’ prosecution of foreign nationals under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act “MDLEA”) unconstitutional where neither the individual nor his offense bears any nexus to the United States?

1

Preserving a constitutional claim “does not demand the incantation of particular words, rather it requires that the lower court be fairly put on notice as to the substance of the issue.” Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 469 (2000).

In Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005), this Court held that a capital defendant may not be visibly shackled before his sentencing jury absent a case- specific finding of necessity.

Before jury selection, Jasper Rushing told the trial court that visible shackles used on him were “arbitrary,” because the decision to use them was based solely on his decision to wear jail clothing.

The Arizona Supreme Court held that the trial court violated Deck, when it allowed the visible shackles, but nevertheless affirmed Mr. Rushing’s death sentence. It held that Mr. Rushing’s statement was “an observation, not an objection,” reviewed the issue for fundamental error — Arizona’s analogue to plain error review — and then required Mr. Rushing to prove “separate prejudice.”

1. Did the Arizona Supreme Court err in concluding that Mr. Rushing failed

to preserve below?

2. Ifthe claim was unpreserved, did the unjustified visible shackling

constitute reversible error, nonetheless? 1

Dated this 12” day of November 20235.

Respectfully Submitted, S/Nicholas Marchi NICHOLAS MARCHI CARNEY & MARCHI, P.S. 7502 W. Deschutes PL. Kennewick, WA 99336 (509) 545-1055 Attorneys for Petitioner PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 2

1. Because a method-of execution-challenge involves a future harm, and nota past harm, lower courts have struggled to determine when the claim accrues, applying an ad hoc assortment of rules. Lower courts and death- sentenced prisoners need guidance from this Court as to when a method of execution challenge must be brought. Does the State of Tennessee’s adoption of a new lethal injection protocol and a new lethal injection drug result in a substantial change that resets the statute of limitations?

2. When a responsive pleading to a complaint correctly identifies (1) a claim and (2) the standard that applies, does a complaint fail to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)?

3. Under its original meaning, the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits punishments that heighten the risk of severe, unjustified harm beyond the baseline established by longstanding prior practice. Does Tennessee’s new one-drug protocol heighten the risk of severe, unjustified harm beyond the baseline established by longstanding prior practice and other acceptable methods of execution such as the firing squad?