Petitioner Jeffrey Andrews resides on his family farm in Connecticut. His farm contains a short reach of an unnamed tributary to the Farm River, but no portion of the farm has a continuous surface water connection to that tributary or to the Farm River.

In 2020, the United States—acting on behalf of the Environmental Protection Agency—brought an en- forcement action alleging that Mr. Andrews’ earth- moving projects to improve his farm disturbed wet- lands that qualify as “navigable waters” under the Clean Water Act.

In Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency, 598 U.S. 651 (2028), this Court held that EPA may only regulate those wetlands that are “as a practical mat- ter indistinguishable” from covered waters. The Sec- ond Circuit nevertheless upheld EKPA’s authority over Mr. Andrews’ farm by omitting Sackett’s indistin- suishability requirement, and by holding that, even after Sackett, EPA may regulate wetlands lacking a continuous surface water connection to covered wa- ters.

The question presented is:

Was the Second Circuit correct to uphold Clean Water Act authority over wetlands that are not “asa practical matter indistinguishable” from covered wa- ters?

1. In an alcohol DUI prosecution where the only question was if Mr. Spencer’s BAC was above Utah’s then-applicable per se threshold of 0.08, two toxicologists testified to Mr. Spencer’s BAC according to their respective toxicological analysis. One testified that his BAC was 0.79, and the other testified that it was 0.08. Both testified that both results were within known measurement errors and were correct measurements. The question 1s whether this evidence was sufficient to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Spencer’s BAC was 0.80 or above.

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1. Is the lifetime ban on possession of firearms by all felons, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), plainly unconstitutional on its face under New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), because it is permanent and applies to all persons convicted of felonies?

2. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the federal statute that prohibits anyone who has been convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year’ from possessing a firearm, violates the Second Amendment as applied to individuals with convictions for nonviolent drug trafficking offenses?

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I. Whether the Sixth Circuit decision affirming Mr. Hunnicutt’s supervised release violation and new law convictions, improperly upheld the clearly erroneous factual findings of the district court that were critical and material to his claim of self-defense?

IT. Whether the district court district court abused its discretion at Mr. Hunnicutt’s sentencing proceeding and imposed a procedurally unreasonable sentence upon him where it erroneously determined that he did not act in self-defense, improperly applied an enhancement, and considered other irrelevant, inaccurate, or uncorroborated information 1n imposing an upward variant sentence upon him?

III. Whether the district court district court abused its discretion at Mr. Hunnicutt’s sentencing proceeding and imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence upon him where it varied upward and made his sentence consecutive, and placed inordinate weight on Mr. Hunnicutt’s history and characteristics, offense facts and the need to punish, in sentencing him to a custodial term of 130-months?

IV. Whether the district court’s 70-month sentence upon Mr. Hunnicutt resulted in a sentencing disparity with those similarly situated nationally?

V. Whether the district court’s reasons for imposition of sentence on Mr. Hunnicutt’s supervised release violation included prohibited factors, including, the seriousness of the offense, promoting respect for the law, and just punishment, contrary to the holding of Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185 (2025)?

LIST OF PARTIES All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. 1

The judicially created doctrine of qualified immunity shields government offi- cials from liability for constitutional misconduct under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 so long as they do not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which every reasonable officer would have known. This doctrine contradicts the text of § 1983, relying on policy concerns instead of the statutory text or the historical com- mon law immunities it allegedly incorporated. The courts of appeals have also splin- tered, disagreeing about when a right 1s “clearly established.” Moreover, the typical immunity-first approach to judicial decisions impedes the development of “clearly es- tablished” rights altogether. All courts of appeals but the Eleventh Circuit, however, agree that a robust consensus of persuasive authority can render a right clearly es- tablished. The First, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh circuits have held that there is a constitutional right, under the First Amendment, to record government officials’ activities in public places.

The questions presented are:

1. Should the Court abolish or substantially reform qualified immunity?
2. If qualified immunity survives, what constitutes a clearly established right?
3. If qualified immunity survives, 1s the right to record government officials on

publicly accessible property clearly established?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING Petitioner is Steven R. DeWitt. Respondents are Ceressa Haney, Trent Sexton, and Melanie Pretti. 1

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The question presented here is:

1. Whether establishing constructive possession of a location is sufficient to establish constructive possession of contraband found in the location occupied by multiple people.

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