This petition arises out of a removed state law statutory damages class action, alleging that Defendant Twitter violated RCW 9.26A.140 by deceptively procuring and then selling users’ cell phone numbers. In the district court, Plaintiff Morgan sought remand for lack of Article III harm. When the court denied that motion, he sought leave to amend to remove allegations concerning sales. Although that was denied, he affirm- atively abandoned the sales claim. The court denied a renewed motion to remand, then ruled against him on the merits of both claims. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding Article III] harm for the procurement claim because the statute proscribes procuring call logs even though Morgan never alleged that Twitter procured his or any person’s call logs. It found standing as to the abandoned sales claim because the fact allegations remained in the last-filed Complaint.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether Article III permits a federal court to entertain a state law cause of action for deceptively procuring non-private information, specifically, a telephone number, simply because the statute also proscribes taking different private information, not at issue in the lawsuit.

2. Whether Article III permits a federal court to rule on the merits of a claim that a plaintiff has voluntarily, affirmatively abandoned.

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This case presents a conflict regarding an important question of statutory construction under the Internal Revenue Code.

The Code provides that no penalty shall be assessed unless the initial determination of such assessment is personally approved in writing by an immediate supervisor.

Courts of Appeals have diverged on when an IRS employee must secure supervisory approval for a penalty assessment to be valid.

The question presented is:

When must an IRS employee secure written supervisory approval for a penalty assessment to be valid?

A “Yates” error occurs when a general verdict is supportable on one theory of hability but not on another, and it 1s impossible to tell which theory the jury used to convict. Black v. United States, 561 U.S. 465, 470 (2010) (quoting Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 812 (1957)); see Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 414 (2010) (reasoning that Yates errors are reviewed for harmlessness). While Petitioners’ cases were pending on appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) decided that two statutory theories of liability for sexual assault were legally distinct. United States v. Mendoza, 85 M.J. 213, 218-20 (C.A.A.F. 2024). In one of the Petitioners’ cases, the CAAF expanded that holding: the Government cannot prove sexual assault “without consent” (10 U.S.C. § 920(b)(2)(A)) by proving a complainant did not consent because he or she was asleep at the time—a distinct theory of liability (10 U.S.C. § 920(b)(2)(B)). Pet.App.12a (citing Mendoza, 85 M.J. at 220). Both holdings rested on how the Government could not charge one theory and then argue another without violating a defendant’s right to fair notice. Id. But by addressing one due process issue, the CAAF created another: a Yates error.

These cases raise the following question:

Were the factfinders able to convict Petitioners on an invalid alternate theory of liability after being instructed on the statutory definition of consent?

The question presented 1s as follows:

Whether granting the IRS a_ judicial presumption of correctness violates due process and equal protection in a case where a taxpayer 1s accused of not reporting income from a ‘legal source’, when the IRS fails to introduce any evidence that the taxpayer actually received the alleged unreported income?

KRK

The courts of appeals have almost universally held that when a taxpayer is accused of failing to report income from an ‘illegal source’, a presumption of correctness does not arise until after the IRS presents substantive evidence that links’ the taxpayer to the alleged criminal activity, along with evidence that substantiates the charge the alleged unreported income was received.

In cases of alleged unreported income from ‘illegal sources’, the evidence linking the taxpayer to the alleged criminal activity gives rise to a presumption that the taxpayer actually received unreported income from the criminal activity, leaving only the question of how much estimated unreported income was actually received (_.e., computational evidence).

In an effort to extend comparable due process protections to taxpayers accused of failing to report income from ‘legal sources’, such as Petitioners in the case at bar, the Fifth Circuit has held that the IRS will only be granted a ‘presumption of correctness’, if

In military courts-martial, under 10 U.S.C. § 860c, the Entry of Judgment (EoJ) is the final judgment, marking the end of trial and the beginning of the post- trial process. In the Air Force, a senior attorney who advises commanders prepares a memorandum, called a First Indorsement, to indicate receipt of the EoJ and summarize criminal indexing requirements. This 1n- cludes indexing for the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS).

The First Indorsement makes a legal determina- tion about whether 18 U.S.C. § 922 applies to the con- victed servicemember and effectuates a restriction of their Second Amendment rights. If that legal determ1i- nation is made in error, the Air Force Court of Crimi- nal Appeals (AFCCA) has statutory authority under Article 66(d)(2), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(2), to provide relief. De- spite a clear statute providing authority to the AFCCA, the Court of Appeals of the Armed Forces (CAAF) decided that military courts have no such au- thority.

The question presented 1s:

Whether military courts of criminal appeals have authority under 10 U.S.C. §§ 860c and 866(d)(2) to cor- rect an unconstitutional firearms ban annotated after entry of judgment.

: I. Did A FUNDAMENTAL MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS VIOUATION OCCUR WHEN THE STATE COURT VIOLATED SCHUUP V. DEUO, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), BY EMPLOYING AN IMPROPER POST-CONVICTION REVIEW PROCESS FOR DECIDING PETITIONER’S CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM BASED ON NEW FORENSIC DNA AND | IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE; IN LIGHT OF WHICH, NO REASONABLE JUROR | WOULD LIKELY HAVE FOUND HIM GUILTY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT?

II. DID THE STATE COURT VIOLATE THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND DONNEULUY V. DECHRISTOFORO, 415 U.S. 637 (1974), BY PERMITTING THE GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY TO UNFAIRLY INFECT THE POST-CONVICTION HEARING PROCESS WITH MISCONDUCT INTENDED TO MISLUEAD THE TRIER OF FACT AND PREJUDICE | PETITIONER? III. DID THE STATE COURT VIOLATE THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND DYE V. HOFBAUER, 546 U.S. 1 (2005), BY ADOPTING AND RELYING UPON PERSONAL OPINIONS, FALSE FACTUAL STATEMENTS, AND MISSTATEMENTS OF EVIDENCE MADE BY THE : GOVERNMENT’S ATTORNEY INSTEAD OF THE ACTUAL CASE RECORD? Li

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right “to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. “[F]Jact[s] that increase[] the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt,” except for prior convictions. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 5380 U.S. 466, 488-90 & n.15 (2000). Apprendi grounded its rule in history and tradition but relied on precedent—Almendarez-Torres v. United States—for the ex- ception to the rule. See id. at 477-838, 487—90 (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)). Can Almendarez-Torres be reconciled with the Sixth Amendment’s history and tradition; and if not, should this Court overrule it?

1

I. Whether a general challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, pursuant to Rule 29(a), preserves for de novo review the full range of sufficiency challenges, stated or unstated.

Il. Whether the intrastate use the internet, in furtherance of a crime, necessarily places that crime “in commerce,” thereby satisfying that jurisdictional element of numerous federal offenses.

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