The Freedom of Information Act embodies a presumption of disclosure. In 2016, Congress enacted the FOIA Improvement Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A), which requires an agency, before withholding, to determine that disclosure of the particular information would foreseeably harm an_ interest protected by a FOIA exemption (or that disclosure is prohibited by law) and to release all reasonably segregable nonexempt material. The Act was intended to promote transparency and curb reflexive use of exemptions by requiring context-specific justifications.

Exemption 7(D) protects “records or information compiled for law-enforcement purposes” to the extent disclosure “could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source,” or information furnished by such a source. Congress enacted this provision to preserve source anonymity |

| and cooperation in criminal and _ analogous | investigations, including —_— protection against

retaliation, harassment, or intimidation.

I. Whether, after the FOIA Improvement Act of

| 2016, an agency invoking Exemption 7(D) must, in addition to establishing that the exemption applies, separately demonstrate that disclosure of the particular information would foreseeably harm an interest protected by that exemption.

IT. Whether Exemption 7(D) permits withholding consistent with FOIA’s 2016 foreseeable-harm ‘requirement when the agency’s asserted risk is recognition of a witness’s account by other

; victims, witnesses, or investigators—rather 4]

1. What is the nature and the cause of action for Mark Braunlich to issue a warrant on June 11, 2019, and to issue a license suspension on February 13, 2020, for the petitioner, Bryant, without probable cause and violating all the elements of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution; and attempting to kidnap the

| petitioner under color of law by issuing the :

warrant? :

2. Ifthe action is civil and there is lack of sworn complaint by an injured party, where is the jurisdiction to issue the warrant with no injured party?

3. If the action is criminal, then is it criminal jurisdiction under Common Law, if so, where is the sworn complaint by an injured : party?

4. Or, is it a criminal jurisdiction under | Admiralty or Military Tribunal venue from Article 1, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution, | and if so, where is the international contract between the petitioner and respondents and; does the Sixth Amendment grant the petitioner the right to know the jurisdiction being applied to issue a warrant and license suspension order?

A forensic pathologist who performed an autopsy on a homicide victim was unavailable for trial. In her place, the State of Georgia offered testimony by a “peer review pathologist who did not participate in the autopsy but testified as to the results based on her review of the autopsy report. Does the surrogate’s oral recitation of testimonial hearsay from an unadmitted autopsy report violate the Confrontation Clause?

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

From 2011 until his arrest in 20138, Respondent Bradley Bieganski operated a girls-only private Christian home-school. Bieganski was arrested after several girls accused him of touching their genitals when they were between the ages of 6 and 9. Bieganski was subsequently convicted of three counts of child molestation. His convictions and sentences were affirmed by the Arizona courts; this Court denied his petition for writ of certiorari, and the district court subsequently denied federal habeas corpus relief. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court, and found that the Arizona statutes under which Bieganski was convicted unconstitutionally shifted the burden of disproving an essential element of the crime–sexual motivation– contrary to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Question Presented 1s:

Did the Ninth Circuit fail to apply the correct deferential standard of review, as set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), and also misapply this Court’s precedents, set out in Martin and Patterson, regarding when an affirmative defense improperly shifts the burden of proof to a criminal defendant, in violation of the Due Process Clause?

In separate proceedings consolidated on review, the state high court affirmed 30-day suspensions of two attorneys, Reverend Girley and Professor Girley (father and daughter), due to extrajudicial statements criticizing a judge and the courts on matters of public concern. These statements, in part, were delivered in a religious forum, where the two attorneys, one of whom is a pastor, practice their sincerely held religious beliefs and followed a directed verdict by a trial judge reversing a jury award of $2.75 million to Reverend Girley’s client, a physician of African heritage. This extraordinary measure included applying a burden- shifting “objective reasonableness” rule (App.11a, 31a, 46a), and upholding protective orders that barred limited, non-deliberative examination of the complain- ing judge. Accordingly, before this Court for decision are the questions:

1. Whether, consistent with the First Amendment, a State may impose professional discipline for out-of- court criticism of a judge and the courts without clear and convincing proof that the attorney made a false statement of fact with knowledge of falsity or serious doubts (actual malice), by instead requiring the attorney to establish an “objectively reasonable factual basis” for the criticism, including when the speech occurs outside court and, in part, 1n a religious setting in a jurisdiction where the religious freedom statute expressly exempts judicial review of the statements and the court 1s comprised of elected judges.

2. Whether, before imposing speech-based profes- sional discipline and/or orders compelling destruction or total surrender to the adverse witness of deposition

I. If a state denies a defendant a public trial by implementing a defective trial structure mechanism to limit the spread of a pandemic at the expense of the defendant’s right to a public trial, is that defendant entitled to relief?

II. Ifcourt-appointed counsel fails to raise meritorious issues of US Constitutional dimension on direct appeal, is that defendant entitled to relief?

III. Did the Coronavirus Pandemic Jury Trial Operational Plan developed and implemented by Wyoming’s Seventh Judicial District deny Mr. Barrett a constitutionally firm trial?

1. Whether defendants may assert as-applied challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) under the Second Amendment.

2. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession by felons violates the Second Amendment as applied to Mr. Dial, who was previously convicted of non-violent drug and property offenses.

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