attorneys’ fees. Hill has sought relief in both state and federal courts continuously since 2006. In 2018, Agency filed im state court to foreclose on the $380,376.20 judgments. In 2015, pursuant to the foreclosure, the state court ordered the Columbia County Court clerk to give a deed to ~81 acres of Hill’s farm to Agency. Hull filed a complaint in the U. S. District Court. The District Court dismissed’ the complaint citing Rooker-Feldman. Hill timely appealed to the U.S. Eleventh Circuit, which vacated and remanded that decision. Subsequently, the District Court again dismissed the complaint citing res judicata. On timely appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal, citing judicial immunity and res judicata.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion citing res

judicata allows the government to overextend and

leverage its permitting monopoly to take private

1. Has a pro se party received due process of notice and redress under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution if the final appealable judgment entry is sent to a non-party attorney and resulted in the loss of an appeal as of right?

2. Did the State violate Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10

L. Ed.2d 215 (1963) and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S. Ct. 763, 31 L. Ed.2d 104 (1972), if the State’s SANE expert withholds impeachment evidence of prior law suits of incompetent examinations and diagnoses?

3. Did trial counsel deny the effective assistance of counsel by failing to discover impeachment evidence of the State’s SANE expert’s history of incompetent examinations and diagnoses?

i

Under Article lil of the Constitution, Federal courts can hear ‘all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, [and] the laws of the United States. ‘US Const, Art Ill, Sec 2. he Supreme Court has interpreted this clause broadly, finding that it allows federal courts to hear any case in which there is a federal ingredient. See, Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S.C. 738 (1824). The Supreme Court has found that a ‘suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action, see, American Well Works v. Layne, 241 U.S. 257 (1916), and therefore, only suits based on federal law, not state lawsuits, are most likely to create federal questions Jurisdiction, see, Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, Grable Test: Courts often use to determine federal questions jurisdiction is called the Grable Test, established in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing. 1. Does the claim have ‘federal questions jurisdiction under Article Ill Section 2 of the Consti8tution? 2. Does the claim meet the requirements for 28 USC 1331 Federal question jurisdiction? See, Grable & Sons Metal Products v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing:

The questions presented are:

(A). Whether a individual receiving Medicaid under Title XIX of the Social security Act (the Act, P.L. 89-97) can sue a physician for violating, the False Claims Act, bind Federal Courts Jurisdiction? And if so, Whether, the limitation on medical malpractice damages in Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. Art. 4590). 11.02 and | 11.03(Vernon Supp.196) is consistent with the TexasConstitution, and if so, whether it applies to limit the liability of each defendant rather than the recovery of each Claimant? |

(B). Whether, punative damages can be levied 4 separate times based on Dr. Bala Davuluri, providing four diagnosis in areas he does not treat nor focus on under Title XIX of the Social security Act(the Act, P.L. 89-97)? C). Whether the First Amendment Limits on intentional Limits on intentional infliction of emotional distress, (IIED) Liability, which certain intentional actions may meet the prima facie case for an (IIED), (Particularly as related to the outrageous conduct components)?

(D). Whether the First Amendment Limits on intentional Limits on intentional infliction of emotional distress, (IIED) Liability, which certain intentional actions may meet the ‘prima facie case’, for an (IIED), (Particularly as related to the ‘outrageous conduct components)?

1. Whether the petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel was infringed upon when counsel failed to argue that, in order for the plain view doctrine, an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment’s protection against the Unreasonable

, Search and Seizure of the Government, to apply, the |

Government must be occupying a place it was lawfully entitled to be, particularly in light of today’s technological advances.

2. Whether, despite the fact that the imposition of sentence _ | may result in the same sentence, was counsel’s performance

, deficient and the petitioner prejudiced when counsel failed to

file a Rule 28 (j) during the pendency of the petitioner’s direct | appeal which would have allowed the petitioner to be resentenced. |

2. Whether the Providence Housing Authority’s failure to investigate or remedy ongoing, well-documented harassment based on Petitioner’s race, religion, and her child’s disability constitutes a violation of the Fair Housing Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, including their respective mandates to provide reasonable

, accommodation and protection from discriminatory housing practices. ,

3. Whether the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s summary denial of Petitioner’s appeal, without hearing or explanation, deprived Petitioner of her right to due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.*“

/ ’ Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619. 2 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.

• Touijer v. Providence Hous. Auth., No. SU-2024-0313-A (R.L 2024). “U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

Tee eennwmrnnen een remem mm sae A TS | GRE CATED /CUMMULATIVE EFFEct AMOUNT TO _FunDhten TRE Ot. iMPosst@iciry OF Getting A Erie Treat IN UIGVM’S Lite TOWN, Qh. DISCUSSING PRE- TURAL PLEA NEGOTIATIONS (INAOM SIBLE) _ LO3, QUESTIONS WHY THE PET Did NOT Confess To THE STATE, Count, TO ey od), Hit Sto OF The STORY? WHy WATT Y SYRS, TAL UME CO WHY dL Goto that AWD NOT PLEA?

LOY, whens The DeFenle 06] ecteD, THe Count SuStAIneD, But THe

| Prosecutor Connnvued Adie SA Me QueINons, (GwoRe Count SosTriNey? GS, Wiens the Pet Wwrd Miley MuliPle Quedions, TO SHow THE JOMT i How he eo the Gon WkEN He fHol bel lolfe (The WOM). Golden hour __ OG. THE Profecuton PLAYED The Avia OF MUAKAIDA -UlOLATION INTEMOC ATO ur Cave No ThanScrw’Prs To the Jory Mon Count, Ad Done Fon Aud OTE Avoio teQoMInes.

a B®. 2d) ——es—“‘“‘<“<‘“‘i‘i‘i‘(‘(‘(‘(iés:S Two AREAS OP ADvSE OF DiscUEeTION BY TRWAL Count DURING Chose NUN ATION OF ee OL. DFO THe Tun Count Err By Prine TO Garant Pet’s Motion ee Fo MISTUAL RechnpinGg THE PRofecuTION OPENING THe Doon” ATO RUUALLY, TO DISCUSSING TNADMSUGLE PRE-TWAL PlemR NEGOTIATIONS. _ bv en

1. Given the United States Supreme Court’s now long standing and clear 5” Amendment jurisprudence, do Florida Courts have authority to expand, or otherwise invent, an exception to the rule announced in Apprendi?
2. Consistent with the strict and secure separation of powers, do Florida Courts have the authority to add words to statutes that were not placed there by the Legislature? Can Florida Courts modify a statute express terms?

| | il

Title 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) requires a court, at the time of sentencing, to “state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.” This Court has previously limited this statute’s mandate and stated that a sentencing court need not issue a full explanation of its reasoning — explaining a court need not write “full opinion” in every case to explain its reasoning. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356-9 (2007). However, the Fifth Amendment guarantees defendants the right to Due Process, including on appeal. But without a complete record on appeal, a defendant cannot argue that a sentencing court failed to properly weigh the factors set forth in § 3553(a), resulting in an unreasonable sentence.

The question presented 1s:

Whether a sentencing court must address mitigating evidence and arguments offered by defense counsel regarding factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 8553(a) when stating its reasons for its imposition of a particular sentence?

1

Petitioner Luis Garza-Gomez challenged the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢g)(1), which makes it a crime for a person convicted of a felony to possess a firearm. He argued that § 922(g)(1)’s permanent disarmament violates the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. The court of appeals affirmed on plain-error review, citing United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458, 472 (5th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 8. Ct. 2822 (2025). In Diaz, the Fifth Circuit relied on a tradition of capital punishment and permanent estate forfeiture to hold that § 922(g)(1) 1s constitutional on its face. The question presented is does § 922(g)(1) violate the Second Amendment?

WHY WILL THE MSPB NOT TAKE JURISDICTION OVER MY REQUEST FOR GRIEVANCE WHEN NUMEROUS PROHIBITED PERSONNEL PRACTICES WERE PERFORMED, THREATS TO MY SAFETY HAPPENED INSIDE THE FEDERAL oo BUILDING AND INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL PROCEDURES WERE NOT ) FOLLOWED REGARDING MY EMPLOYMENT AS A FEDERAL EMPLOYEE, ESPECIALLY THE PROPER TRAINING OF A NEW EMPLOYEE (MYSELF) AND : THE APPROPRIATE COMMUNICATION THAT IS STANDARD AMONG

| PROFESSIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES TO SAID EMPLOYEE (MYSELF)? (WHY AM | BEING FORCED TO LIVE OUT THE DURATION OF MY LIFE IN THIS GREAT COUNTRY OF OURS WITHOUT THE ENJOYMENT OF MY ae CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, AMONG THOSE PARTICULARLY THE FOURTEENTH : AMENDMENT?

: AM | ONE OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA? MAY | |

EXPERIENCE JUSTICE? MAY I LIVE WITH DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY? MAY | ENJOY A REASONABLE AMOUNT OF GENERAL WELFARE? MAY | SECURE THE | BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY? WHY IS IT A PAINFUL FACT THAT | HAVE NOT BEEN PROTECTED FROM HARM? WHY AM | UNABLE TO OBTAIN GAINFUL EMPLOYMENT? WHY AM | REPEATEDLY FORCED OUT OF EMPLOYMENT? WHY IS IT THAT NO ONE WILL REPRESENT ME IN MATTERS OF LAW? WHY AM | CONTINUOUSLY FORCED INTO A STATE OF BEING UNEMPLOYED? WHY AM | BEING FORCED INTO HOMELESSNESS? WHY IS SOCIETY STRUCTURED IN A MANNER THAT LEAVES ME IGNORANT WHEN | TRY TO ENJOY MY SHARE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM IN JUST ABOUT ANY ASPECT? WHY IS IT TODAY NOVEMBER 21, 2025 | AM NOT FREE?)

1. Oath of Office & Due Process Whether a state court judgment is void when initiated by a municipal officer who never filed the constitutionally required oath of office; and whether the Due Process Clause requires courts—particularly after Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. ___ (2024), and E.M_D. Sales, Inc. v. Carrera, 604 U.S. ___ (2025)—to independently review such jurisdictional defects rather than presume regularity. ,

2. Stateless Person & Federal Removal } Whether a stateless resident of the United States, asserting violations of federal constitutional rights, is entitled to removal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,

, 1441, or 1443 when state courts refuse to adjudicate those federal claims.

3. AI-Assisted Petitioning & the First Amendment Whether the First Amendment’s Petition Clause protects an individual’s right to use artificial intelligence as a speech-prosthetic to draft legal filings, and whether courts may disregard petitions prepared with AI assistance consistent with the right to petition for redress of grievances.

5 ,

1. Whether the Supreme Court should issue an extraordinary writ of mandamus where the petitioner has provided documented evidence of fraudulent docket entries which includes overwritten judicial orders, altered metadata, iT’ext-modified PDF’s inconsistent judicial signatures, and CM/ECF backend interference that replaced legitimate court filings with fabricated files?

2. Whether the mandamus 1s warranted where the petitioner direct appeal was falsely misclassified as interlocutory depriving petitioner of her appellate rights, and to remove the misclassified file 66 from the docket?

3. Whether intervention 1s necessary where multiple judicial filings were never mailed, where filings were mis-docketed and ignored. And, where both the District Court and the D.C. Circuit have failed to act on the

. petitioner’s motions, leaving Ms. Thomas with no adequate alternative remedy?

4, Whether this court should intervene to protect the integrity of the judiciary where the pattern of obstruction began at the Atlanta division EEOC and continued through the defense counsel, and individuals with docket access, and CM/ECF administrators, resulting in the petitioner-a pro-se black woman being denied access to the courts?

ti

Did the Sixth Circuits denial of a COA decide the important federal question related to sufficiency of the evidence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a way that disregards the decisions of this Court holdings in Jn re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, and Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, and 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)?

, Whether due process extends to the representation of counsel on habeas corpus review, and if due process requires counsels conduct to meet the Sixth Amendment standard as this court held in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 or ata minimum laws of agency? 7 Can hired counsel for the purposes of representation during habeas corpus review be deemed ineffective counsel? Can this ineffectiveness of counsel on habeas review allow for review of the higher courts?

Did the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit impose an improper and unduly burdensome certificate of Appealability standard that contravenes this courts precedent and deepens a four-circuit split when it denied Ronald Wolters COA to review his 2254 Habeas petition?