Although Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to hold state actors accountable for violating federal civil rights, the application of inconsistent and unreasona- bly short state statutes of limitations has impeded access to this important federal remedy. This petition presents the Court an opportunity to revisit the cur- rent fifty-state borrowing framework in light of Congress’s enactment of a federal catchall statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a). Section 1658(a) now provides a “suitable” federal rule of decision that did not exist when this Court last addressed the ap- propriate limitations period for Section 1983 claims. This petition also enables the Court to decide the question it expressly reserved in Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989): whether a one-year state limitations period is inconsistent with the federal interests under- lying Section 1983.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a)’s uniform residual limitations period provides a “suitable” federal rule to govern federal claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

2. Whether Kentucky’s one-year residual personal injury statute of limitations is too short to be con- sistent with the federal interests underpinning Section 1983.

The Newspaper Preservation Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1804 (NPA), provides antitrust immunity for “joint operating agreements” (JOAs) between a failing newspaper and a stronger one so communities do not lose competitive and diverse viewpoints. All agree that JOAs predating the NPA do not require Attorney General “prior written consent.” The Circuits, however, are now split over whether an amendment to a previously approved, post-N PA JOA needs another round of Attorney General signoff to be lawful.

The Circuits to address the issue—the D.C. and Sixth Circuits—have held that additional consent is not required. At most, an unapproved amendment might be subject to antitrust scrutiny, but it is lawful. The Department of Justice’s contemporaneous implementing regulations reflect the same statutory interpretation.

In this case, the Ninth Circuit created a circuit split. It is the only court to hold that all amendments to previously approved, post-NPA JOAs require additional consent to be lawful. The Ninth Circuit invalidated the amended JOA between the Las Vegas Sun and Las Vegas Review- Journal and, on the same reasoning, sua sponte declared unlawful the DOJ’s implementing regulations.

The question presented is:

1. Whether, under the NPA, an amendment to a previously approved, post-NPA JOA needs another Attorney General written consent to be lawful or to be entitled to antitrust immunity.

Just 21 days before Governor DeSantis signed Mr. Walls’s death warrant, on October 28, 2025, records surfaced implicating Florida’s execution process during the last year of eighteen record-setting, breakneck-speed executions. Those records revealed that, over the course of the year, execution officials in Florida increasingly shunned their own lethal injection protocol, instead barreling forward through executions while preparing lower dosages of drugs than required, administering expired drugs, and preparing unauthorized drugs altogether. These records raised grave concerns that Mr. Walls, who is already medically vulnerable and had been diagnosed four months earlier with conditions known to cause complications with lethal injection, could suffer a torturous death in violation of the Eighth Amendment. One week after his death warrant was signed, Mr. Walls filed an as-applied method- of-execution suit requesting an injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Mr. Walls proffered the recently discovered execution records, combined with the findings regarding his medical conditions as the basis for his challenge.

The district court refused to review the substance of Mr. Walls’s claims or his evidentiary proffer, or even hold a hearing on his complaint’s request for a preliminary injunction. The district court conceded that “Walls has presented evidence demonstrating that he may well suffer a cruel death by experiencing a feeling akin to drowning.” NDFL-ECF 22 at 10-11. But without analyzing any of the four established factors for a stay or injunction, including the likelihood of success on the merits, the district court summarily denied Mr. Walls a stay of execution solely

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In 2018, Congress enacted the Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act, which established a mandatory minimum restitution amount of $3,000 per victim for certain child exploitation offenses. See 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(2)(B).

As this Court has repeatedly held, the Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to have a jury find all the facts necessary to criminal punishment. Thus, a jury must find any fact that increases the statutory maximum penalty, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), as well as any fact that increases the mandatory minimum, Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013). This bedrock constitutional rule applies “broadly” to all forms of criminal punishment, including monetary penalties like fines. Southern Union Co. v. United States, 567 U.S. 348, 350 (2012).

The question presented is: Does the Sixth Amendment require a jury to find the facts needed to justify a restitution order meeting or exceeding § 2259(b)(2)(B)’s $38,000 mandatory minimum?

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The Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial… .”

The question presented is: Whether an appellate court reviews de novo, or instead with considerable deference, a district court’s determination under the Speedy Trial Clause that the government was diligent in bringing the accused to trial.

1

At Mr. VanDivner’s post-conviction hearing, it was determined that three pieces of evidence had been suppressed by the Commonwealth prior to his trial. This evidence was material support for a voluntary manslaughter defense. If competent trial counsel had been provided this evidence, she would have undertaken a more thorough investigation that would have uncovered additional information supporting a voluntary manslaughter defense theory. Counsel would then have properly presented this theory at trial, and the burden would have necessarily shifted to the Commonwealth to disprove that Mr. VanDivner acted in the heat of passion. This evidence would have also supported trial counsel’s on-the-record request for a voluntary manslaughter instruction.

These eventualities were not considered by the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in denying Mr. VanDivner’s habeas petition nor by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in denying his request for a certificate of appealability.

The question presented is:

Should a certificate of appealability have issued, where the suppressed evidence, | considered cumulatively, would have placed a burden on the Commonwealth to disprove heat of passion and would have provided threshold support for trial counsel’s voluntary manslaughter instruction request?

1

The Fifth Circuit strictly enforces a waiver of appeal and holds that the walver bars challenging an illegal or unconstitutional sentence.! The waiver’s only exceptions are: 1) ineffective assistance of counsel and 2) a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum.? There is no miscarriage of justice exception in the Fifth Circuit. For a sentencing court to consider information about a defendant extrinsic to his PSR without at least giving him prior notice violates Fed R. Crim P. 82 & U.S.S.G. Sec. 6A1.33 and also violates his due process right to be sentenced upon information which is not false or materially incorrect.4 Although this error was preserved at Ita’s sentencing, he was denied appellate review because his plea agreement contained a general waiver of appeal.

In direct conflict, in the Ninth Circuit, a waiver of appeal does not bar a defendant from challenging an illegal sentence® including due process violations. ? 1 United States v. Jones, 134 F.4*» 831, 839-840 (58 Cir. 2025) citing United States v. Barnes, 953 F.3d 383, 389 (52 Cir. 2020). 2 Jones, 134 F.4*4 at 840. 3 United States v. Garcia, 797 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 2015) 4 United States v. Smith, 13 F.3d 860, 866 (5 Cir. 1994). 5 United States v. Ita, No. 24-40444, 2025 WL 2417750 (5t» Cir. Aug 21, 2025) 6 United States v. Wells, 29 F.4th 580, 584 (9th Cir. 2022). 7 United States v. Odachyan, 749 F.3d 798, 801 (9t» Cir. 2014).

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