Federal employees’ rights are determined under statutes which require that “all personnel actions effecting employees or applicants for employment… in executive agencies as defined in Title 5… shall be made free from any discrimination .. .” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (“based on” race, color, religion, sex, or national origin) (emphasis added); 29 U.S.C. § 6338a(a) (“based on” age). The language and syntax of these statutes differ from private sector statutes. Babb v. Wilkie, 589 U.S. 399, 409-413 (2020). The questions presented are:

Whether federal District Court jury instructions and decisions on motions for summary judgment must be consistent with Babb uv. Wilkies statutory framework and specifically:

1. As to summary judgment whether the “shall be made free from any discrimination” permits summary judgment of: (a) federal-sector adverse personnel decisions when a combination of sex and age (1.e., older female) are considered in the process of making those decisions; and (b) damages caused by consideration of EEO activity during the process of making adverse personnel actions.

2. In jury instructions, failing to instruct the jury on what constitutes differential treatment and failing to instruct on burden shifting to the defendant under LeSage and Mt. Healthy.

1

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act allows suit against a foreign sovereign that “has waived its 1m- munity … by implication.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1). The Second Circuit has long held that a foreign sover- eign impliedly waives its immunity from a suit seek- ing recognition of a foreign judgment confirming an arbitral award where the sovereign both (1) joins the U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 (the “New York Convention”) and (2) agrees to binding arbitration of a dispute in another Convention state. See Seetransport Wiking Trader Schiffarhtsgesellschaft MBH & Co. v. Navimpex Centrala Navala, 989 F.2d 572, 581-5838 (2d Cir. 1993).

In this case, the District of Columbia Circuit ex- plicitly disagreed. App.12a—-13a. As a result, an acknowledged conflict of authority exists between two of the “principal” circuits in which parties seek to en- force arbitral awards against foreign sovereigns. See Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Hemerich & Payne Intern. Drilling Co., 581 U.S. 170, 186 (2017).

The question presented by this Petition 1s:

When a foreign sovereign that is a party to the New York Convention agrees to arbitrate a dispute governed by the Convention, does it impliedly waive immunity from an action in U.S. courts to recognize a valid foreign judgment confirming the arbitral award in another member state. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1).

Petitioners owned a lot with a slowly failing 1937 bulkhead onshore of the shoreline along Hood Canal, Washington state. Hundreds of properties along Hood Canal use bulkheads to control erosion. The lot has had no continuous surface water connection to any body of water since 1937. In August 2017, with state approval arising from the Coastal Zone Management Act, Peti- tioners performed routine maintenance of their 1937 bulkhead. In August 2020, the United States filed a Clean Water Act complaint alleging Petitioners caused environmental injuries that incurred an astounding $323, 134,524 of penalties. In November 2020, the state’s lead agency found the permitted activities were complete, in compliance, and closed its permit. Without any violations under state law, Petitioners received a shoreline variance and permit to build a house on the lot.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the default judgment entered in favor of the United States while disregarding the District Court’s statement, “Although Mr. Bayley obtained approval from Mason County for the project, he took no steps to comply with federal law.” The questions presented are:

1. Did Congress provide the ultimate remedy to federal overreach by releasing and relinquishing the United States’ complaint for Clean Water Act environ- mental violations due to Petitioners following state authority?

2. Did the United States waive the allegations raised in its complaint for Clean Water Act environ- mental violations due to its approval of the State of Washington’s environmental program, which resulted

The American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-2, 1385 Stat. 4, established the Special Financial Assistance program to provide funding for certain se- verely underfunded multiemployer pension plans. A plan is eligible for such assistance if, as relevant here, it “is in critical and declining status (within the meaning of [29 U.S.C. 1085(b)(6)]) in any plan year beginning in 2020 through 2022.” 29 U.S.C. 1432(b)(1)(A) (Supp. ITI 2021). Critical and declining status is one of several possible pension-plan “zone statuses” set forth in 29 U.S.C. 1085. Ifa plan terminates as a result of the mass withdrawal of every employer from the plan, Section 1085 ceases to apply to the plan. See 29 U.S.C. 1081(c¢). The question presented is:

Whether a multiemployer pension plan that termi- nated through mass withdrawal before the 2020 plan year is eligible for Special Financial Assistance under 29 U.S.C. 1432(b)(1)(A).

(I)

The District Court granted the Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss, by facial attack, the Petitioner’s Complaint under Rule 12(b)(1). The material part of the Complaint was to recover money the Respondents (collectively the “County”) took as taxes which the Committee did not owe without notice and in violation of their civil rights.

The District Court 1n its Order relied on allegations of fact in the County’s Motion to Dismiss despite facial attack case law. Some of those allegations were false and material. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s Order and Judgment with little attention to the rule that motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) with facial attack must accept well pled allegations of the complaint as true.

The Question Presented Is:

Because the District Court and the County agreed on the facial attack procedure, should the Tenth Circuit on appeal have reversed the Order of the Dis- trict Court which used in its Order allegations of fact from County’s Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1)?

At issue in this case is the ability of government to referee religious services 1n a house of worship.

Government officials in California imposed COVID rules governing any “business,” which was defined to include churches. These rules — governing such matters as social distancing, masking, and capacity ceilings — contained multiple exemptions, but did not allow Petitioners Calvary Chapel San Jose and Pastor Mike McClure to conduct religious services 1n accord with their religious beliefs. County officials sought injunctive relief and contempt sanctions for the church’s noncompliance (both of which were overturned in prior proceedings), then sought nearly three million dollars in fines. The state courts upheld fines 1n excess of a million dollars. The four questions presented are:

1. Do COVID restrictions that contain multiple exceptions, exceptions permitting comparable risks of viral transmission, trigger strict scrutiny under Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), because they are not “generally applicable”?

2. Should this Court hold that the church autonomy doctrine, which provides an exception to Smith, includes not just a “ministerial exception” but also a “liturgical exception”?

3. If Smith does not require strict scrutiny in this case and does not include a liturgical exception, but instead allows governments to micromanage religious services, should this Court overrule Smith as incompatible with a proper reading of the Free Exercise Clause?

Article I, § 4, cl. 1, the “Elections Clause” of the United States Constitution, delegates to the states, the Time, Manner, and Place of conducting national elections. The Pennsylvania Constitution delegates this power to the General Assembly, which has further delegated this power to County Boards of Elections (including the Petitioners). 25 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2641(a).

County Boards of Elections therefore have authority, inter alia, to purchase voting machines for voting in national elections. 25 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2642(c). In 2019, the Petitioners signed a contract with Dominion for the provision of voting machines for the November 2020 General Election. The Petitioners filed suit against Dominion for breach of contract, when they discovered that the voting machines were defective and compromised. The District Court summarily dismissed, ruling that the Petitioners lacked standing and their suit had no merit. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

I.

Did the District Court err in holding that the Petitioners failed to state a claim for breach of contract on the basis that they did not have standing to sue Dominion, vendors of a product that the Petitioners purchased by contract, where the Petitioners are constitutionally and_ statutorily delegated the authority to contract with vendors for the provision of voting machines to conduct national elections?

What is the meaning of religion as it concerns the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the 1st Amendment, and what are the implications of such?

, How is the court system and entire government supposed to handle, according to their constitutional law, an individual who proffers evidence of his Anointment according to Christian Scripture?

According to compelling interest tests in Free Exercise cases and the solemn oath of the government to serve the better interest of the people, that the people may not understand themselves as is remedied by the mechanisms of a Republic, would it not then be explicitly in the interest of the government to respect the Truth when the Truth has been revealed? ,

_ ii