The Federal Bureau of Investigation obtained four warrants from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to surveil Petitioner Dr. Carter Page. But its applications contained multiple errors, omissions, and misstatements that the FBI later concluded vitiated its showing of probable cause. Worse, it was later revealed that two agents leaked information about the FBI’s surveillance to the press, resulting in an April 2017 article in The Washington Post on which the government expressly “declined to comment.” The United States first acknowledged its surveillance abuses in an Office of the Inspector General report two years later. Less than a year later, Dr. Page sued the individual respondents—the FBI officials and leaders involved in the surveillance—for unlawfully surveilling him and unlawfully using or disclosing surveillance-obtained information.

The D.C. Circuit held that Dr. Page’s claims accrued, not when the government acknowledged its abuses, but when Dr. Page became aware of the anonymously sourced, unverified news article. And the D.C. Circuit did so without applying—and in contravention of—this Court’s “standard rule” that a claim does not accrue “until the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.’ Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 603 U.S. 799, 810-811 (2024) (emphasis added).

The question presented is: Do claims that the government violated surveillance authorities accrue as a matter of law based merely on facts that might lead a victim to suspect unlawful surveillance, rather than on facts that would establish a basis for relief?

In the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress codified an exception under 28 U.S.C. §1447(d) allowing appellate review for cases “removed pursuant to” 28 U.S.C. §1448, which codification guarantees the availability of a federal forum for certain civil rights claims. See §901, 78 Stat. 266.

Some courts of appeals have interpreted Section 1443(1) to require exercise of the civil right at issue to avail of protection under a federal statute with an anti-prosecution provision; other courts of appeals have required that the federal statute merely proscribe coercion or intimidation of any person in the exercise of the civil right. Others yet have required that the state law at issue be facially unconstitutional. Even this Court has conveyed mixed messages about the sufficiency of the state law violating constitutionality as applied.

The question presented is the following:

Whether a defendant may remove a state

court proceeding to federal court under

28 U.S.C. § 144801) when the state action

itself violates constitutional rights or

federal law.

The United States Constitution grants certain | inalienable rights to its citizens.

The purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment is to protect people from being abused by a_ powerful | sovernment…and the nght to due process. The Judicial Act of 1789 and 28 U.S.C. § 1654 give litigants the right to represent themselves. The Supreme Court in Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) gave the pro se litigant the right to be heard.

The question presented is whether the Petitioners’

| rights were violated with respect to the Court’s actions of reversing a decision and remedy granted just because an attorney suddenly appeared for the adversary, and whether those actions violated the rights granted citizens by the Fourteenth Amendment, the Judicial Act of 1789 and 28 U.S.C. § 1654, and the standards set by the United States Supreme Court in Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).

Should a case be summarily dismissed against a self- represented litigant in deference to an attorney, without the matter being fully heard and adjudicated on the merits, if only because the litigant is self-represented and an unwarranted courtesy is being given to the attorney’?

When police make an arrest, they need to know whether they need a warrant to look inside any bags the arrestee might be carrying. Yet right now, the answer is, “It depends.”

Courts generally pick one of two tests. Some courts look to Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969), which authorizes a warrantless search “of the arrestee’s person,” as well as the area within the arrestee’s “immediate control,” when justified by concerns for officer safety or evidence preservation. Others look to United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1978), which adopts a categorical rule: a lawful custodial arrest authorizes a full search of the arrestee—including any bags the person might be carrying—without any further justification.

In this case, police searched a backpack Michael Keith Allman was carrying moments before his arrest. Applying Chimel (and expressly rejecting Robinson), the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that the search violated the Fourth Amendment because the State had not shown that “the backpack was in an area from within which Mr. Allman might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.” App.30a (cleaned up).

Thus, the question presented is:

Whether the State must show that an arrestee could access a weapon or destructible evidence from a bag the arrestee was carrying immediately before arrest to justify a search of that bag incident to the arrest.

In light of our current toxic and vindictive politics and a circuit split, under a-person-of-ordinary-firmness test, does a referral by one governmental official to another governmental official for a potential criminal investigation constitute adverse action sufficient to meet the elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim where there is no indication that the petitioner was ever investigated?

1. Whether, consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Federal Arbitration Act, a state court may extend the claim preclusion doctrine to deprive a nonparty of its day in court and extinguish its contractual claims based on a prior arbitration award where the tribunal had no jurisdiction over the nonparty, its contracts, or its claims.

2. Whether, consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the due process limitations established by this Court, a state court may extend the claim preclusion doctrine to deprive a nonparty of its day in court and extinguish its contractual claims by finding an exception to nonparty preclusion based on corporate affiliation and overlapping rights and interests, where the nonparty’s rights and interests were not represented and its claims were not resolved in the prior action.

Internal Revenue Code Section 6751(b)(1) provides that “[n]o penalty under this title shall be assessed unless the initial determination of such assessment 1s personally approved (in writing) by the immediate supervisor of the individual making such determination or such higher level official as the Secretary may designate.”

The question presented:

Is a formal written communication from the IRS informing a taxpayer that penalties have been determined to apply and that solicits payment of those penalties an “initial determination” that requires written managerial approval under Section 6751(b)?

1. Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, in order to determine whether the parent of a disabled child is entitled to reimbursement from the local school district for a unilateral placement, local and state administrative officers and courts apply the Burlington/Carter analysis. If the parent prevails on the first two prongs of that test, is there a rebuttable presumption of full reimbursement, which the school district may rebut only by producing evidence showing that the equities do not favor full reimbursement?

2. Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, when a parent wishes to seek reimbursement for their disabled child’s unilateral placement, they are required to provide the local school district a Ten-Day Notice before withdrawing their disabled student from the public school and unilaterally placing them in a private school. To obtain a_- reduction’ of reimbursement for a unilateral placement under Prong III of the Burlington/Carter test on the grounds that the parent failed to comply with the IDEA’s ten-day notice requirement, must a school district show that it was harmed by the _ parent’s noncompliance?

1. Whether the Ninth Circuit violated petitioners’ Fifth Amendment due-process rights by summarily denying in-forma-pauperis status and dismissing three related appeals as “frivoious” without addressing |

| more than a dozen pending substantive motions. | 2° Whether the repeated re-labeling of duly filed writs of mandamus and sanctions motions as

_ “miscellaneous pro se filings” constitutes a denial of meaningful appellate review. 3. Whether assigning the same judicial panel to ali three appeals and issuing virtual’y identical | dismissal orders violated the Ninth Circuit’s random-assignment procedures and the constitutional guarantee of impartial tribunals. | PARTIES TO THE PROCEED!NG Petitioners: Loni Nicole Granger and Casey Michael Granger. , : . , Respondents: United States of America, et al. | : : | OPINIONS BELOW , , | Unpublished memorandum dispositions and judgmenis entered October 7 and 9, 2025, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. : | “ } | JURISDICTION : “. a - Judgments were entered October 7 and 9, 2025. This petition is timely under 28 U.S.C. § 2101ic). , Jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) and Supreme Court Rule 12.4, as this petition seeks , review of multiple related judgments involving the same parties and overlapping questions. } CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED “

• U.S. Const. amend. V; 28 U.S.C § 1975(e)(2); Ninth Circuit Internal Operating Procedures 6.1.

, STATEMENT OF THE CASE | :

Petitioners filed three separate appeals—Nos. 25-2781, 25-3342, and 25-3675-—in the Ninth Circuit. | Under governing procedures, each appeal should have been assigned randomiy. Instead, all three – were assigned to the same panel. —

, The panel then issued three nearly identical memorandum dispositions within hours of each other, ‘ dismissing ail appeals as “frivolous.” The court did not aduress more than a dozen pending motions, including writs of mandamus and sanctions motions. The Clerk reclassified substantive filings as

. “miscellaneous pro se submissions,” preventing judicial review. . These actions deprived petitioners of individualized appellate consideration and violated structural rules

designed to ensure impartiauty.

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1) 1S unconstitutional on its Face or as applied to Petitioner because, consistent with the Second Amendment, the federal government may not permanently disarm a citizen based exclusively on a prior felony conviction.

2. Under Esteras v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2031 (2025), should Petitioner’s prison sentence for violating a condition of supervised release be vacated because the district court relied on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2) (A).

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Petitioner Miguel Abreu possessed a gun only because, during a dispute, he disarmed another person and then retreated. Because he had two prior felony convictions, he was charged and convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢)(1).

The question presented is whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face or as applied to Mr. Abreu because, consistent with the Second Amendment, the federal government may not permanently disarm citizens like him, preventing them from defending themselves.

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Under federal law, murder is defined as “the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.” 18 U.S.C. § 1111. Voluntary manslaughter is defined as “the unlawful killing of a human being without malice[, u]pon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.” 18 U.S.C. § 1112(a).

In Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 692-704 (1975), after examining the historical development of homicide crimes, this Court held that Due Process requires the prosecution to prove the absence of the heat of passion in order to convict a defendant of murder, when the evidence would also support a jury’s conclusion that the defendant acted in the heat of passion.

The question presented here is: In a federal homicide prosecution, must the jury be instructed that the government has the burden of proving the absence of the heat of passion before the jury can find a defendant guilty of second degree murder whenever a party requests that the jury consider the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter? Or is such an instruction only required when the defendant argues for or requests instruction on the lesser included offense?

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1. Do convicted felons have a Second Amendment right, or do only law-abiding persons enjoy this right?

2. Does 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) withstand Second Amendment scrutiny in all of its applications, or is it unconstitutional as applied to some felons?

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