In response to requests for records under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) regarding potential domestic surveillance abuse, the respondent agencies issued so-called Glomar responses that refuse to confirm or deny the existence of any responsive record on the supposed grounds that doing so would reveal information protected by a FOIA exemption. Worse, the agencies issued those responses without even searching for responsive records. The D.C. Circuit approved the agencies’ searchless Glomar responses on the mistaken theory that FOIA allows agencies to decline even to search for responsive records if the agency believes such records—were they to exist—would be subject to a Glomar response.

The questions presented are:

1. Does FOIA allow agencies invoking any of the exemptions in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), including those not based on national security, to refuse to confirm or deny the existence of any records responsive to a FOIA request?

2. Assuming FOIA allows such a response, may an agency issue it without first searching for responsive records to determine whether its concern actually applies to all responsive records and/or whether some can be released in segregated or redacted form?

1. Should the district court have held an evidentiary hearing to address Petitioners’ allegations that pieces of paper purporting to be summonses lacked the essential attributes justifying characterization as summonses?

2. Did the Notice of Agreed Order filed in the district court on May 238, 2024, preserve the petitioners’ right of appeal when it stated that the Movants agree to the order in form and reserve the right to ask the Court to reconsider its rulings and/or appeal the substance of the rulings?

3. Did the district court, the petitioners, and the respondent consider the Decision of the district court to be final within the meaning of 12 U.S.C. §3410(d) when that Court issued an unopposed stay to its ruling until the Fifth Circuit decides Petitioners’ appeal of that ruling?

4, Are the forty-one (41) States’ Constit-ution Open Court Provisions (App.22-36) “laws of the several states [that] shall be regarded as rules of decision” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1652 tantamount to an amendment of the United States Constitution, civen that they typically provide, as 1s the case under Tex. Const. Art. I, § 13 (App.33-34), that “[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law” and given further that it requires only 38 States to ratify an amendment to the Constitution, or if not tantamount to an amendment, laws that should be given considerable weight by this Court in this matter?

Whether a federal court exercising diversity juris- diction exceeds its authority under Erie R. Co. v. To- mpkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1988) by creating a new state law duty for insurers to provide “objectively reason- able” notice of potential claims to reinsurers when the State’s courts and legislature have not previously recognized such a duty?

1. Whether the District Court is precluded from. |

exercising jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman } doctrine when Petitioner’s injury occurred prior to

the state-court decision; the federal lawsuit did not seek to disturb any state court decision; and the > federal action would not affect any of the other . parties to the state court proceeding? a

2. Whether the Seventh Circuit erred when it. a purported to reach the merits of Petitioner’s ! underlying lawsuit, dismissing the same for failure to state a claim, before conclusively determining that , the federal courts had jurisdiction to decide the same? :

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) requires state prisoners to exhaust all available state remedies prior to filing a federal ha- beas petition, unless “circumstances exist that render such [state-court] process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(i1). Below, Petitioner Alan Lane Hicks argued that a 27- year delay, during which the state court assigned his case to a conflicted judge for 15 years and lost his case file, amounted to circumstances that rendered the state’s process ineffective. The Fourth Circuit recog- nized that Hicks’s “journey through West Virginia’s state court system” was “Kafkaesque,” and “no doubt offend[ed] basic notions of how a state should treat its prisoners,’ and the state was therefore entitled to no comity. App. 3a, 20a, 15a n.7. But the Fourth Circuit held that a one-sentence order from the state court dis- missing Hicks’s state petition—issued a week after oral argument in the Fourth Circuit—precluded ex- cusing non-exhaustion under § 2254(b)(1)(B)(11).

This Court has never directly interpreted § 2254(b)(1)(B)(i), and circuits are irreconcilably split on whether such eleventh-hour, state-court movement 1s dispositive when analyzing whether inordinate de- lay warrants excusing non-exhaustion under § 2254(b)(1)(B)(@)).

The question presented 1s:

Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(@1)’s exception to the exhaustion requirement for “circumstances” that render state proceedings “ineffective” can apply when a state court reanimates inordinately delayed proceedings after a petitioner files in federal court.

The free speech guarantee of the First Amendment applies to servicemembers. This guarantee is limited by military law and tradition. Part of that law and tradition is that military courts use this Court’s free speech jurisprudence when deciding the scope of the free speech guarantee for servicemembers. Despite this, military courts continue to rely on an outdated, abrogated obscenity standard that this Court has rejected.

The question presented 1s:

Whether the military’s obscenity standard is unconstitutional under Parker v. Levy and Miller v. California.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) provides that “circumstances constituting fraud” must be “state[d] with particularity.” The circuits are divided over what Rule 9(b) requires in qui tam cases arising under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729, which prohibits the submission of false or fraudulent claims for payment to the Government. Six circuits allow qui tam plaintiffs to proceed if the submission of false claims can reasonably be inferred from other well-pleaded facts. Three circuits, including the Eleventh, hold that the submission of claims cannot be inferred from other circumstances; plaintiffs must plead direct, firsthand knowledge of actual false claims submitted to the Government to overcome dismissal. Three others generally require the plaintiff to plead the details of a specific false invoice submitted to the Government.

This Court has thrice sought the views of the United States. Each time, the Government argued that a qui tam complaint satisfies Rule 9(b) if it pleads “other sufficiently reliable indicia supporting a strong inference that false claims were submitted to the government,” but predicted that the circuit conflict would resolve itself. It has not. A complementary petition presenting the same issue is pending before this Court in United States ex rel. Olsen v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., No. 25-347.

The Question Presented is:

Whether a qui tam complaint satisfies Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) when it alleges detailed firsthand knowledge of a fraudulent billing scheme paired with reliable indicia supporting a_ strong inference that false claims were submitted to the Government, or whether relators must also plead direct knowledge of actual false claim submissions.

In an earlier decision in this case, Brownback v. King, 592 U.S. 209 (2021), the Court “forged a new interpretation” of the Federal Tort Claims Act’s judg- ment bar, 28 U.S.C. 2676. Pet. App. 21a (Clay, J., dis- senting). Brownback held that, “despite the absence of subject matter jurisdiction,” a district court order can trigger the judgment bar to foreclose claims against individual federal employees. Pet. App. 21a (Clay, J., dissenting). On remand, the Sixth Circuit applied Brownback’s change in procedural law to “ru- inous effect,” retroactively barring “King’s separate constitutional claims that were still pending on ap- peal, *** leaving King with no legal recourse against the federal officers who brutalized him.” Jd. at 25a (Clay, J., dissenting).

King moved for relief from judgment under Fed- eral Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), citing the Ninth Circuit’s grant of such relief in the similar change-of- procedural-law case Henson v. Fidelity National Fi- nancial, Inc., 943 F.3d 484 (9th Cir. 2019). But the Sixth Circuit ignored Henson and denied King relief. As Judge Clay observed in dissent, the decision below created an outcome-determinative split between the circuits. Pet. App. 26a—28a.

King now petitions this Court to hear his case again. This time the question presented 1s:

Whether a litigant can claim relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) when a change in settled proce- dural law retroactively vitiates the litigant’s reasona- ble reliance on the law.

In an earlier decision in this case, Brownback v. King, 592 U.S. 209 (2021), the Court “forged a new interpretation” of the Federal Tort Claims Act’s judg- ment bar, 28 U.S.C. 2676. Pet. App. 21a (Clay, J., dis- senting). Brownback held that, “despite the absence of subject matter jurisdiction,” a district court order can trigger the judgment bar to foreclose claims against individual federal employees. Pet. App. 21a (Clay, J., dissenting). On remand, the Sixth Circuit applied Brownback’s change in procedural law to “ru- inous effect,” retroactively barring “King’s separate constitutional claims that were still pending on ap- peal, *** leaving King with no legal recourse against the federal officers who brutalized him.” Jd. at 25a (Clay, J., dissenting).

King moved for relief from judgment under Fed- eral Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), citing the Ninth Circuit’s grant of such relief in the similar change-of- procedural-law case Henson v. Fidelity National Fi- nancial, Inc., 943 F.3d 484 (9th Cir. 2019). But the Sixth Circuit ignored Henson and denied King relief. As Judge Clay observed in dissent, the decision below created an outcome-determinative split between the circuits. Pet. App. 26a—28a.

King now petitions this Court to hear his case again. This time the question presented 1s:

Whether a litigant can claim relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) when a change in settled proce- dural law retroactively vitiates the litigant’s reasona- ble reliance on the law.

In an earlier decision in this case, Brownback v. King, 592 U.S. 209 (2021), the Court “forged a new interpretation” of the Federal Tort Claims Act’s judg- ment bar, 28 U.S.C. 2676. Pet. App. 21a (Clay, J., dis- senting). Brownback held that, “despite the absence of subject matter jurisdiction,” a district court order can trigger the judgment bar to foreclose claims against individual federal employees. Pet. App. 21a (Clay, J., dissenting). On remand, the Sixth Circuit applied Brownback’s change in procedural law to “ru- inous effect,” retroactively barring “King’s separate constitutional claims that were still pending on ap- peal, *** leaving King with no legal recourse against the federal officers who brutalized him.” Jd. at 25a (Clay, J., dissenting).

King moved for relief from judgment under Fed- eral Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), citing the Ninth Circuit’s grant of such relief in the similar change-of- procedural-law case Henson v. Fidelity National Fi- nancial, Inc., 943 F.3d 484 (9th Cir. 2019). But the Sixth Circuit ignored Henson and denied King relief. As Judge Clay observed in dissent, the decision below created an outcome-determinative split between the circuits. Pet. App. 26a—28a.

King now petitions this Court to hear his case again. This time the question presented 1s:

Whether a litigant can claim relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) when a change in settled proce- dural law retroactively vitiates the litigant’s reasona- ble reliance on the law.

In military courts-martial, the Entry of Judgment (KoJ) is the final judgment marking the end of trial and the beginning of the post-trial process. In the Department of the Air Force, a memorandum called a “First Indorsement” memorializes receipt of the Kod. The First Indorsement summarizes criminal indexing requirements, including indexing for the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS).

On the First Indorsement, one lawyer—a judge advocate—makes a _ legal determination about whether 18 U.S.C. § 922 applies to a convicted servicemember, thereby effectuating a restriction of that servicemember’s Second Amendment rights. If that legal determination 1s made in error, the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (AFCCA) has statutory authority under Article 66(d)(2), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(2), to provide relief. Despite this clear statutory authority, the Court of Appeals of the Armed Forces (CAAF) decided that no military appellate court has the authority to correct an erroneous firearm prohibition made during post-trial processing.

The question presented 1s:

Whether the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals has authority under 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(2) to correct an unconstitutional firearms ban annotated after entry of judgment.

In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. 451, 457, 187 S.Ct. 9738, 979, 197 L.Ed.2d 398 (2017), this Court held, “The [Bankruptcy] Code makes clear that distributions of assets in a Chapter 7 liquidation must follow [the] prescribed order. §§ 725, 726.” The Bankruptcy Court below approved a settlement which provided distributions to one unsecured creditor with- out regard to statutorily prescribed priorities, thereby engaging in “the priority shell game of sorts involved in Jevic.” 1

The Bankruptcy Code? prioritizes payments to claimants pro rata within each class. The Trustee in this chapter 7 case agreed to settle a cause of action belonging to the estate by payment to one unsecured creditor in violation of the statutorily-prescribed distribution scheme. Over the objection of excluded creditors, the bankruptcy court approved the settlement.

Lower courts, including conflicting Circuit Courts considered themselves unburdened by the clear directions of Congress and this Court. The question presented on which Courts of Appeals are divided 1s:

Whether distributions to creditors in bankruptcy shall be done in the manner prescribed in the Bankruptcy Code? 1 Inre Daily Gazette Co., 584 B.R. 540, 546 (Bankr. S.D.W. Va. 2018). 2 See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a). 11 U.S.C. § 507(a). 11 U.S.C. § 726(b).

Petitioner was sentenced to death after his own counsel presented expert testimony that petitioner’s genetic makeup made it more likely that he would commit future violent offenses. That evidence was in itself sufficient to establish future dangerousness— one of two necessary conditions in Texas for imposing a death sentence—and thus effectively conceded the is- sue, while conferring no countervailing strategic ad- vantages. Nonetheless, in petitioner’s federal habeas proceeding, the district court denied relief, and the Fifth Circuit denied petitioner a certificate of appeala- bility. 28 U.S.C. 2253. The question presented is:

Whether trial counsel provides constitutionally in- effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of a capital trial by presenting evidence that concedes future dangerousness.

1. Did the Court of Appeals violate the Petitioner’s Due Process rights by affirming the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of a detailed civil RICO complaint as “delusional”, despite the complaint being supported by medically verified evidence of chemical battery delivered via water & HVAC systems, specific documentation of $50K SSA imposter fraud, alleged subsequent murder to key witnesses-thereby substituting judicial fact- finding for legal review and denying discovery?

2. Did the lower courts err in dismissing claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 & 1985 when the most recent acts of the Enterprise utilized a state-level , administration body (Baltimore County Housing) and digital fraud (fake email) to wrongfully revoke the Petitioner’s housing voucher immediately following a family hospitalization due to chemical exposure, demonstrating | an ongoing conspiracy to deprive the Petitioner of basic rights through economic and physical duress. : | ,

3. Did the Court of Appeals improperly fail to apply the requisite liberal pleading standard for pro se litigants who are demonstrably suffering from documented physical and cognitive impairment resulting directly from the chemical battery and continuous racketeering activity alleged against the Enterprise, effectively denying the Petitioner access to the courts?

4. Did the lower courts err in failing to recognize a continuing pattern of

racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. 1962 (c ), where the alleged Enterprise, } comprising high-level government officials, escalated its criminal conduct after dismissal to include the alleged murder of an Election Supervisor and , a Police Officer to conceal electoral fraud, demonstrating “open and persistent resistance to laws” that requires immediate intervention by this Court?

The question presented is:

Whether a defendant’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment are violated when a court refuses to apply the rule of lenity to an ambiguous sentencing statute and instead resolves the ambiguity under the guise of the absurd-principles doctrine, thereby violating basic rules of statutory construction. , |

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