WHETHER, this Court will recognize this extraordinary and pressing constitutional question and promptly direct full judicial consideration by the lower courts to answer the question of who is an Article II, §1, Clause 5 “natural born Citizen” when to do so now will not vitiate a major party nomination for that office shortly before the next Presidential election?

1

The Lanham Act prohibits use of a trademark when such use is “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.” 15 U.S.C, $1114(1)(a); see also §$1052(d), 1125(a). This federal likely confusion standard is implemented by the circuit courts under variable “non- exclusive” factor tests that, in practice, are in tension with summary judgment standards. Most lower courts, including in this case, impermissibly weigh evidence to determine which party is likely to succeed on each confusion factor before weighing these judgments again in deciding likely confusion. This approach leads courts to apply “rules of thumb” that contain embedded judgments about likely confusion that, under the summary judgment standard, should be left to the jury. For example, the Ninth Circuit held that the similarity factor favored Peloton Interactive, Inc. because it used its house mark with World Champ Tech, LLC’s otherwise identical mark. This effectively eluminated—as a matter of law—the inference that the district court made on the same record that Peloton’s use of its house mark aggravates likely confusion (an inference that the majority of circuits recognize). To preserve the right to a jury consistent with this Court’s summary judgment rules, the likely confusion factors must be treated on summary judgment as an evidentiary guide, not a factor scorecard.

The question presented, accordingly, is whether lower courts must, to comply with the summary judgment standard, avoid a factor-by-factor analysis that balances competing evidence and the weight to be given likely confusion factors.

i

Officer Nick Kosmalski and another Lincoln Park, Michigan police officer initiated a traffic stop because Sherrell King was driving a vehicle with expired plates, and, as it turned out, no insurance, a suspended driver’s license, and multiple outstanding traffic warrants. To conduct further investigation, the officers placed King in handcuffs. When King complained the cuffs were tight, both officers checked the tension and double-locked the handcuffs to prevent them from getting tighter. As Kosmalski then directed King into the back seat of the patrol vehicle, King made a second comment that the handcuffs were hurting her wrists. Kosmalski declined to recheck the handcuffs because he had checked them one minute earlier and knew they could not have gotten tighter. King remained in the handcuffs for less than fifteen minutes.

In King’s subsequent § 1983 suit in which she claimed injury from the handcuffs, the Sixth Circuit, applying its precedent in excessive force cases involving tight handcuffing, affirmed the district court’s order denying Kosmalski’s motion for summary judgment. The Court held the mere fact that Kosmalski “ignored” King’s second, close-in-time complaint was enough for King to reach the jury on her Fourth Amendment excessive force claim.

The question presented is:

Whether the Sixth Circuit’s three-factor tight handcuffing test, a brightline rule as stated and as applied in this case to deny qualified immunity, fails to comport with the Fourth Amendment and Graham v. Connor,

The Internal Revenue Code authorizes the Internal Revenue Service to assess monetary penalties for “fraud” when a taxpayer fraudulently underpays fed- eral income taxes or fraudulently fails to file a tax re- turn. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6651(f), 6663. The only way for a taxpayer to challenge the government’s fraud claims without first paying the penalties in full is to file a pe- tition with the Tax Court, which adjudicates fraud penalties without a jury. Id. § 6213(a).

In this case, the IRS imposed fraud penalties against four taxpayers through administrative pro- ceedings, and the Tax Court denied their request for a jury trial. After this Court decided SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 109 (2024), the taxpayers petitioned for a writ of mandamus to the court of appeals. The court held that the writ was not available because, even if the taxpayers were wrongly denied a jury trial, they had not shown that their jury-trial right was “clear and in- disputable” or that they had “no other avenue of re- hef.” App. 2a. The questions presented are:

1. Whether the court of appeals must issue a writ of mandamus when a petitioner is erroneously denied a jury trial, without considering whether the right is clear or unambiguous or the peti- tioner has other potential avenues of relief.

2. Whether the Internal Revenue Code violates the Seventh Amendment and Article III by au- thorizing the IRS to order the payment of mon- etary penalties for fraud without providing the taxpayer a jury trial.

(1)

When Petitioner’s husband died of COVID-19 in Colorado, she brought a wrongful death action into federal court, alleging novel tort claims against the New York entity she judged in the best position to have protected her husband against SARS-CoV-2, the cause of COVID-19.

Petitioner alleged that in the course of furthering the goals of its National Institutes of Health (NIH) research grant, EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. knowingly funded risky gain-of-function research enhancing abnormally dangerous SARS viruses in a foreign lab beset by known biosafety issues, ultimately releasing SARS-CoV-2 and causing her vulnerable husband’s death.

The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of Petitioner’s novel claims by contravening the doctrine established in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). It misapplied state substantive law and refused to certify a novel question implicating public health policy to the state’s highest court.

QUESTION ONE: In a diversity action raising novel claims involving abnormally dangerous research activity, may a federal court determine the negligence and strict liability claims contrary to the substantive law of the State?

QUESTION Two: Did the Second Circuit contravene Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) by refusing to certify a novel question of New York law to the State’s highest court where the issue involves public health policy reserved to the States under the U.S. Constitution?

To protect the right of access to the courts under the First Amendment’s Petition Clause, during the petition stage of this Court seeking review of federal constitutional claims arising from a federal court action with supplemental state tort claims, whether this Court’s petition stage is a statutory right to petition under 28 U.S.C. §2101(c) (granting 90 days to file a petition for a writ of certiorari) as a “federal court proceeding’ and hence, a filed petition a matter “pending” sub judice as declared in 28 U.S.C. § 1867(d) to continue the tolling of state tort statute of limitations until a final Court order is issued.

1. In 2021, Congress added a new subsection to Article 67(c), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 867(c). The new language incorporated factual sufficiency review into the portion of the statute pertaining to the review authority of the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF). In United States v. Csiti, 85 M.J. 414 (C.A.A.F. 2025), the CAAF concluded that the new language did not allow it to conduct factual sufficiency review.

The first question presented is:

Whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has statutory authority to hold that a conviction is factually insufficient under 10 U.S.C. § 867(c)(1)(C).

2. In courts-martial, the entry of judgment (HOJ) under 10 U.S.C. § 860c is the final judgment, marking the beginning of the post-trial process. In the Air Force, a First Indorsement memorandum summarizes criminal indexing requirements. It reflects a legal determination about whether 18 U.S.C. § 922 applies to the convicted servicemember and effectuates a restriction of their Second Amendment rights. Despite statutory authority under Article 66(d)(2), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(2), to correct post-judgment processing errors, the CAAF decided that military courts cannot correct indicated firearms prohibitions.

The second question presented 1s:

Whether military courts of criminal appeals have authority under 10 U.S.C. §§ 860c and 866(d)(2) to correct an unconstitutional firearms ban annotated after entry of judgment.

This proceeding was brought by the United States on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, seeking recognition and enforcement of a Philippine forfeitu- re judgment. The funds at issue have been at Merrill Lynch in New York since 1972. The funds were depo- sited in the name of a Panamanian corporation, Arel- ma, Inc., which was an alter ego of Ferdinand E. Ma- rcos, a former President of the Republic. In an inter- pleader filed by Merrill Lynch in 2000, a federal court awarded the funds to a Class of 9,539 Filipino human rights victims in partial satisfaction of the Class’s judgment against Marcos. In 2008, this Court reversed that judgment, holding the Republic, which exercised its sovereign immunity, was a required party that could not be joined under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19. Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851 (2008). In 2009, a Philippine court entered a judgment forfeit- ting the funds to the Republic. Despite the funds being in custodia legis of a United States federal court, the Philippine court held that it possessed in rem jurisdiction over the funds. The district court held that Philippine law applied, and it was bound by the Philippine court’s conclusion of law as to in rem jurisdiction. The court of appeals affirmed. This proceeding presents the following questions:

1. Whether recognition of a foreign judgment based on a fictitious assertion of in rem jurisdiction is barred as contrary to fundamental principles of due process?

2. Whether recognition of the foreign judgment is barred by the Republic’s failure to give notice to the

e Can acriminal defendant knowingly and voluntarily waive the right to appeal a district court’s yet-to-be-made errors as part of a plea agreement, and, if so, what are the limits on the validity and enforceability of such appeal waivers?

e Relatedly, did the appeal waiver in Mr. Johnson’s case qualify for the so-called “miscarriage of justice” or other exception recognized by numerous appellate courts?

ia

1. Law enforcement conducted warrantless searches related to Marcus Dixon and a supervision condition that allowed searches of “his” property. He moved to suppress property seized 1n those searches 1n part based on an invalid invocation of the search condition: law enforcement didn’t establish that the property was “his.” Should such a supervisee have at least limited standing to challenge warrantless searches based on supervision conditions authorizing searches of their property?

1

Though district courts have discretion to impose appropriate conditions of supervised release, that discretion is limited by 18 U.S.C. § 3583. See Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481, 494 (2022). Under that provision, district courts may only impose special conditions of supervised release that are “reasonably related” to the sentencing factors set out in 18 U.S.C. 3553 and “involve[] no greater deprivation of liberty than is necessary’ for those purposes. 18 U.S.C. § 3583.

Generally, appellate courts agree that this statutory mandate requires district courts to justify the imposition of special conditions of supervised release with factual findings on the record. But under what circumstances may a court impose a special condition without explanation, and when 1s a district court’s failure to adequately justify a special condition harmless? Because there is a divide among the circuit courts on this question, the Court should grant certiorari and resolve the issue.