The trial court has been placed in an unten- able position by aberrant appellate rulings. First, the intermediate appellate court issued a judgment and monetary sanctions against Petitioner despite the later adjudication by the trial court that the underly- ing order was never “final” or “effective.” Second, that same appellate court knowingly refused to recall its void mandate, applying an equitable “reliance” test designed for waivable personal jurisdiction de- fects to this non-waivable subject matter jurisdiction defect. Third, the Clerk of the State Supreme Court administratively rejected Petitioner’s timely, fee-paid application to appeal this refusal, on the grounds that the “case is closed.” Fourth, the Tennessee Supreme Court summarily refused to instruct the Clerk to file Petitioner’s proper application for appeal.

The question presented 1s:

Whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibits a state from maintaining a judicial system which (1) enforces a void judgment issued without subject matter jurisdiction, by em- powering a court clerk to block appellate review, and (2) thereby permanently deprives a litigant of vested property interests and monetary assets without a proceeding before a competent tribunal.

Petitioner Matthew Cline served as an intermediary in a scheme in which he received funds from a government agency and forwarded the vast majority of the money to the scheme’s ringleader. Although most of the money never came to rest with Cline, the Tenth Circuit interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) to require him to forfeit the full amount that traveled through his bank account, meaning that he was ordered to forfeit property transferred to a co-conspirator. In so holding, the Tenth Circuit joined four of its sister circuits and rejected the Ninth Circuit’s contrary rule that permits forfeiture only when the relevant property “came to rest” with the defendant.

The question presented is:

Whether under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) a defendant may be ordered to forfeit property to the government that he transferred to a co-conspirator merely because it was at one point under his control.

(i)

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) prohibits federal courts’ from invalidating a state conviction unless there is both a legal error violating clearly established federal law from this Court and a determination of prejudice that defers to state-court findings of harmless error. In this case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit nullified a New York jury verdict convicting respondent Pedro Hernandez of the infamous 1979 kidnapping and murder of Etan Patz, based solely on the state trial judge’s purported failure to instruct the jury in accordance with Justice Kennedy’s controlling concurrence in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). The questions presented are:

1. Did the Second Circuit violate AEDPA by finding a state jury instruction invalid under Seibert, when this Court has never held that Seibert’s rule about pretrial suppression extends to jury deliberations?

2. Did the Second Circuit violate AEDPA by finding that a single response by a state trial judge to a jury note necessarily infected the jury verdict, when the state courts found that there was more than sufficient evidence of the defendant’s guilt that was unaffected by the response?

(1)

“access” to covered drugs at below-market prices set

by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services

(“CMS”) and sign “agreement[s]” describing those

prices as “negotiate[d]” “maximum fair price[s]” for

their drugs. 42 U.S.C. § 1320f-2(a). Manufacturers that do not comply with these requirements are subject to tens of billions in annual excise taxes or exclusion from Medicare and Medicaid, which together account for nearly half the U.S. drug market.

Petitioner Janssen Pharmaceuticals Inc. markets

Xarelto®, a drug selected by CMS for the Program.

Janssen alleged that the Program unlawfully compels

the company’s speech and effects a per se taking of the

company’s property. The Third Circuit rejected those claims, holding that the Program is lawful because participation is “voluntary.” Judge Hardiman dissented, concluding that the Program’s “enterprise- crippling” penalties unconstitutionally “force”

Janssen “to turn over’ its products on terms “set by

CMS” and “misrepresent” that 1t “negotiated” a “fair”

price for Xarelto®. The questions presented are:

1. Does the Program violate the First Amendment by compelling Janssen to express the Government’s disputed messages regarding drug pricing?

2. Does the Program effect a Fifth Amendment taking by forcing Janssen to transfer its Xarelto®

Whether under 46 U.S.C.A. § 30104 (The Jones Act) relaxed causation standard, requiring only that the employer’s negligence play “any part, even the slightest, i.e. featherweight standard” in producing injury, applies to toxic tort claims involving scientific causation, or whether a plaintiff must meet the height- ened Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 1138 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) style requirement for dose response and threshold exposure evidence.

As part of the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, Con- eress created the “Medicare Drug Price Negotiation Program.” Under the Program, manufacturers of the Nation’s leading prescription medications must ex- pressly “agree” to sell selected products to Medicare beneficiaries at a below-market “maximum fair price.” If a manufacturer declines to do so, it incurs an “enter- prise-crippling” daily tax on all sales of the product that tops out at 1,900% of its total daily revenue. App.49a (Hardiman, J., dissenting). For petitioner Bristol Myers Squibb Company and its selected prod- uct Eliquis, that would mean up to $1 billion in daily hability. Other than “agreeing” to sell its product at a sovernment-dictated below-market price, the only way for a manufacturer to avoid this massive penalty is to withdraw every one of its medicines from both Medi- care and Medicaid—about half the American market.

A divided Third Circuit upheld the Program, rea- soning that participation in it is wholly “voluntary” be- cause a manufacturer can “choose” to avoid the IRA’s crippling taxes by withdrawing entirely from Medicare and Medicaid—thereby destroying its domestic busi- ness. The questions presented are:

1. Whether the Program violates the Fifth Amend- ment’s Takings Clause by forcing manufacturers to sell medicines to Medicare beneficiaries at below-mar- ket prices.

2. Whether the Program violates the First Amend- ment by compelling manufacturers to expressly “agree” with the government’s narrative that its dic- tated amount is the medicine’s “maximum fair price,” set through a voluntary negotiation.

| 11 - | |

Mr. Havins was convicted by a jury of being a person in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢)(1). On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, he argued his conviction was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. The Ninth Circuit in an unpublished decision of September 19, 2025, rejected his appeal, citing United States v. Duarte, 1387 F. 4th 743 (9th Cir. 2025) (en banc). Duarte’s petition for a writ of certiorari 1s currently pending before this Court, 25-425.

In the meantime, other circuit courts of appeals have been resolving similar constitutional challenges to subsections of Section 922(g). See, e.g., Range v.

Attorney General, 69 F.4th 96 (8d Cir. 2028) (en banc). Through the end of the past Term, various parties sought certiorari from this Court on these questions.

Last year, this Court recently issued its decision in United States v. Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. 1889 (2024), involving a Second Amendment challenge to Section 922(¢g)(8)(C)(i). The Court then granted seven certiorari petitions raising challenges to subsections of Section 922(g), vacated the court of appeals’ decisions, and remanded for further consideration in light of Rahimi. See, e.g., Garland v. Range, No. 23-374, 2024 WL 3259661 (U.S. July 2, 2024).

The question presented is: Should the Court grant the petition, vacate the judgment of the court of appeals, and remand for further consideration in light of the potential granting of a writ in Duarte or any other similar case?

1

: matter of great public importance, with every lower Court ignoring the law and issue completely?

il V : |

The Question Presented is:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred by denying jurisdiction over Petitioner’s appeal. In particular, did the Court of Appeals err by interpreting provisions of the Third Geneva Convention, incorporated by Army Regulation 190-8, to allow the United States discretion over the implementation of Mixed Medical Commission conclusions regarding sick and injured Guantanamo Bay detainees?

1

I. Texas robbery may be committed by a reckless use of force merely incidental to the taking of property. Did the Fifth Circuit misapply the categorical approach by dismissing an elemental mismatch as a mere variation in terminology and misconstruing the mens rea required in the amended definition of robbery in the Guidelines, in finding that Texas robbery is a crime of violence.

Il. Whether 18 U.S.C. §922(¢g)(1) comports with the Second Amendment?

Ill. Whether 18 U.S.C. §922(¢g) permits conviction for the possession of any firearm that has ever crossed state lines at any time in the indefinite past, and, if so, if it is facially unconstitutional?

1

1. Whether this Court’s language in footnote nine from New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 38 n. 9 (2022), allows courts to bypass Bruen’s mandated two- step historical analysis when addressing a second amendment challenge to so-called “shall issue” licensing regimes.

2. Whether Illinois’ aggravated unlawful possession of a weapon statute (AUPW), which enforces Illinois’ dual licensing regime under the Concealed Carry Act by imposing criminal punishment, is unconstitutional under Bruen.

1

In Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 73 (2023), the Court clarified that, to comply with the First Amendment’s protections, prosecutors “must prove in true- threats cases that the defendant had some understanding of his statements’ threatening character.” Since then, almost all courts have rejected defendants’ facial overbreadth challenges based on Counterman’s true-threat doctrine, instead considering as-applied challenges to specific prosecutions and specific threats. The Ninth Circuit has, alone, taken the opposite tack. It has continued to reject as- applied challenges, instead requiring defendants to bring facial challenges under Counterman.

The question presented is: To state a claim under the First Amendment’s true-threat doctrine, must a criminal defendant bring a facial challenge to the statute with which he is charged?

prefix

1. Whether the due process rights of the petitioner were violated when he was subjected to multiple pretrial assaults/batteries/maiming by deputies acting under color of judicial authority, without redress or protection from the trial court.
2. Whether a judge who authorized or ordered multiple violent assaults on a pretrial detainee by sheriff’s deputies forfeits jurisdiction to proceed over that defendant’s criminal case, or to command a separate Judge to perform in His place.
3. Whether the refusal of state courts to review overwhelming evidence of judicial misconduct and unconstitutional treatment of a pretrial detainee constitutes a denial of due process and equal protection under state and Federal Laws.

I

A district court violates Rule 11 if it fails to provide the defendant with accu- rate information about the statutory minimum and maximum penalties at the time of the defendant’s guilty plea. See Fed. R. App. P. 11(b)(1)(H)-(1). If a defendant fails to object to such an error in the district court, any claim for relief on appeal is subject to the rigorous four-prong test under the plain-error standard of review. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (19938). The question presented, on which the cir- cuits are divided, 1s:

Does a defendant’s failure to object to a Rule 11(b)(1)(H)-()) error count against him twice, not only by subjecting him to the rigorous plain-error standard in the first place, but also by serving as a factor that weighs against a showing of prejudice under the standard’s third prong?

1

The Texas statutes defining Mr. Kerstetter’s prior offenses explicitly prohibit conduct outside the Armed Career Criminal Act’s definitions of “serious drug offense” and “violent felony,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2). He also tried to comply with the Fifth Circuit’s “realistic probability” jurisprudence by pointing to cases in which Texas courts confirmed that the state laws mean what they say. Even so, the Fifth Circuit affirmed his ACCA sentence and refused to reconsider its realistic probability requirement.

Under the ACCA’s categorical approach, if a state statute expressly criminalizes conduct outside the federal definitions of “serious drug offense” or “violent felony,” does the defendant bear a burden of proving that the state had also applied its law to convict someone for non-qualifying conduct?

If so, has Mr. Kerstetter satisfied that burden?