A certified nurse-midwife and her medical prac- tice brought a constitutional challenge to Nebraska statutes that prohibit certified nurse-midwives from attending home births and bar them from working at all unless they purchase a “practice agreement” with a physician. Petitioners alleged in detailed factual terms how the scheme undermines maternal safety, restricts access to care—particularly in rural areas— and bears no rational relationship to the State’s as- serted health and safety interests. At the pleading stage, those allegations were required to be accepted as true.

Nevertheless, the district court dismissed the complaint, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed in a brief opinion that disregarded the complaint’s factual alle- gations, reasoning that the legislature could have ra- tionally believed that restrictions on nurse midwives would generally promote health and safety.

The questions presented are:

1. Does rational basis review permit courts, at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, to treat plaintiffs’ well- pleaded factual allegations as irrelevant?

2. Does rational basis review permit courts to uphold a law without any inquiry into whether the means bear a rational connection to the government’s stated ends?

1. Whether, under the Lanham Act, a court or

jury may find joint ownership of atrademark

between competing entities—neither of

which pleaded or proved co-ownership—

without violating the fundamental principle

that a trademark must indicate a single

source of goods or services to consumers.

1. Whether, on an acknowledged Circuit split, copyrightability is a pure question of law, as the Ninth Circuit held below, or includes considerations of background facts, either as a pure question of fact or as a mixed question of law and fact, as heavily implied by this Court’s decision in Feist and expressly adopted by other Circuits citing Feist.

2. Whether copyright protection for photography is only selection and arrangement as the Ninth Circuit held in Rentmeester and extended below, or whether copyright protection for photography is assessed just as for all other works of the visual arts that Congress placed on an equal footing in 17 U.S.C. § 101 and in accordance with this Court’s seminal decision in Burrow-Giles.

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I. Whether the Ninth Circuit permitted the government to violate’ the First Amendment of the Constitution, Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause that protects churches that own legitimate property in their name and prohibits undue interference of church by the government by seizing its assets using a nominee claiming the property was really owned by its ministers.

II. Whether the Ninth Circuit court erred when it affirmed a summary judgment against the non-moving’- party, an Ecclesiastical Church Society where there were many genuine disputes of material fact that should have been read in a light favorable to the Petitioner.

A. Whether the church is able to change its name and file a deed without fear that the new name could lead to its property being levied by the government in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

B. Whether Yavapai a County assessors unwavering and_ responsible determination of full church exemption of real property owned for 25 years should not carry creat weight regarding the ownership and beneficial use for religious purposes and exemption from taxes.

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The First Amendment’s protection of political speech ensures that a political contribution will not constitute extortion under 18 U.S.C. § 1951 or honest services fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1348, 13846 unless the candidate and donor make an “explicit” quid pro quo agreement that an official act is a condition for the acceptance of the contribution. McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991).

The question presented is:

Is McCormick’s requirement of a “quid pro quo” satisfied when a political candidate accepts a political contribution knowing that the donor believes the candidate will take official action because of the contribution?

The First Amendment protects soliciting for, and contributing to, political campaigns based on policies that a candidate agrees to take while in office. To avoid chilling that core speech, this Court’s precedent requires an explicit quid pro quo when the alleged “bribe” is a contribution. Yet some courts, invoking H’vans v. United States, allow conviction on ambiguous “in return for” evidence and “as opportunities arise” jury instructions.

The question presented is:

When alleged bribery rests solely on lawful campaign contributions, must the government prove an explicit, unambiguous quid pro quo conditioning an official act, or may a conviction rest on such ambiguity?

Under CERCLA, private parties who clean up contaminated land may recover their costs from pol- luters only if their cleanup substantially complies with the National Contingency Plan. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). When the United States government, a State, or an Indian tribe conducts a cleanup itself, it enjoys a presumption of compliance with the Na- tional Contingency Plan. Jd. And when private par- ties obtain EPA approval of their cleanup, they too enjoy a presumption of compliance. 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(3)(a1).

The question presented, which has divided the circults 3-4, 1s whether a private party whose clean- up is reviewed and approved by a State likewise en- joys a presumption of substantial compliance with the National Contingency Plan.

In December 2022, Petitioner discovered a chest binder in her 18-year-old child’s room. After speaking with her child, she learned that a social worker at her child’s public school had given her child the binder and that others had “socially transitioned” the child by using a different name and pronouns. No one from the school informed Petitioner of these decisions, and despite a written policy requiring parental involvement in such decisions, school officials have repeatedly said that school staff violated no policy by withholding this information. Petitioner sued the School Board, alleging the existence of an unwritten policy allowing employees to make these decisions without informing parents, which violated Petitioner’s fundamental right to control and direct the education and upbringing of her child. The First Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s claims, however, determining that there was a more probable “alternative explanation” than the existence of an unwritten policy. In doing so, the court widened an entrenched circuit split over the application of the Twombly/Iqbal “plausibility” requirement.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether a court can rely on a probable alternative explanation at the 12(b)(6) stage to dismiss a claim, as five circuits hold, or whether a complaint can only be dismissed if the plaintiff’s explanation is itself implausible, as three circuits hold.

2. Whether a parent’s fundamental constitutional rights include the right to be notified when public schools affirmatively recognize and facilitate a child’s gender- transition.

Section 1983 guarantees that “[e]very person” who violates an individual’s constitutional rights “under color of any statute, ordinance, custom, or usage, of any State * * * shall be hable.” 42 U.S.C. 1983.

Respondent St. Paul Police Officer Heather Wey- ker framed Petitioner Hamdi Mohamud for a crime, causing Mohamud (then a minor) to spend two years in prison. At the time, Weyker was cross-deputized with narrow federal authority, so Mohamud asserted causes of action against her under both Section 1988 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The Eighth Circuit recognized that Mohamud’s rights were clearly established, but it held in 2020 that she may not sue under Bivens. In its opinion below, the Eighth Circuit held that Mohamud may not sue under Sec- tion 1983, either. In doing so, the court deepened a circuit split over how to apply this Court’s state-action doctrine and left Mohamud remediless.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether a local police officer wielding both state and federal authority can act under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. 1983.

2. If not, whether a local police officer acting with federal authority 1s subject to a Bivens cause of action for Fourth Amendment violations she commits in the common and recurrent sphere of domestic law enforcement.

Section 1983 guarantees that “[e]very person” who violates an individual’s constitutional rights “under color of any statute, ordinance, custom, or usage, of any State * * * shall be hable.” 42 U.S.C. 1983.

Respondent St. Paul Police Officer Heather Wey- ker framed Petitioner Hamdi Mohamud for a crime, causing Mohamud (then a minor) to spend two years in prison. At the time, Weyker was cross-deputized with narrow federal authority, so Mohamud asserted causes of action against her under both Section 1988 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The Eighth Circuit recognized that Mohamud’s rights were clearly established, but it held in 2020 that she may not sue under Bivens. In its opinion below, the Eighth Circuit held that Mohamud may not sue under Sec- tion 1983, either. In doing so, the court deepened a circuit split over how to apply this Court’s state-action doctrine and left Mohamud remediless.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether a local police officer wielding both state and federal authority can act under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. 1983.

2. If not, whether a local police officer acting with federal authority 1s subject to a Bivens cause of action for Fourth Amendment violations she commits in the common and recurrent sphere of domestic law enforcement.

Section 1983 guarantees that “[e]very person” who violates an individual’s constitutional rights “under color of any statute, ordinance, custom, or usage, of any State * * * shall be hable.” 42 U.S.C. 1983.

Respondent St. Paul Police Officer Heather Wey- ker framed Petitioner Hamdi Mohamud for a crime, causing Mohamud (then a minor) to spend two years in prison. At the time, Weyker was cross-deputized with narrow federal authority, so Mohamud asserted causes of action against her under both Section 1988 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The Eighth Circuit recognized that Mohamud’s rights were clearly established, but it held in 2020 that she may not sue under Bivens. In its opinion below, the Eighth Circuit held that Mohamud may not sue under Sec- tion 1983, either. In doing so, the court deepened a circuit split over how to apply this Court’s state-action doctrine and left Mohamud remediless.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether a local police officer wielding both state and federal authority can act under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. 1983.

2. If not, whether a local police officer acting with federal authority 1s subject to a Bivens cause of action for Fourth Amendment violations she commits in the common and recurrent sphere of domestic law enforcement.

Section 1983 guarantees that “[e]very person” who violates an individual’s constitutional rights “under color of any statute, ordinance, custom, or usage, of any State * * * shall be hable.” 42 U.S.C. 1983.

Respondent St. Paul Police Officer Heather Wey- ker framed Petitioner Hamdi Mohamud for a crime, causing Mohamud (then a minor) to spend two years in prison. At the time, Weyker was cross-deputized with narrow federal authority, so Mohamud asserted causes of action against her under both Section 1988 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The Eighth Circuit recognized that Mohamud’s rights were clearly established, but it held in 2020 that she may not sue under Bivens. In its opinion below, the Eighth Circuit held that Mohamud may not sue under Sec- tion 1983, either. In doing so, the court deepened a circuit split over how to apply this Court’s state-action doctrine and left Mohamud remediless.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether a local police officer wielding both state and federal authority can act under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. 1983.

2. If not, whether a local police officer acting with federal authority 1s subject to a Bivens cause of action for Fourth Amendment violations she commits in the common and recurrent sphere of domestic law enforcement.

The Inflation Reduction Act grants the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) unprecedented and unfettered authority to impose price controls on pharmaceutical products. As interpreted by the government, the statute includes no enforceable standards or procedures to guide and constrain CMS’s price-setting decisions; authorizes the agency to implement price controls by imposing new binding rules at whim, unconstrained by the Administrative Procedure Act’s procedural and judicial review requirements; and forces manufacturers to express the view that any price CMS dictates is the “maximum fair price.” Although the statute levels an enterprise-crippling penalty on any manufacturer that does not comply, CMS claims that no constitutional constraints apply because the agency says it will not enforce the statute’s multi-billion- dollar penalties if a manufacturer stops selling all of its products to the more than 140 million individuals who participate in Medicare and Medicaid.

The questions presented are:

1. Is the separation of powers violated when an agency exercises sweeping price-setting and rule- making authority with no constraints to ensure that it acts reasonably and within lawful bounds?

2. Is the federal government permitted to sidestep all constitutional constraints in the course of dictating the price of pharmaceutical sales made to a huge segment of the American population when such pricing is dictated in connection with a government- funded financial-assistance program, like Medicare?

Did the federal agency FinCEN exceed the authority granted in 2001 by Congress in 31 U.S.C. § 5330 to regulate money transmitting businesses when FinCEN interpreted one word in that statute — “funds” — as authority to require sellers of bitcoin and other virtual currencies prior to 2021 to register with FinCEN, when virtual currency was not invented until 2008 and when Congress did not amend the statute to capture virtual currencies until 2021, after they had become financial instruments of great political and economic significance?

1. Whether this Honorable Court should grant certiorari to review whether the Sixth Circuit’s determination that 18 U.S.C §922(g) is constitutional on its face and as applied to Mr. Coward in violation of the Second Amendment.

2. Whether this Honorable Court should grant certiorari to review whether the Sixth Circuit determination that a two-level role organizer or leader enhancement was appropriate where the record showed Mr. Coward merely played an essential role.

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1. Due Process and Access to Courts 7 Whether the combined effect of emergency tolling restrictions, deriial of disability accommodations, and additional procedural barriers violated the Due Process Clause by depriving pro se litigants with disabilities of meaningful access to the : courts and extinguishing otherwise timely claims.
2. Equal Protection in Application of Tolling Orders

| Whether limiting tolling relief only to claims expiring strictly within the emergency period, while denying relief to similarly situated htigants whose claims expired immediately thereafter, violates the Equal Protection Clause. 3. Conflict with Federal Precedent on Tolling Principles Whether the District of Columbia courts’ narrow interpretation of emergency tolling orders conflicts with federal precedent requiring broader tolling to protect litigants’ . rights during extraordinary circumstances. 7 :

| 4. Delayed Discovery Doctrine and Disability Rights | Whether refusal to apply the delayed discovery doctrine, despite physician-documented cognitive impairments and D.C. Code § 12-302, violated : federal law and Title IT of the ADA by denying equal access to justice. 5. Impact of Hostile Work Environment and Retaliation on Disability Progression | : Whether courts must consider the cumulative impact of unresolved hostile work , environment and retaliation claims—where the record shows progression from one disability to multiple impairments—when applying tolling doctrines and access-to-justice protections. ; 6. National Importance of Uniform Standards for Pro Se Litigants with | Cognitive Impairments | | Whether inconsistent application of emergency tolling, disability-based tolling, and delayed discovery doctrines among jurisdictions raises a question of national importance warranting this Court’s intervention to ensure uniform access to justice for pro se litigants with cognitive impairments.

Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the federal statute that prohibits anyone who has been convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” from possessing a firearm, violates the Second Amendment either facially or as applied to individuals with prior convictions for offenses that did not result in disarmament in the Founding era.

This Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of properly calculating the Guidelines range. Calculating the applicable Guidelines range is the first step for a district court at sentencing. Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 536 (2013). Courts work towards nationwide consistency in sentencing by making the range the “starting point and initial benchmark.” Jd. Having a properly calculated range is so important that it 1s also the first step an appellate court must take: it must ensure “the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).

However, the Circuits are divided on whether a district court can prevent appellate review of its Guidelines calculation by stating, regardless of the proper range, it would have imposed the same sentence. The Eighth Circuit falls on the minority side and has repeatedly skipped this crucial step because of a simple statement made by a district court.

The question presented 1s:

Whether a district court’s statement, asserting it would have imposed the same sentence regardless of any potential procedural error, renders that error harmless and precludes meaningful appellate review.

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Whether this Court should recognize the “ruse exception” to the Speedy Trial Act when federal law enforcement and immigration authorities work together to violate defendants’ right to a speedy indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b)?

LIST OF PARTIES All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. ii

_ | Whether a district court violates 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Article III when it adopts

a magistrate judge’s recommendation through complete judicial silence—without addressing the claim at issue or responding to timely filed specific objections supported by controlling legal authority—thereby permitting a non-Article III officer’s determination to stand as final. | | . | | ;