1. Should this Court summarily reverse and remand this case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for the same reason it did so on January 13, 2025, in Santana v. Garland, No. 24-46: “the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for further consideration in light of Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024).” Inits August 4, 2025, Opinion the 4“ Circuit does not mention Loper, even though the appellant squarely presented Loper in its appeal: “The panel decision of August 4, 2025, is contrary to Loper Bright Enters. v. Ravmondo, 144 8. Ct. 2244, 2261 (2024) (overruling Chevron and holding that ‘courts, not agencies, will decide ‘all relevant questions of law’ arising on review of agency action… even those involving ambiguous laws’). Instead of “decid[ing] ‘all relevant questions of law’ arising on review of agency action” in the face of an at best ambiguous provision the CARES Act, the panel deferred to the District Court, which had in turn deferred to the SBA, on four questions of law presented by appellant Pacem Solution International, LLC. The Court of Appeals denied rehearing on September 30, 2025, without an opinion.

2. Now that “Chevron deference” has been overruled, should this Court direct lower courts to utilize the final article of the Bill of Rights for the purpose explained in the Preamble to the Bill of Rights – “in order to prevent

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) reflects “a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.” CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 98 (2012) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).

In the case below, the signatories to a contract agreed to arbitrate any claim “arising out of’ the contract, and suit was subsequently brought relating to the performance of that contract.

The Question Presented is:

Whether placing the “tort” label on a claim excludes that claim from the scope of the dispute resolution clause in the parties’ contract.

1. Does this Court’s opinion in Jacobson ov. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), limit a court’s review of government mandated medical treatments to the highly deferential rational basis review or does Jacobson require heightened scrutiny based on a balancing test, as the Court held in Cruzan v. Director of Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)?

2. If, as the Ninth Circuit held, Jacobson limits courts to rational basis review, should it be overruled or limited to its specific facts because it is inconsistent with modern constitutional scrutiny, including this Court’s opinions in Cruzan and Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003), which explicitly recognized a person’s fundamental interest in rejecting unwanted medical treatments?

(i)

Whether a state statute discriminates against nonresidents in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause if it confers eligibility for a business license upon individuals who attended a university “in the state” where 40% or more of the students are eligible for Pell Grants but denies eligibility to individuals who attended universities 1n other states where 40% or more of the students are eligible for Pell Grants.

1. Whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel or the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a municipality from re-litigating factual

— determinations resolved in the petitioner’s favor during prior criminal and civil traffic proceedings when those determinations are central to a subsequent civil negligence action?

2. Whether repeated warrantless seizures and the final taking of a vehicle after multiple dismissals or acquittals raise a federal question under the

| Fourth and Fourteenth Amenaments?

3. Whether a vehicle previously recognized by state courts as exempt under state law may be subjected to renewed seizures and a taking

, without implicating federal constitutional limits?

4. Whether continued withholding of a vehicle following dismissal or acquittal of all related charges, without a prompt post-seizure hearing,

| Satisfies due process requirements?

5. Whether a state supreme court’s refusal to review an unelaborated per curiam affirmance prevents meaningful consideration of federal | questions that were properly raised and preserved?

6. Whether a summary judgment order that provides no findings and does not address judicially noticed facts satisfies the minimum procedural protections required by the Due Process Clause?

, Petition for Writ of Certiorari: i

Amendment Due Process Rights violated when the Commonwealth refused to call the victim to testify at |

| trial, although victim was present in court, thus, preventing petitioner from facing his accuser? ,

1. How isn’t an official being responsible for an inmate’s death not a basis for suing them??

2. Ifitis possible to hypothesize a set of facts consistent with the complaint then why : wouldn’t relief to the plaintiff be entitled??

3. Soa failure to protect claim may sound against a “high level” official if that “high level” official (A) demonstrated deliberate indifference towards a prisoners safety needs (B) showing that the inmate was incarcerated under condition posing a substantial risk of serious harm and (C) that that “high level” prison official had subjective knowledge of the risk of harm, which they personally disregarded????

4. What if non-official customs resulted in the death of an inmate?? Or the non-enforcing of certain policies??

5. Would or could that be consider a 14 amendment violation???? Pertaining to question four’.

6. A correctional officer assigned to check on our well-being never walked the range. So what if I don’t know who was working the range the day that young man killed himself???

7. What if an injury occurred as a result of a denied grievance?? The un-insuring of adequate remedy??

8. If I make a complaint to a higher authority that a hole is around the corner and they tell me to shut the hell up, then a man walks around the corner and falls in that hole and dies, how isn’t that higher authority liable when he was made aware??

9. What does indigent mean to failing to pay a filling fee without the means to do so?

10. Does the constitution and its amendments only apply to those poverty stricken?

11. Are the wealthy above the law??

12. How did Joshua Wallen somehow (only) checked the wrong side??

13. How isn’t a suicide that went unchecked because of neglect not consider a physical

injury??

14. Does 42 U.S.C §1997 (e)e specify- explicitly if the physical injury has to occur to me,

personally??

15. How isn’t a death that occurred as a result of not enforcing the policy not consider a .

physical injury?? ;

16. How isn’t leaving a depressed person unattended too for more than an hour not seen as a

physical injury on some level??

17. Is there occasion to consider the meaning of the statutory term “Physical injury” or

whether what, I, the plaintiff Belcher, was alleging could fit into it??

18. How isn’t the plaintiff Belcher personally involved when he complained about the

neglect that killed a young man?

19. Does paraphrase and construe have the same meaning?

20. How can the courts reword their own explanation when it pertains to the meanings of

plainly stated statutes or pleadings?? |

21. How is it proper or ethical to construe anything when it comes to court proceedings??

22. Doesn’t construe mean to guess or assume without clarity??

1. Whether Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated by Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas, Pennsylvania when it failed to honor this Court’s precedent that requires a pro se litigant be provided with legal counsel at the start of her misdemeanor _

: disorderly conduct jury trial when she was jailed in her divorce one week before her criminal trial and had no access to electronic evidence, jury instructions or the prison law library; and therefore, she was not given a fair trial in violation of Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments?

2. Whether the Due Process Clause was violated when the court | in Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas, Pennsylvania refused to quash the criminal information when it did not state a crime but rather allowed the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to amend in violation of her constitutional rights provided by the Fourteenth, Fourth and First Amendments?

3. Whether it violated the Fourteenth and First Amendments

’ when Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas, Pennsylvania allowed Petitioner to be charged with a crime when she was not in “public” but rather purportedly one step off her rural driveway onto the rural road with farm equipment in the field across her driveway and miles from the nearest public bus stop?

4. Whether 18 Pa. C.S. § 5503 misdemeanor disorderly conduct is unconstitutionally vague, overbroad and allows discriminatory application since Petitioner was charged with the crime the moment she purportedly stepped off her rural driveway onto the rural road because “persistent” disorderly conduct criminalized constitutionally protected activity on her property?

1

Did the lower Court wrongly dismiss the Petitioner’s appeal

because it effectively prevented the Petitioner from having access

to the Court as a result of his indigency. Also did the Court violate the Petitioner’s constitutional right by denying the undersign due

process and procedural due process which is guaranteed in the

14th Amendment that ensures fair legal proceedings. |

2

In a 2014 federal capital trial, Mr. Sanders was convicted of the 2010 kidnapping and killing twelve- year-old L.R. In accord with the jury’s verdict, the district court sentenced him to death on one count of kidnapping resulting in death and one count of use of a firearm in connection with a crime of violence (kidnapping) resulting in death. Mr. Sanders timely appealed, challenging his convictions and death sentences, and his appeal was argued before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in 2020. While the appeal was pending, on December 28, 2024, President Biden commuted Mr. Sanders’s death sentences to life in prison. Months later, on March 27, 2025, the Fifth Circuit decided Mr. Sanders’s appeal, vacating the use of a firearm conviction and otherwise affirming the judgment of the district court.

Mr. Sanders’s appeal raised thirteen issues for review. Some of these concerned both his convictions and death sentences, but some concerned only the death sentences, which were no longer in effect by the time the Court of Appeals issued its opinion. Nonetheless, finding that “[the commutation] did not necessarily moot the issues Sanders has raised in his appeal,” the Fifth Circuit proceeded to decide the death-penalty-related issues. It did not explain why the issues were “not necessarily” moot, given that the President had commuted the death sentences Mr. Sanders had challenged.

Mr. Sanders moved for panel rehearing, arguing that the rulings on the death-penalty-related issues should be withdrawn as advisory opinions, since he was no longer facing the federal death penalty, which

1. Whether, to qualify under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 for relief from a sentence enhancement imposed by operation of the now- abrogated residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i1), a criminal defendant must prove that the sentencing court relied “solely” on the residual clause to impose the enhancement or whether it is sufficient to establish that that the sentencing court “may have” relied on the residual clause.

2. Whether retroactive relief from a sentence enhancement based solely on the now-abrogated residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(G1) 1s available under Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. 120, 184-185 (2016), to a criminal defendant who did not challenge the enhancement until after this Court abrogated the enhancement in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015).