In the decision below, the court of appeals held— without notice to or briefing by the parties—that the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111, does not preclude suit in district court when “a factual record” shows that the CSRA is not “function[ing| as intended.” App., anfra, 15a.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether the decision below should be summarily reversed for violating the party-presentation principle.

2. Whether the decision below should be summarily reversed for failing to adhere to this Court’s precedents holding that the CSRA generally precludes challenges to federal personnel actions in district court.

(I)

Mandamus is a “drastic and extraordinary” remedy available only when there is no other adequate means of relief, the right to the writ is clear and indisputable, and issuance is appropriate to confine a lower court to its lawful authority or compel it to act. Cheney v. U.S. District Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004).

The Fourth Circuit denied relief on “undue delay” and “substitute for appeal” grounds, denied rehearing, and then refused to correct when petitioner moved to correct the opinion under 28 U.S.C. § 2106, invoking a local rule instead.

This Court’s mandamus standard says nothing about ‘delay’, yet the Fourth Circuit treats delay as a stand-alone requirement. The Fourth Circuit’s denials are nearly all unpublished boilerplate opinions with no analysis of whether any adequate

: alternative remedy exists or what constitutes undue delay. These categorical rules have been applied in more than 1,100 Fourth Circuit cases compared to approximately 111 in all other circuits since 2000.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether the Fourth Circuit may impose “undue delay” as a standalone prerequisite to mandamus relief when this Court’s three-part test includes no such requirement.

2. Whether the Fourth Circuit may categorically deny mandamus as a “substitute for appeal” without analyzing whether any appeal is available.

This Court has struck down state taxing schemes that amount to economic protectionism, incentivizing in-state activities and burdening out-of-state activities, as violative of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994), Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996), and Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 575 U.S. 542 (2015).

This Court has likewise struck down a state taxing scheme that indirectly taxes out-of-state income or transactions lacking a sufficient connection or nexus with the taxing state as violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Board, 528 U.S. 458 (2000).

Under New Jersey’s corporate business tax, a royalty payor was disallowed otherwise deductible royalty expenses paid to a related party, with the amount of the disallowance determined by the extent of the related party royalty recipient’s New Jersey activity. The more New Jersey activity conducted by the related party royalty recipient, the lower the tax burden on the royalty payor; conversely, the less New Jersey activity by the related party royalty recipient, the higher the tax burden on the royalty payor. The New Jersey courts upheld this scheme.

The Questions presented are:

(1) Whether New Jersey’s scheme for taxing royalty payments, that conditions the deductibility of related-party royalty payments on the extent of

As the District Court explained, “Of course, Dershowitz said nothing of the kind[.]” App. 71a. The court was referring to how CNN defamed Professor Alan Dershowitz by systematically distorting his Senate floor statement in deliberately omitting his crucial qualifying language. The result was to turn Dershowitz’s meaning on its head. Yet the Eleventh Circuit ruled that CNN’s omission of crucial portions of a statement could not establish actual malice. This holding creates a circuit split and highlights how New York Times Co. v. Sullivan’s actual-malice standard has devolved into near-absolute immunity for media defendants, even when they profoundly misrepresent verifiable public statements.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether a defendant’s systematic omission of qualifying and limiting language from a plaintiff’s recorded statement constitutes proof of actual malice under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), sufficient to survive summary judgment, as the Second, Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have held, and contrary to what the Eleventh Circuit held below.

2. Whether the actual malice standard established in Sullivan, or as extended by its progeny, should be discarded altogether or at least as to private citizens who are public figures.

3. Whether this Court should modify Sullivan’s clear-and-convincing and burden-of-proof evidentiary standards.

Whether the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ narrow application of the presumption of prejudice standard when evaluating unrefuted evidence of jury tampering by a party’s business partner having a clear and obvious financial stake in the outcome of the trial constitutes an actionable departure from precedent and contravenes the unmistakable judicial objective to protect the integrity of the jury system, thus warranting corrective action by the Court.

1. Whether a federal court of appeals is categori- cally barred from finding plain error if circuits are split on the issue under review.

2. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) precludes the imposition of joint-and-several liability in forfeiture awards, consistent with this Court’s decision in Hon- eycutt v. United States, 581 U.S. 4438 (2017).

I. WAS THE FACTUAL BASIS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT MR. ASEMOTA’S GUILTY PLEA WHEN NO INTERSTATE NEXUS WAS ESTABLISHED? IS HIS GUILTY PLEA THEREFORE INVOLUNTARY ?

2. DID THE RESTITUTION ORDER EXCEED THE COURT’S STATUTORY AUTHORITY? IS MR. ASEMOTA’S SENTENCE ILLEGAL ?

ll

(1) Whether this Court’s decision in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) provides } authority for automatic dismissal of lawsuits

| challenging the enforcement of COVID-19 mandates or similar emergency-decreed “public health” mandates without holding trial by jury. |

(2) Whether the doctrine of “substantive” due process

} and its corresponding “rational basis review’ and “tiered scrutiny” jurisprudence should be overruled or cabined-off as a matter of law.

(3) Whether the common-law preservation of the right to trial by jury embodied in the Sixth and Seventh Amendments safeguards a jury prerogative to pass judgment not only on the facts, but also on the law to be applied in a given case before it.

In Fischer, 144 S. Ct. at 2185, this Supreme Court focused on what conduct was prohibited by the “otherwise” clause in 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) and emphasizéd that its broad language is cabined by the narrow terms that precede it in § 1512(c)(1). Here, the question presented is whether the lower courts construed the two subsections independently, applying the Statute exactly backwards — in Mr. Dillon’s case?

I. A writ of certiorari 1s requested to determine whether the district court’s loss calculation which included intended losses under §2B1.1 Application Note 3 of the Sentencing Guidelines and the losses attributed to alleged co-conspirators was erroneous in light of this Court’s decision in Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558 (2019).

2. A writ of certiorari 1s requested to determine whether the district court’s final bank fraud instruction to the jury constructively amended Count Three of the indictment, charging bank fraud [18 U.S.C. §1344], by including the elements of both subsections | and 2 of the statute when the indictment, which did not articulate the subsection being charged, only included language that tracked subsection 2.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The parties to the proceeding are those named in the caption. The Petitioner is Djonibek

Rahmankulov. The Respondent is the United States of America.

1. Whether a defendant’s appeal waiver bars appellate review of a clear sentencing error when the defendant preserved the exact legal argument below and the sentencing error resulted in the defendant receiving a longer sentence than he would have received absent the error?

2. Alternatively, whether this Court should hold this petition pending its decision in Hunter v. United States, No. 24-1063, which presents closely related questions about the scope of exceptions to appeal waivers, and then dispose of this petition as appropriate in light of Hunter.

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