Whether a court may refuse to consider a foreign national defendant’s motion to dismiss an indictment based on the fugitive disentitlement doctrine where the foreign defendant was at home abroad upon being criminally charged and has merely remained at home abroad without concealment or evasion.

This Court cautioned in Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996) that the “limits of a patent must be known” to benefit the public and avoid a “zone of uncertainty” as to the scope of patent protection. Toward this end, the courts have long recognized that a patentee may make binding definitional and disclaimer statements limiting patent claim scope. But the Federal Circuit has been inconsistent in applying such disclaimers, including statements made during znter partes reviews (IPRs). Here, in an IPR, the petitioner expressly disclaimed scope. The Federal Circuit invalidated patent claims by refusing to apply the patentees “far narrower” constructions that matched its disclaimer. App. 8a-Ya. To preserve the sanctity of the prosecution and review process as the essential foundation for the proper functioning of the patent system, the question presented is:

1. Whena patentee disclaims subject matter from

the scope of its claims by written statements made

at any time during U.S. Patent and Trademark

Office proceedings, including during an inter partes

review, are courts precluded from construing

the claims more broadly than the scope of the

disclaimer?

The State of Washington makes it unlawful to sell a lawful product “with which evidence of sexual assault is collected” if, and only if, the seller “markets or otherwise presents” it as usable “over-the-counter, at-home, or self- collected,” or knows the person will use it for that purpose.

1. Does a law that bans the sale of otherwise lawful items based exclusively on the content of the seller’s truthful marketing burden speech protected by the First Amendment?

2. Do content and viewpoint restrictions on speech avoid strict scrutiny review merely because the speech is commercial in nature?

1… Whether state judges are BOUND by | the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (USFSPA) Pub. Law 97-252 (1982) pursuant to

Article I § 8 of the Constitution, | thereby REQUIRED to OBEY the precise definition of ‘disposable : retired pay’ expressed in the plain text of Positive Law 10 U.S.C. §

1408(a)(4).

2. Whether state judges are BOUND by the Veterans Judicial Review Act (VJRA) Pub. Law 100-687 (1988) pursuant to Article I § 8 of the Constitution, thereby REQUIRED to OBEY the Complete Federal Preemption expressed in the plain text of Positive Law 38 U.S.C. § 511.

3. Whether the Defendants are Personally Liable in their Individual Capacity for their violations of Positive Law 10 U.S.C. § 1408 and Positive Law 38 U.S.C. § 511 in the

: complete absence of all Jurisdiction : on the Subject Matters of Title 10 and Title 38. 1

Congress through federal legislation created the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) which is overseen by the Health and Human Services (HHS). HHS-NPDB has authority over a board of medical examiner’s that takes an adverse action and a State Licensing and certification authorities (Texas Medi- cal Board) under Title IV, Section 1928, Section 1128E, 42 U.S.C. §11111, 42 U.S.C. §11112 and 42 U.S.C. §11111(a)(1)(D). The Questions presented that has National Importance are: 1.Whether Congress, through the creation of the |

HHS-NPDB, Abrogates sovereign, state and quali-

fied immunity of the Texas Medical Board? 2.Whether Congress creates a Structural Waiver of

the Texas Medical Board’s sovereign, state and ,

qualified immunity to HHS-NPDB as dictated by

the Supremacy Clause in Article VI of the

Constitution?

In 2018 Petitioner Caruso re-applied for a — Texas medical license, was denied and she appealed to the State Office of Administrative Hearings (SOAH). Caruso appealed because the Texas Medi- cal Board (TMB) changed their 2015 requirements from 1 year additional training to, in 2018, 1 year surgical training from an AGCME/AOA program. Also in 2015 Caruso was adjudicating a case against her former employer (AQOP) regarding Caruso’s competency and privileges. AQOP informed the TMB that they made no determination regarding Caruso’s competency and privileges terminated bas- | ed on Caruso’s license expiring. -SOAH scheduled a hearing for December 9,

2020 for an Application for License. In November |

1. Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and the Due Process Clause permit a district court to strike a non-movant’s summary-judgment opposition and enter judgment without considering the non- movant’s record materials, where the court did not afford a meaningful opportunity to respond.

2. Whether a district court may decline to enforce its own discovery orders under Rule 37 and nonetheless grant summary judgment against a civil-rights plaintiff deprived of evidence necessary to oppose the motion.

3. Whether denial of leave to amend that cures all identified deficiencies, contrary to Rule 15(a)(2) and Foman v. Davis, warrants reversal. |

1

This case presents important issues concerning the Sixth Amendment right to represent oneself in a criminal proceeding and the fair administration of justice in Texas. Petitioner respectfully presents these issues, which warrant the involvement of this Court, for review:

1. Whether the 6” and 14” Amendments to the United States Constitution

prevent a State appellate court from imputing a finding to a trial judge that a

defendant suffered severe mental illness sufficient to deny him the right to

represent himself when that trial court first found no more than that the

defendant had “issues” and later explicitly denied that its ruling was based on

the defendant’s mental illness?

2. Whether a trial court’s undefined and legally unsupported “extremely high”

requirement of legal proficiency from a defendant wishing to represent himself

can be allowed to stand, when that standard comports with neither Faretta v.

California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), nor Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008),

and would preclude virtually all lay people from representing themselves?

i

1.Petitioner, Leontis Cornelius 2. Respondent, United States of America.

No related cases

2

1. “Whether the state-court judgments sanctioning the transfer of real property obtained through a collusive foreclosure process denied owners of constitutionally sufficient notice or meaningful opportunity to be heard and thus violated the ‘taking’ Clause of the 5 Amendment, the Right to Jury Trial 7 Amendment and the 14% Amendment Due Process Clause.”

a. “Does a billion-dollar company using a defective “trustees deed upon sale” facilitated by a state-sanctioned auction constitute the unconstitutional ‘taking’ of private property without compensation,

| due process, or a jury trial per constitutional provisions?”

b. “Under state & federal property law can a large-scale institutional buyer be considered a ‘good faith’ purchaser if it acquires property suggestive of constructive fraud or fails to perform due diligence concerning the legitimacy of the deed before filing it in the county property register as a validated security deed?”

1|Page Application No. 23A1012 Petition for Writ of Certiorari Redwood Holdings, LLC, dba Wedgewood Inc. vs. Azonia Haney and all other occupants of 8707 SE 347th Ave., Boring, OR 97009 and Petitioner - Brent Evan Webster December 25, 2025