A jet engine mechanic brought a civil rights lawsuit after a Massachusetts County denied him a permit to perform plumbing on the home he was building. Ar- culng pro se, Petitioner claimed that the Massachu- setts regulation banning homeowners from perform- ing plumbing on their own home—the strictest in the nation—serves no legitimate purpose and instead fur- thers only illegitimate economic protectionism. De- spite his well-pleaded allegations, the district court dismissed his due process claim based on two sen- tences of analysis. The First Circuit summarily af- firmed without briefing or argument. Neither court referenced any of the allegations in his complaint.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether a court may relegate a due process claim to rational basis scrutiny merely because the asserted right 1s not enumerated in the Con- stitution or previously recognized as fundamen- tal by the Supreme Court, or whether instead courts must apply the history and tradition test recently affirmed in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 8. Ct. 2228 (2022).

2. Whether, under the rational basis test, courts must accept a plaintiff’s well-pleaded allega- tions when resolving a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

3. Whether, under the rational basis test, courts may uphold a challenged law without any in- quiry into the relationship between the govern- ment’s means and asserted end.

Whether a physical-presence requirement that dis- criminates between in-state and out-of-state alcohol re- tailers can be deemed constitutional under the Twenty- first Amendment solely as an essential feature of a State’s three-tier system of alcohol distribution, without concrete evidence establishing that the requirement predomi- nantly promotes a legitimate, nonprotectionist interest

such as public health or safety.

(I)

Whether an arbitration agreement governing disputes in a professional sports league is categorically unenforce- able under the Federal Arbitration Act because it desig- nates the league commissioner as the default arbitrator and permits the commissioner to develop arbitral proce- dures.

(I)

3. Does “indefinite imprisonment” mean being placéd in prison for the rest of one’s life, and because the Rule of Lenity and Plain Language has to be used when determining the correct interpretation, is not the court mandated to use the definition that favors the accused?

4. State Constitutions are derived from the United States Constitution; does this not in turn violate the United States Constitution when a state’s statute violates a

, provision or prohibition within the State’s constitution?

5. When taking a judicial oath, does not every judiciary swear or affirm that they will support the Constitution of the United States and of Florida (or whatever state : they represent)? : |

6. What can be done to correct the indefinite imprisonment sentence of life, thatis unconstitutional by the Florida Constitution Article I, Section 17 that forbids “indefinite Imprisonment’?

1. Whether the Fourth Amendment requires law enforcement to make sufficient inquiries as to the authority of a third person to consent to a warrantless search of a computer hard drive.

2. Whether state courts must employ the sufficient inquiry test when reviewing a Fourth Amendment challenge to a warrantless search of a computer hard drive based upon the apparent authority of a third person.

I. Is the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling in United States v. Williams, 113 F.4” 637 (6” Cir. 2024) unconstitutional because it allows a judge to determine a fact that should be presented to a jury and violates the right to remain silent?

II. Must a vagueness challenge, or even overbreadth challenges, to 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) be reviewed under the particular facts of the case at bar or should Second Amendment issues be reviewed the same as First Amendment Freedoms?

I. Does the criminalization of possession of a weapon in a person’s home pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §924(c) violate the Second Amendment?

ll

1. KNOWING AND INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION (Kousisis). Whether the Sixth Circuit’s affirmance of wire-fraud convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 conflicts with this Court’s requirement that the government prove a knowing and intentional misrepresentation at the time property is obtained, , where the alleged “fraud” rested on the timing and sequencing of payments later directed by the architect and owner under a financing structure that vested the developer with discretion over drawdowns and disbursements; and where the record shows the project was completed, the contractors were paid, and Petitioner’s net contributions exceeded withdrawals. See United States v. Kousisis, 145 S.Ct.1382 (2025); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 20-25 (1999).

2. REVIVAL OF RIGHT-TO-CONTROL (Ciminelli). Whether the Sixth Circuit effectively revived the discredited “right-to-control” theory by upholding convictions based on alleged breaches of “trust,” “expectations,” and “fiduciary duty,” rather than a false statement obtaining money or property, in direct conflict with Ciminelli v. United States, 598 U.S. 306, 312—15 (2023), and MeNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356-60 (1987).

3. MVRA RESTITUTION WITHOUT LOSS (Lagos). Whether the court of appeals expanded the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, contrary to Lagos v. United States, 584 U.S. 577 (2018), by affirming restitution exceeding $840,000 to public entities and a vendor that suffered no direct,

2

First, whether a State Appellate Court violates a Defendant’s Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when it affirms a trial Court’s denial of a request to discharge privately retained counsel without addressing the Federal Constitutional Claim?

Second, whether discretionary jurisdiction should be exercised where the outcome of a District Court of Appeal decision conflicts in substance with the holding of another District Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court, even if the conflict is not explicitly acknowledged in the written opinion?

1

I. Whether the Indiana Court of Appeals’ holding that Candelario Cruz-Trujillo waived his post-conviction claim because he failed to make specific citations to the Record in his petition for post-conviction relief and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law represents such a significant departure from the usual course of judicial proceedings as to warrant Supreme Court jurisdiction?

, fl. | Whether Candelario Cruz-Trujillo received ineffective assistance of trial counsel

: due to his lawyer’s failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct? i