1. Whether the district court erred in not understanding Tenn. Code Ann. §.28-3-104 statute of limitation mandated the Plaintiff to file civil action Edward Ronny Arnold v Allstate Insurance Company 20-C2199?

2. Whether the district court erred in not

: understanding Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-105 statute of limitation mandated the Plaintiff to file civil action Edward Ronny Arnold v Allstate Insurance Company 22-C2097?

3. Whether the district court erred in incorrectly stating the Appellate Civil Court of Tennessee at Nashville upheld M2022-00907-CA-R3- CV? |

4. Whether the district court erred in not understanding the Defendant violated U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 right to exclusionary evidence prior to trial?

5. Whether the defendant’s “Take It Or Leave It” policy violates Allstate Insurance Company policy number: 030671568 issued July 15, 2014?

. Whether a court may .exclude. a, Federal Rule. of . : Kyidence .1006.. summary—derived entirely from | . ee. + et ae ” so us . oO ; records already admitted into evidence—without |

reviewing it, and then invoke Rule 60 to deny: relief :

on the, ground ;that the same evidence is “not. new,’ |

thereby leaving no, forum in which.the evidence can |

| be considered… , a , GY - | | |

3

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1. Does the 1975 Age Discrimination Act apply to applications for matriculation in the medical residency match process, to prohibit discrimination based on age?

2. Does the 1975 Age Discrimination Act’s private right of action permit individuals to bring actions for intentional discrimination based upon age in the medical residency match process?

Although this Second Amendment case began seven years ago primarily | centered upon the denial of a pistol permit by New York State based upon secret evidence undisclosed to Petitioner, the case metamorphosed into a forensic exposition of the decent of the New York State and federal justice systems far below Constitutional minimums and thus raises the following four (4) important questions for review:

WHETHER federal in forma pauperis litigants may be significantly denied immediate access to Court while filing-fee paying litigants suffer no such constraints as the Second Circuit has here below tacitly approved?

WHETHER New York’s handgun licensing substantive law and licensing adjudicative practices denied Petitioner: (1) his Second Amendment rights, (i1) due process and (111) equal protection?

WHETHER the Second Circuit’s refusal to address significant issues raised by Petitioner by summarily claiming those issues were “without merit” impermissibly trespassed upon Petitioner’s right to “petition” and be meaningfully “heard” and thereby breached the settled principle that litigants in similar situations should be treated the same, a fundamental component of stare decisis and the rule of law?

WHETHER the corrigendum of 42 United States Code §1983 required by the “separation-of-powers’ principle and intellectual integrity obligates this Court to reconsider the scope of the judge—made doctrine of judicial immunity stated in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)?

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Title 18, United State Code, Section 1028A imposes a mandatory two-year consecutive sentence on anyone who “knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means. of identification of another person” “during and in relation to” an enumerated felony. As Dubin v. United States, 599 U.S. 110, 114 (2023), confirmed, for a conviction under that statute to stand, the government must prove that the transfer, possession, or use of the means of identification lies “at the crux of what makes the underlying offense criminal.” Despite this, a divided Ninth Circuit panel affirmed Mr. Duru’s Section 1028A conviction based his use of his own identity to open two bank accounts. And although those accounts were linked to a single attempted deposit from one individual, the panel affirmed the determination that the offense involved 10 or more victims under U.S.8.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(1) based on individuals who suffered no actual loss. The questions presented are:

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, which applies to the use “without lawful authority, [of] a means of identification of another person” permits conviction based on a defendant’s consensual use and sharing of his own information.

2. Whether using a means of identification to open a bank account satisfies the requirement that that use be at the “crux of what makes the underlying offense criminal.”

In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), this Court held that a criminal defendant is entitled to seek an evidentiary hearing to challenge a sworn affidavit submitted in support of a search warrant. Such a hearing must be granted where the defendant “makes a substantial preliminary showing” that (1) a swearing officer made “a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth”; and (1) “the allegedly false statement [was] necessary to the finding of probable cause.” 438 U.S. at 155-56. This Court has never addressed whether Franks applies to material evidence that is intentionally or recklessly omitted from a search warrant affidavit. Nor has it explained how lower courts should assess such omissions when considering the credibility of the swearing officer.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether, and how, Franks applies to material information that is omitted from a search warrant affidavit.

2. Whether omissions from a_ search warrant affidavit can so undermine the credibility of the affiant that a Franks hearing is necessary even if probable cause would otherwise exist.

Medicaid Services (“CMS”) selects drugs for the

Program and sets a below-market “maximum fair

price” for each selected drug. Manufacturers must

then provide Medicare beneficiaries “access” to the drugs at that price and attest that they “negotiate[d]” and “agre[e]” to CMS’s terms. Failing to comply subjects manufacturers to severe sanctions—billions of dollars in annual tax penalties or complete exclusion from Medicare and Medicaid, which account for nearly half the U.S. prescription drug market. The Second Circuit upheld the Program, but it never engaged with the substance of Petitioner

Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc.’s

constitutional claims. The court instead held that the

Program cannot violate the First or Fifth

Amendments because it is “voluntary”: A

manufacturer can “choose” to avoid the Program’s

mandates by incurring crippling tax penalties or withdrawing its entire drug portfolio from Medicare and Medicaid. The questions presented are:

1. Is the Program immune from scrutiny under the First and Fifth Amendments because it relies on economic coercion to secure participation?

2. Does the Program unconstitutionally condition Medicare and Medicaid _ participation on manufacturers giving up their constitutionally protected speech, property, and due process rights?

Does it violate the Fourth Amendment when, during the execution of a residential search warrant, law enforcement subverts the geographical restrictions established in Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186 (2013) by directing probation officers to order Mr. Rocco, a probationer, to return home for fictitious reasons, thus bringing him (and his phone) within the purview of the residential search warrant?

Petitioner Tom Schramm, a 30-year member of the United Steelworkers union (USW), was fired based on false rumors. Although wholly innocent, the USW accepted the company’s version of events at face value and did not interview Schramm, otherwise investigate, or even file a step one grievance.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the USW, giving deference to the union’s decision in reliance on Air Line Pilots v. O’Neill. Four other circuits follow this approach; four do not (three are unclear).

The questions presented are:

1. Whether the same standards for determining

a breach of the duty of fair representation in contract negotiations should be imposed upon unions for individual discharge and grievance cases.

2. Whether the duty of fair representation requires

a union’s decision-making to be based on objective competent evidence, or whether the union may decline to pursue a meritorious grievance for unjust discharge based on subjective information and belief.

Three churches in San _ Diego County, California, seek to open preschools on their campuses as extensions of their ministries. Under the Child Day Care Act, California requires a license to operate a preschool. The churches object to licensure because it 1s conditioned on the waiver of certain constitutional rights. Central to their claim is the “religious services provision,’ which is a regulation mandating that a “licensee shall ensure that each child is accorded the following personal right[]: . . . To be free to attend religious services or activities of his/her choice.” The decision whether to opt-in or out of religious services and activities 1s made by the parents of the preschoolers. Preschools must also post signage of the religious services provision in a publicly accessible place and hand out a paper copy to parents for signature and filing. The signs and notice also inform parents of the right to have visits to the school by a spiritual advisor of the child’s choice.

Though the Act enumerates fifteen exemptions to licensure, religious institutions do not make the preferred list. One exception is that a church can run a Sunday school on Sunday but cannot engage in materially the same program through a preschool on Monday through Friday. The questions presented are as follows:

1. Does California’s religious services provision, requiring the posting of signage and handing out

1. Has the authority or ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway v. Waters, 294 U.S. 405 (1935), been extinguished by the Respondent-Appellee, Exeter Finance LLC or by the Court | of Appeals for the 11 Circuit, permit the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit to decide cases without due process of law and without any opportunity to hear both parties in person?

2. Has the authority or decision of the United States Supreme Court in Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 16 Wall. 271 (1872), been extinguished or overruled by the U.S. District Court or by the Court of Appeals (11 Cir.) or by EXETER FINANCE LLC, permit Exeter Finance LLC’ use of deprivation of rights and property without due process of law decisions?

3. Does Exeter Finance LLC possess a federal due process right to repossess automobiles without due process, and without Exeter’s signature on any contract proving Exeter can really build security in- terest pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S.

| Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)?

4. Do the holdings in Bank v. Lanier, 78 U.S. 369 (1870), in First National Bank of Tallapoosa v. Monroe, 135 GA 614; 69 S.E. 1123 (1911); and in CE. Healey & Son v. Stewardson National Bank, 1 N.E.2d 858 III. App. 290 (1936), render Exeter Finance LLC corporate jurisdiction to lend its credit lere- dit] to the Petitioner of this case without due process of law? ,

5. Does the United States Supreme Court have the power to order the District Court and the Court of

1. Did the Eleventh Circuit err in affirming the district court’s requirement that Petitioner serve individual government employees in a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) lawsuit, when well-established precedent and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4() mandate service only upon the United States While converting a FTCA Claim into a Bivins further 11th Circuit conversion into a 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 or 1985 that’s not in the original compliant?

2. Did the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling effectively affirm the lower court’s conversion and enforcement of the Petitioner to pursue a Bivens claim rather than an FTCA claim, thereby misapplying governing law and creating an unconstitutional barrier to Petitioner’ ability to seek redress against the United States, while the complaint did not assert claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 or 1985, nor did it invoke Bivens?

3. Did the lower courts’ actions violate Petitioner’ due process rights by imposing improper procedural burdens that contradict Supreme Court precedent regarding the FTCA and Rule 4 service requirements?

4. Did the lower courts fail to provide sufficient findings of fact and legal reasoning, thereby violating Petitioner’ due process rights and obstructing meaningful appellate review, as established in Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985)?

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1} Shall the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issue a Right to Sue to a claimant only to have the Right-to-Sue

expeditiously denied upon entry to the U.S. district court?

2. Shall a Plaintiff that was granted in forma pauperis in one lawsuit be granted in forma pauperis again when said Plaintiff files . another lawsuit (against a different Defendant) within the same court and the financial circumstances of the Plaintiff remains the

same or worse as before?

3. Shall the Judge muzzle the defense entirely?

4. Shall a teachers’ union provide fair and timely representation to its Caucasian and non-white members alike?

5} Shail a teachers’ union provide fair and timely representation to its dues-paying and non-dues paying members alike?

For over 30 years this Honorable Court has emphasized in a series of cases that youth matter in sentencing. Underpinning the opinions issued by the Court was a relatively simple concept that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing” because they “have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform.” Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012). More recently this High Court in Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98, 108(2021) decided to reaffirm the holding in Miller, supra explaining that the Court in Miller “repeatedly descried youth as a sentencing factor akin to a mitigating circumstance.

The First Circuit confirmed the sentence issued in this case treating Petitioner age and youth circumstances as an aggravating factor. The question is presented as follows:

Whether youth (minor age) at the time of the commission of a criminal offense, with its intrinsic characteristics, is inherently a mitigating factor that must be considered in sentencing a juvenile defendant.

1. Whether the Supreme Court should exercise its supervisory power under Rule 20 and the All Writs Act to -

restrain a state judge who continues to act without venue or subject matter jurisdiction and after removal ,

to federal court, in defiance of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) and the Fourteenth Amendment. |

2. Whether the Court should direct Kansas courts to restore Petitioners parental rights and enforce federal.

due-process and ADA protections where the state Judiciary has refused to act and dismissed Petitioners writ |

of prohibition for lack of jurisdiction, leaving no forum for relief. ! Petitioner timely filed the prior version of this writ on October 31, 2025; this corrected version is submitted - solely to conform with the procedural requirements identified by the Clerk and does not alter the ’ substance or timeliness of the original filing.

1 Due Process—Sufficiency of the Evidence / Digital Possession. Whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause permits affirmance of a conviction for knowing and voluntary possession of digital contraband where the State introduced no forensic or | | attribution evidence tying petitioner to the device or files and did not establish that the images were stored on a local device under petitioner’s dominion and control—rather than displayed from an unidentified external attachment, network device, or remote , system—and where the State’s proof of petitioner’s connection to the premises and equipment was inferential and contested. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).

2 Due Process—Limited-Purpose Evidence Used as Substantive Proof. Whether due process is violated when a reviewing court sustains a conviction by treating evidence admitted only for a limited “course of investigation” purpose as substantive proof of an element (knowledge/voluntariness), in order to fill evidentiary gaps in the State’s proof.

LIST OF PARTIES

Petitioner: Charles Bocock.

Respondent: People of the State of Illinois. 1

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW Mr. Trail was an indigent, death sentenced individual who diligently pursued the appointment of conflict-free counsel to raise credible claims related to the ineffective assistance of trial counsel, who had remained on as his direct appeal counsel. A postconviction court imposed indigency hurdle after indigency hurdle not required by Nebraska law or procedure—and then bootstrapped that lost time as a basis to decline to even consider the verified postconviction petition once non-conflicted counsel was appointed. Nebraska’s deprivation of the entirety of the post-conviction remedy when an individual pursues the appointment of conflict-free counsel presents the following questions:

1. Does a state violate this Court’s precedent and the Due Process clause when it penalizes the request for the appointment of conflict-free counsel?

2. Does the Due Process clause endorse a theory of a client’s abandonment of an attorney?

3. Is the timely and unencumbered appointment of conflict-free counsel a requirement of an adequate and corrective process where the statute requires effective and meaningful counsel?

ial

I. The Sixth Amendment protects a criminal defendant’s right “to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.” In Apprendi v. New Jersey, this Court held that “fact[s] that increase|]| the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum” were elements that must be charged in an indictment but carved out an exception for prior convictions. 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). It rooted the general rule in common- law historical practices, see id. at 477-83, but relied on an earlier opinion—Almendarez-Torres v. United States—to support the prior-conviction exception, see id. at 489 (citing 523 U.S. 224, 230 (1998)).

The first question presented is:

Whether the prior-conviction exception from Almendarez-Torres can be squared with the text of the Sixth Amendment’s Notice Clause and the historical practices it codified.

II. The text and history are clear. In the Founding Era and immediately afterward, courts, prosecutors, and defendants in England and America treated the fact of a prior conviction necessary to satisfy a statutory recidivism enhancement as an element of an aggravated crime to be alleged in the indictment and proved to a jury at trial. The text of the Notice Clause codified this common-law practice. A crime’s “nature” included all allegations necessary to distinguish one statutory offense from another. A prior-conviction allegation served to differentiate between the offense applicable to first-time offenders and the one aimed at recidivists.

The second question presented 1s: Whether, in light of the historical record, Almendarez-Torres should be overruled.

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