1. Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated when a state court affirms the dismissal of civil claims without findings of fact, without evidentiary hearings, and while repeatedly denying discovery, thereby depriving a litigant of any meaningful opportunity to

: be heard.

2. Whether the Equal Protection Clause is violated when courts selectively enforce procedural , rules—sanctioning a pro se litigant for minor | technical errors while excusing licensed attorneys who repeatedly miss deadlines and ignore motions.

3. Whether pro se litigants are constitutionally entitled to meaningful access to the courts, including liberal construction of filings under Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), and Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), and whether state appellate courts violate due process by refusing to apply those precedents.

4. Whether a state appellate court violates — the Fourteenth Amendment by affirming a trial court judgment that contains no findings of fact or ,

| conclusions of law, thereby foreclosing meaningful | a

review of constitutional claims.

5. Whether the cumulative effect of | multiple due process violations—including denial of discovery, refusal to compel testimony, summary

1

In the decision below, the Fifth Circuit held that the “church autonomy doctrine” provides a defendant “immunity” from claims by a plaintiff who never worked for the defendant, never served as a minister for the defendant, and never submitted to the authority of the defendant with respect to any ecclesiastical or secular matter.

The Question Presented is:

Does the church autonomy doctrine apply to, and

foreclose, civil law claims which are not disputes about the internal affairs or self-governance of a religious institution?! 1 Petitioner agrees with the Fifth Circuit that the ministerial exception is “one ‘component’ of the church autonomy doctrine” (Pet. App. 14a) and intends that the applicability of the ministerial exception is subsumed within the Question Presented.

as a result of his indigency. Also, did the Court deprive the Petitioner

of his constitutional rights by denying the undersigned due process, procedural due process which is secured by the Constitution that _ ensures fairness in legal proceedings?

2

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seg., like the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seqg., specifies that a person aggrieved under the statute may “obtain appropriate relief against a government.” In Tanzin v. Tanvir, 592 U.S. 438 (2020), this Court held that individuals may sue government officials in their individual capacities for damages under RFRA. This Court then granted certiorarl1 and earlier this term heard oral argument in Landor uv. Louisiana, Case No. 23-1197. The question presented in Landor is whether an individual may sue a government official in his individual capacity for damages for violations of RLUIPA. The question presented in this case is identical.

1

1. Whether police deception that explicitly disavows the interrogative nature of questioning—specifically, an officer’s false promise that she is not trying to interrogate the suspect or ask him any questions about the case—renders a suspect’s subsequent statements involuntary under the Fifth Amendment when made immediately after the suspect invokes Miranda rights, thereby requiring suppression of those statements and their fruits.

2. Whether courts conducting a totality-of-circumstances voluntariness analysis must distinguish between permissible police misrepresentations of fact and constitutionally impermissible misrepresentations that negate the legal consequences of waiving Fifth Amendment rights, particularly when an officer affirmatively contradicts warnings just given about a suspect’s right to remain silent and the use of statements against him.

1

This petition presents two questions.

First, whether Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) should be overruled?

Second, whether this Court should grant certiorari, vacate the judgment be- low, and remand in light of Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024), if it does not elect a plenary grant of certiorari?

1

1. Following a months-long investigation into drug trafficking and while preparing to search an apartment within a large apartment complex, police observed a Jeep occupied by three unknown individuals park outside the complex, interact briefly with an unknown woman, and then leave. The police stopped the Jeep and ultimately uncovered evidence used against Mr. Amado. Other police involved in the months-long investigation, but not in the stop of the Jeep, had twice observed the Jeep in the course of the investigation. Does the collective knowledge doctrine apply where the police who stopped the Jeep did not personally know of information relating to the broader investigation and were not directed to stop the Jeep by someone with such knowledge and, with or without application of the collective knowledge doctrine, should the evidence have been suppressed?

2. Where the district court failed to make the findings required by United States v. Dunnigan and where the record does not support that Mr. Amado willfully gave false testimony on material matters, was it error to apply the obstruction of justice enhancement?

3. Mr. Amado had two prior felony convictions for controlled substances offenses, but he was sentenced for those two convictions on the same date. Where the record at sentencing contained no evidence of an intervening arrest, was it error to designate Mr. Amado as a career offender?

4, Mr. Amado was sentenced to 32 years in prison while his co-equal co- defendant was sentenced to fewer than 16 years in prison. Is such a drastic disparity among similarly situated co-defendants unreasonable?

ii

v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) and Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).

(2) Was The Arizona Superior Court who knowingly was aware that the plea agreement conviction was procured through fraud and dueprocess violations required to overturn | the conviction as announced in Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278 (1st Cir. 2006).