The first question presented is whether 29 U.S.C. §1386(b)(1)’s instruction to “reduce[]” any “withdrawal hability” of an employer in a subsequent plan year “by the amount of any partial withdrawal liability … for a previous plan year,” requires a multiemployer plan to calculate the employer’s “withdrawal liability” for the subsequent plan year and reduce that amount, or to apply the earlier withdrawal liability as one of four potential adjustments to the “allocable amount of unfunded vested benefits’ used to reach the amount of “withdrawal lability” for a subsequent year.

Despite the statute’s instruction that any partial withdrawal liability in a previous year “shall” “reduce[]” any “withdrawal liability” in a subsequent plan year, the majority below applied this credit as an adjustment to the “allocable amount of unfunded vested benefits” used to determine the subsequent “withdrawal lability” in the first instance.

This result conflicts with the long-standing opinion of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, which in 1985 declared such a method “clearly erroneous.” PBGC Op. Ltr. 85-4, p. 1 (January 30, 1985). Moreover, the circuit judge supplying the second vote joined the majority opinion only “[a]fter much back and forth,” and despite “residual doubts about the correct answer,” explaining that his doubts were “not sufficient to create a circuit split.” App., infra, 16a.

This raises a second question: whether in construing a statute a circuit judge may treat an out of circuit opinion as a statutory tiebreaker, in effect civing that opinion decisive weight against creating a “circuit split,” and to that degree shield the majority’s reasoning from this Court’s legitimate scrutiny.

This petition addresses the latest affirmation decision rendered by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concerning the sixth of six related federal cases filed in the U.S. District Court for the District Court of New Jersey. In the six cases, the four presiding district judges committed a combined 60+ judiciary violations (the latest presiding district judge committed at least 11) which deprived me of due process and which the Third Circuit affirmed.

In the six related appellate cases, the Third Circuit used some of the very same judiciary viola- tions as support for its affirmation decisions, as well as disregarded important sections of my proffered facts and legal arguments. Significantly, no opposing party had ever disputed with specificity any of my proffered key facts, such as the 60+ judiciary viola- tions, and few of the legal arguments that support my deprivation-of-due process allegations.

This petition constitutes my fourth petition to this Court — the prior three had been denied. I[ allege that that the Third Circuit affirmed two district court decisions which deprived me of due process. As such, the pertinent questions are:

1. Does this Court need to intercede be- cause the lower courts have deviated substantially from the norm in judicial proceedings?

2. Did the judges in the lower courts act impartially?

The Fifth Circuit has indicated it is jurisdictional that a person must present their issues under § 2255 to the district court and receive a certificate of appealability from the district court before proceeding on appeal. The question presented 18:

Does the Supreme Court’s ruling that 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(8) 1s non-jurisdictional in nature overrule the Fifth Circuit’s jurisprudence?

This question encapsulates what the Plaintiff presented to the lower Courts:

1. When a woman signs a Prenuptial Agreement for a set amount, she cannot argue in divorce court that the Law says “she has the right” to half. Therefore, is it is a Breach of Contract for a Defendant to have a JAMS Arbitration case dismissed by saying the Law says that there is not a “private right of action”’ when the Arbitration Agreement’ itself overrules the Law _ by claiming/promising that “[n arbitration, each side in the dispute presents tts case to a neutral third party called an arbitrator, rather than to a judge or jury.” …to maintain… “all rights and remedies that we would be entitled to pursue in a court of law.”..making arbitration… “the exclusive method for…resoluing any and all disputes and claims”, which in effect creates a “private right of action”.

It 1s the Plaintiffs opinion that this Question obliviously “contains sufficient factual matter” that should easily be “accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that 1s plausible on its face” (Ashcroft v. Iqbal) to satisfy FRCP 12(b)(6). But the District Court Judge disagreed and basically said, the Parties went to Arbitration, and the Plaintiff is just dissatisfied with the Ruling (the Appeals Court simply quoted a 1 Supposedly, the Plaintiff should have filed with the Immigrant and Employee Rights Section “JER” instead of JAMS. (But no hmiting-factors clause is in the contract,)

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In Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999), this Court held that a claim of total disability for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) purposes does not automatically estop a plaintiff from claiming to be a “qualified individual” under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), provided the plaintiff proffers a “sufficient explanation” for the apparent inconsistency.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether the “sufficient explanation” requirement under Cleveland is satisfied only by an affirmative, textual reconciliation within the four corners of the SSDI application or testimony, as held by the First, Third, and Fifth Circuits; or whether it may be satisfied by contextual evidence as held by the D.C. and Ninth Circuits; and
2. Whether courts may effectively apply a judicial- estoppel or heightened summary-jJudgment standard against ADA plaintiffs by resolving credibility and factual disputes arising from SSDI filings at summary judgment rather than leaving those determinations to the trier of fact.
3. Whether a plaintiff’s explanation is legally sufficient under Cleveland where she applies for SSDI while on medical leave and actively pursuing an available accommodation that would render her a “qualified individual.”

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Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 88 (1968), and its progeny, prosecutors have an obligation to disclose evidence favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it 1s impeaching. Federal prosecutors interviewed a key government witness on the eve of the criminal jury trial but failed to disclose to the defense either the fact of the interview or the notes created by the government. While the witness’s name arose 118 times during the trial, he was never called to testify.

Long after trial, Petitioner learned for the first time about the interview when the witness provided an affidavit. He averred he told the government Petitioner was not the individual responsible for the series of events that led a local airport authority to guarantee a loan for a startup airline business. That loan guarantee formed the basis for the charges against Petitioner, the witness was intimately involved in the process, and the information he provided would have impeached the testimony of several other government trial witnesses.

Federal prosecutors refused to provide the notes from the meeting to the defense either before or during habeas evidentiary hearing addressing Petitioner’s Brady claims, and the District Court denied Petitioner’s motion to compel production. The Question Presented 1s:

Whether defendants raising Brady violations that can show the government suppressed evidence are entitled to production of that evidence in discovery to meet their burden of proof in a habeas proceeding?

This Court has applied two standards for whether a statute is sufficiently ambiguous to trigger the rule of lenity. One standard asks whether there is “reasonable doubt” about the statute’s meaning. Mos- kal v. United States, 498 U.S. 108, 108 (1990); see also Wooden v. United States, 595 U.S. 360, 383-97 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (arguing in favor of the rea- sonable doubt standard). The other asks whether the statute contains a “grievous ambiguity.” Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 458, 463 (1991) (quoting Hud- dleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 831 (1974)); see also Wooden, 595 U.S. at 376—79 (Kavanaugh, J., con- curring) (arguing in favor of the grievous ambiguity standard). As the en banc Fifth Circuit recently ob- served, “[t]he Supreme Court does not appear to have decided which of these standards govern the rule of lenity.” Cargill v. Garland, 57 F.4th 447, 469 (5th Cir. 2023) (en banc) (citations omitted).

The question presented is this: What degree of statutory ambiguity triggers the rule of lenity?

| discrimination by recipients of federal financial assistance, pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 28 C_F.R. Part 42; or is this action committed to agency discretion by law?

2. If this action is a nondiscretionary duty, does a complainant have a right to judicial review of the agency’s final action? a

(1) Whether after New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) and United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), a criminal defendant may raise an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

(2) If so, whether under the Bruen/Rahimi methodology, the Second Amendment is unconstitutional as applied to a defendant like Petitioner with only non-violent priors.

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This Court long interpreted the Sixth Amendment consistent with how our founders understood it. One component of that right was that criminal defendants “should be tried by a jury composed of not less than twelve persons.” Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 348, 350 (1898). Of this conclusion, this Court reasoned, “there can be no doubt.” Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 586 (1900).

In Williams v. Florida, the Court shifted to a functionalist approach. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 99-100 (1970). Parting from decades of jurisprudence, the majority concluded that 12 people were not necessary to the function of the Sixth Amendment. /d. at 100-01. Six jurors were enough. Id.

Two years later, this functionalist approach became the basis for a plurality decision discarding jury unanimity in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 411 (1972).

But in the unanimity context, this Court rejected the functionalist approach just six years ago in Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 88, 100 (2020). Rather, this Court was guided by how our founders understood the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 89-98.

The obvious tension between Williams and Ramos has led many to call for this Court to reconsider Williams—including Justice Gorsuch. See Khorrami v. Arizona, 598 U.S. __, 148 8. Ct. 22 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of certiorar1); Cunningham v. Florida, 144 8. Ct. 1287 (2024) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).

This Petition asks:

Does the Sixth Amendment guarantee the right to a 12-person jury?

ia

e Whether a post-trial waiver of appeal is unknowing and involuntary, and therefore invalid under the Fifth Amendment, where petitioner was not fully advised of the consequences of the post-trial agreement and the nature of his appellate rights.

e Whether an appeal waiver applies when the district court’s advisals during the courtroom colloquy suggested that the defendant was not waiving his right to appeal his convictions and sentence on all counts.

STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS The proceedings identified below are directly related to the above-captioned case in this Court.

e United States v. Arthur Raffy Aslanian, No. 22-CR-445-JGB, U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. Judgment entered May 15, 2024.

e United States v. Arthur Raffy Aslanian, No. 24-3172, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Order issued October 8, 2025.

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(1) Whether the State of Colorado violated petitioner’s rights to due process, a fair trial, and equal protection by failing to address prosecutorial misconduct in the form of pernicious use of racially charged language, including twenty-four instances of the all-white prosecution team using the N-word in front of the jury that convicted petitioner of murder, sometimes when referring to petitioner himself, a Black man.

(2) Whether, given the persistent and pernicious presence of racial bias in the criminal legal system and the important position that prosectors hold in our society, constitutional harmless-error review should apply to prosecutorial misconduct of a racial nature even when such error is unpreserved due to a lack of contemporaneous objections by defense counsel.

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who was parked along the highway, pulled out, sped to catch up to him, and then followed closely behind him. In response to the deputy’s driving, Larremore signaled and parked on the shoulder. The deputy stopped behind him, approached, and spoke with him about his travel. After some questioning, during which the deputy made physical contact with lLarremore’s truck, the deputy instructed Larremore to “hang on a sec,” while the deputy walked back towards his cruiser before diverting to further inspect the trailer Larremore was hauling. He did not have a reasonable suspicion to justify the seizure at that point. Larremore and the deputy spoke outside of the trailer for over fifteen minutes, during which the deputy developed probable cause to search the trailer and found that Larremore was transporting people with the intent to further their unlawful presence in the United States.

1. Whether the deputy’s instruction to “hang on a sec,” particularly in context, communicated to a reasonable person in Larremore’s position that he was not free to leave and, therefore, seized for Fourth Amendment purposes.

1. Whether federal courts can brand as “frivolous” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).a

citizen’s constitutional claims supported by official government correspondence, dated . surveillance-verified incidents, sworn declarations under penalty of perjury, and audio

recordings submitted to federal agencies—thereby weaponizing Neitzke v. Williams, 490

. U.S. 319 (1989) and Denton v. Hernandez, 504 US. 25 (1992) to silence allegations of government misconduct that are verifiable, concrete, and grounded in established legal precedent——or whether dismissing such evidence-backed claims as “irrational” or “wholly incredible” without discovery, without examining the proof, and without applying the

correct legal standards violates due process and transforms frivolousness review from a |

shield against baseless litigation into a sword that strikes down legitimate constitutional grievances before they can be heard.

2. Whether the federal judiciary can permit the Executive Branch to author its own judicial . absolution—drafting dismissal orders under judges’ names to escape accountability— without destroying the foundational separation of powers enshrined in Article II, and whether such allegations of executive usurpation of judicial authority can ever be dismissed as “frivolous” when the very orders dismissing the claims bear the legal errors, procedural irregularities, and substantive deficiencies that evidence non-judicial | authorship.

3. Whether the promise of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)}—that no person shall be denied their constitutional right to counsel—can be nullified through the secret machinations of National Security Letters, allowing federal agents to systematically obstruct a citizen’s access to legal representation for over a decade without judicial

: oversight, without statutory authority, and without remedy, thereby creating a shadow system where fundamental constitutional rights disappear at the stroke of an executive

• pen cloaked in the false armor of “national security.”

4. Whether due process and equal protection tolerate a pre-filing injunction that permanently banishes a citizen from the courthouse steps based on a demonstrably fabricated litigation history—where a federal court punishes a man for cases he never filed, disregards his sworn testimony proving his innocence, refuses to investigate evidence of identity fraud by government operatives, and erects an insurmountable barrier to justice—all while the actual wrongdoers operate with impunity under the protection of that same fabricated record.

5. Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)’s express requirement that “the district court certifies, in writing, that the appeal is not taken in good faith” means what it says, or whether courts may strip indigent litigants of their appellate rights through interpretive sleight-of-hand that treats judicial silence as certification, constructive presumption as statutory compliance, and the absence of due process as procedurally sufficient—thereby denying the poor their day in court while the powerful proceed unimpeded.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING Petitioner Dewayne Bulls is the pro se plaintiff-appellant in the proceedings below. | 2