For 20 years, petitioner Jeanne Hedgepeth was a teacher at Palatine High School in Illinois. While on summer vacation in Florida, she posted several comments on her private Facebook page criticizing political unrest following the death of George Floyd. The school district fired Hedgepeth after administrators deemed her core protected speech “disrespectful, demeaning of other viewpoints, and racist.” In any other context, such blatant viewpoint discrimination by government officials would be a non- starter. But because Hedgepeth is a public employee, the Seventh Circuit held that the First Amendment does not bar the government from firing her based on the views she expressed in off-the-job speech on topics unrelated to her work. The court recognized that Hedgepeth’s Facebook posts constituted core political speech on matters of public concern. It did not matter. Invoking the balancing test set forth in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 568 (1968), the court held that the school’s interest in “avoiding disruption’—specifically, emails and phone calls from some members of the public (most of whom had no direct connection to the school) “expressing concern or outrage’ about Hedgepeth’s summer vacation posts— “outweighs her right to speak.”

The question presented 1s:

Whether and in what circumstances public employers may discipline employees based on their expression of controversial views while off the job.

In Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392 (2004), this Court recognized “a growing divergence of opinion in the Courts of Appeals” regarding whether the actual innocence exception to the habeas corpus procedural bar rule applies to noncapital sentencing errors. Then, as today, the Eighth and Tenth Circuits held that there is “no actual innocence exception for noncapital sentencing error,” while the Second and Fourth Circuits held that the exception “applies in [the] noncapital sentencing context” where the petitioner was erroneously found eligible for a career or habitual offender sentence enhancement. Id. Ultimately, this Court did not resolve the question.

Since Dretke, the conflict has only deepened with lower courts in disarray on the applicability and scope of the actual innocence exception to noncapital sentencing errors. As a result, similarly situated defendants receive dramatically different treatment depending solely on the circuit in which they were sentenced.

Here, although “no one disputes” that petitioner did not commit three prior “serious drug offenses” to trigger his 15-year mandatory minimum sentence enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act, Pet. App. 18a, the court below declined to apply the actual innocence exception. The court held that the erroneous “misclassification of a predicate offense for a sentencing enhancement is” only “legal innocence” that “does not open the actual innocence gateway” in a noncapital case. Pet. App. 14a.

The question presented is: Whether an individual who did not commit the qualifying predicate offenses required to trigger the Armed Career Criminal Act’s 15- year mandatory minimum sentence enhancement in a noncapital case can assert the actual innocence exception to procedural bars on habeas corpus relief.

(1)

Amendment therewith in suits against the State? Whether the State’s committance of legal estoppel is a cause

} | of action for damages thereof under federal constitutional claims processes for relief of grievance thereon?

a 7

Whether the warrantless impoundment and subsequent inventory search of a vehicle violates the Fourth Amendment when the operator has not been arrested or taken into custody as . expressly required under state law (Mo. Rev. Stat. §304.155 (5)). :

If so whether the U.S. Court of Appeals erred in upholding the Constitutionality of an impoundment and inventory search that directly conflicts with explicit state statutory limitations on such police conduct. . |

Whether the impoundment and subsequent search of Mr. Potter’s vehicle by city police

was contrary to state law and violated his Constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. } | |

If so whether the U.S. Court of Appeals failure to follow this court’s precedent regarding the Rules of Statutory Construction violated Mr. Potter’s rights to due process under the Fifth

ae —and-Fourteenth-Amendments,—~…… nen ce natn tanta inna seater

4. WHETHER A STATE’S APPLICATION ANO ENFORCEMENT OF TTS PROCEQURAL BARS VIA LTS HIGHEST APPELLATE CouRT IN CERTAIN CASES RESULT IN ANNIHZLATION ANDO OXMENUTION OF FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL Or GHrs AND CLAIMS ORA ELATM WITHIN A PARTZCULAR CAUSE OF ACTION AS SPECLES OF VALUABLE AND PERSONAL PRIVATE TENCORPOREAL OR INTANGIBLE PROPERTY THAT TS”TAKEN’ BY “ JUDIE TAL DECREE” FoR GSoVERNMENTAL USE WITHOUT TUST COMPENSATION AND THE PROCESS OVE XN COMPORT WITH DUE PROCESS ?

2, WHETHER THE SCOPE OF THE FEDERAL EX Pos T FACTO LAW CLAUSE(S) OF UNIVED STATES CONSTITUTION ARTICLE I, $9 & § 10 EXTENDS To Sr TUA- TIONS WHERE AS A RESULT O¥ STATE LEGISLATIVE FXTATA”NEW” CRIME OR OSFENSE TS CREATED USING THE SAME PRE-~ EXISTING : STATUTORY ELEMENTS TO DEFINE THE “NEw” OFFENSE WHILE STMULTAN-~ EQUSLY CHANGING THE PRIOR SENTENCENG GULDELINES BUT NOT GIVE THE “NEW” SENTENCING PROVESKON RETROACTIVE RETROSPECTIVE EXFECT?

3. WHETHER THE FORECLOSURE ANO PRECLUDING OF RETROACTIVE ANORETRO- SPECTIVE APPLICATION OF A “NEW” SENTENCING GULOELTNE FOR THE SAME STATUTORY ELEMENTS DEFINED FOR MURDER UNDER PRE- EXxSTZNG 1 Aw VIOLATES THE OUE PROCESS CLAUSES AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF U.S.C. ART. 14, § 14, ANO RUN AXoUL OF THE EX POST FACTO LAw CLAUSES Cu.S.¢. ARYV.T, $$ 9810)?

G, WHETHER THE *NGW STATUTORY SENTENCING GULDELENES TOR MURDER CREATE A ENTITLEMENT ANO A PRESYUMPYTEON OF AND A “LXSERTY INTER-

EST” PROTECTED BY THE OVE PROCESS CLAUSE OF U.S.C. ART. 44, $1 TO THE CLASS OX OF FENDERS ASFECTEOD THEREBY BUT PRECLUDED FROM ACCESS TO ATTAIN A “ZuRY DETERMINATION” To EMPOSE A LIFE SENTENCE RATH- ER THAN A WUDGES LMROSK TION OFA LIFE SENTENCE ONCE PRESCRIBED UNDER PRE-EXISTING LAw C§ AT-3- ab} ? il

In. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534 (1992), this Court held that “[o}nce a federal claim is properly presented, a party can make any argument in support of that claim];] parties are not limited to the precise arguments they made below.” The questions presented are:

1. Did appellants Cyr Banguguilan and Miguel Bocardo forfeit their Fed. R. Evid. 403 challenge to the admission of photographs and video recordings depicting Steven Rodriguez’s sexual abuse of a physically and mentally disabled eight-year-old girl when opposing admission pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 403 but without specifically demanding that the district court review the proffered exhibits before ruling?

2. Whether a district court abuses its discretion by admitting graphic depictions of violent sexual abuse of a mentally and physically disabled 8-year-old girl without viewing the evidence to assess defendants’ Rule 403 challenge? And

3. Whether the court of appeals must review evidence challenged under Rule 403 before resolving that claim of error?

l

1. Was Petitioner Cassandra Wiltz denied her 14th Amendment Due Process rights to be provided with a notice and an opportunity to be heard (and were the defendants for case no. 24-CVH-04-0331 and the State of Ohio intentionally allowed by State judges to escape accountability/liability for the crimes that they were charged with committing, when the following events occurred (a) the Petitioner filed a lawsuit that charged the defendants with committing crimes and with helping the State of Ohio to commit crimes (The crimes included, but were not limited to, unlawfully using and unlawfully cremating the body of Dan Burnett, engaging in a racially motivate threats/assault against the Petitioner, and retaliating against the Petitioner ‘because she exercised her First Amendment right to petition the government and to file lawsuits against the defendants and the State of Ohio’), (b) the defendants for the case filed a Counterclaim that asked the Court to declare the plaintiff to be a Vexatious Litigator (so that she could not litigate the lawsuit) and did not provide a copy of the Counterclaim to the Petitioner, (c) the Court made a 7/18/24 and 7/19/24 written decisions indicating that it would not compel the defendants or Court staff to provide the Petitioner with a copy of the

defendants’ Counterclaim or Motion for Judgment on the Counterclaim, so that she could respond to them (while having knowledge that the Petitioner was unaware that the Counterclaim was a request for the Court to declare the Petitioner to be a | Vexatious Litigator), (d) the Court granted the Motion for Judgment on the Counterclaim (and stated that this was a ‘default judgment’) and supported its decision with fabrications about the petitioners litigation history and behavior, (e) the Court stated that the Petitioner’s lawsuit that described criminal behavior was dismissed ‘solely because the Petitioner was found to be a Vexatious litigator, and (f) the Court of Appeals refused to allow the Petitioner to Appeal the 7/18/24 and 7/19/24 decision and stated that it was not going to hear any Appeal Brief arguments concerning the 7/18/24 and 7/19/24 decisions and concerning the Petitioner’s claim that she was denied a due process right to be provided with a notice and an opportunity to be heard?

2. Did the Respondents lack ‘standing’ to initiate a Vexatious Litigator civil action against Petitioner Cassandra Witz (via the 4/23/24 filing of a Counterclaim for case no.24-CVH-04-0331) and did the Common Pleas Court judge lack ‘jurisdiction’ to make a 7/23/24 Vexatious Litigator Declaration and to dismiss case no. 24-CVH- 04-0331 (because the 7/23/24 Declaration was made)? Were the acts of (the Common Pleas Court) making the 7/23/24 decision without having jurisdiction to make it, (the Court of Appeals) adopting the 7/23/24 decision, and (the Supreme Court) refusing to accept jurisdiction of the case additional evidence of the judges’ bias against the Petitioner and/or denial of the Petitioner’s 14th Amendment Procedural Due Process rights?

3. Did the Common Pleas Court Judge have the ‘authority’ to make the 7/23/24 decision for case no. 24-CVH-04-0331 (which (first) granted a 4/23/24 Counterclaim request to declare the Petitioner to be a Vexatious Litigator and

FREDRIKSON & BYRON, P.A.

60 South Sixth St., Ste. 1500

Minneapolis, MN 55402

(612) 492-7000

(admitted pro hac vice)

Kevin C. Riach

THE LAW OFFICE OF KEVIN C. RIACH, P.L.L.C 125 SE Main St., Suite 339

Minneapolis, MN 55414

(admitted pro hac vice)

Counsel for Petitioner Darrell James Robinson

• Counsel of Record

1. WHETHER THE 8TH CIRCUIT ERRED FINDING THAT REASONABLE SUSPICION EXISTED JUSTIFYING THE STOP OF PETITIONER’S VEHICLE AND MISAPPLYING RODRIGUEZ ON WHETHER OR NOT THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS IMPROPERLY EXTENDED.

2. WHETHER THE 8TH CIRCUIT ERRED BY AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S ADMISSION OF HEARSAY STATEMENTS UNDER F.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E).

3. WHETHER THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S ADMISSION OF PETITIONER’S PRIOR CONVICTION IN KANSAS PURSUANT TO E.R.E. 404(b)(1).

LIST OF PARTIES All parties appear in the caption 1n the case on the cover page. 2

1. MAY A DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS, AND CIRCUIT COURT

DISREGARD MANDATORY RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

ASSOCIATED WITH A SUPREME COURT ORDER?

2. ONCE A JUDGE IN A CIRCUIT COURT MAKES AN “ADMISSION IN

JUDICIO” CONCERNING A VIOLATION OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL RULE, MAY

THE COURT CONTINUE THE TRIAL ANYWAY?

3. MAY A JUDGE AND PROSECUTOR TAKE ACTION TO CIRCUMVENT A | DEMAND FOR SPEEDY TRIAL UNDER R. CRIM. P. 3.191 (B) IN CIRCUIT

COURT?

A. MAY A FLORIDA DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATE IT’S OWN

FLORIDA CONSTITUTION BY REFUSING TO PROVIDE AN OPINION ON A

PER CURIAM AFFIRM DECISION WHILE A SUPREME COURT ORDER

REQUIRES ONE?