The GEO Group, Inc. is a service provider at the Northwest ICE Processing Center (“NWIPC”) in Tacoma, Washington, under contract with the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (‘ICE’). Consistent with congressional direction, that federal contract requires GEO to offer the immigration detainees at the facility the opportunity to participate in a voluntary work program. The program is designed not to treat immigration detainees, who are generally ineligible for lawful work in the United States, as employees, but to give them an outlet to avoid idleness during their detention. To that end, while all ICE detention facilities must offer the program, Congress has long capped the amount it will reimburse from appropriated funds at $1 per day per participant. Washington state had radically different ideas, and would classify federal immigration detainees participating in this federal voluntary work program as ordinary employees entitled to the state minimum wage, even as it exempts its own detainees from that same law. The Ninth Circuit blessed this extraordinary inversion of our constitutional order, rejecting intergovernmental immunity and preemption arguments endorsed by three other circuits and the three most recent administrations, and saddling GEO with an approximately $37 million judgment that has forced the suspension of the federal work program at the federal facility at issue.

The question presented 1s:

Whether the Supremacy Clause allows a state to reclassify federal immigration detainees participating in a federal work program as employees and thereby

1. Whether the Indian Commerce Clause preempts state regulation of loans made on an Indian reservation, by an arm of a tribe, when the borrower contracts via the internet.

2. Whether a violation of the unlawful debt prohibition of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962, requires scienter for civil liability.

Article III confines federal courts to live cases or controversies. When claims become moot on appeal, this Court has long required vacatur—not a merits decision. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950). The Sixth Circuit defied that rule. The departure clashes with Article III.

The decision below also approves a regime allowing state officials and their partners to indefinitely retain and exploit the genetic and medical data of nearly every newborn without informed consent in perhaps the largest compulsory genetic database ever assembled. That holding cannot be reconciled with this Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence recognizing profound privacy interests in such data.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether a court of appeals may issue binding merits precedent on constitutional claims after those claims have become moot during appeal as a result of the government’s compliance with a permanent injunction, contrary to Article III and United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950).

2. Whether the Fourth Amendment permits a State, without informed parental consent, to indefinitely retain and use newborns’ highly-private genetic and medical data after the screening for which the samples were involuntarily compelled has concluded.

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On Hat Day at her public elementary school, third- erader C.S. chose a baseball cap depicting an AR-15 and the historical phrase “come and take it,” to show her support for the constitutionally protected right to bear arms. Because school officials believe wearing weapon imagery 1s never appropriate in school, they made her remove it. Months later, after C.S. sued, the same officials contrived the excuse that a high-school shooting two counties away made them concerned for emotional reactions the hat could prompt—a post hoc rationalization lower courts credited even though it was not referenced the day of the incident and even though there was no evidence any of C.S.’s school- mates even knew of the tragedy.

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 508, 514 (1969), requires school offi- clals seeking to restrict student speech to show “sub- stantial disruption of or material interference with school activities.” The justification “must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation.” Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597 U.S. 507, 543 n.8 (2022). This Court has never recognized a “hurt feelings” exception to this principle.

The question presented 1s:

Is post hoc speculation about emotional harm that speech could cause to other students insufficient to meet Tinker’s “substantial disruption” standard?

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Suggested Answer: Yes.

II. Did Petitioner satisfy the savings clause under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) by virtue of the § 2255 Court’s ruling effectively barring his claim from § 2255 review? Suggested Answer: Yes.

III. Isaclaim that is based on the assertion that the Government waived its right to execute a sentence properly raised under 28 U.S.C. § 2241? Suggested Answer: Yes. |

IV. Should the Court of Appeals have remanded the matter for a hearing to determine whether the Government was in contempt of the District Court’s order of August 31, 2023 where it acted contrary thereto? Suggested Answer: Yes.

1. Whether a district court’s 13-month, unexplained silence on liberty-related motions—followed by unsigned docket-entry denials that never addressed a single substantive claim—constitutes court-induced prejudice and an “extraordinary circumstance” warranting equitabie tolling of § 2255(f) under Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010).

2. Whether the Second Circuit’s refusal to issue a COA—despite the total absence of any reasoned ruling on timeliness or the merits—violates the “reasonable jurist could debate” standard of Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000).

3. Whether issuing the mandate on the very day Petitioner received the order, thereby denying him the full 14-day period guaranteed by FRAP 35 and 40, violated due process.

4. Whether federal courts’ systemic failure to abide by procedural rules in pro se habeas cases— | such as unexplained delays, unsigned denials, and premature mandates—violates the Constitution’s due process guarantees and the Suspension Clause, affecting tens of thousands of litigants nationwide. ,

Does a court violate a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense by excluding the strongest evidence supporting the sole theory of defense, simply because the evidence is circumstantial rather than direct and relies on reasonable inferences?

Under Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), does a court violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation by making the cross-examination of witnesses about potential bias contingent on the witness first admitting an expected benefit and the benefit coming directly from the prosecution?

3d 613, 615-16 (Miss. 2023) to change the procedural standards in effect at

| the time MaGee was convicted of such crime, was sentenced for crime, and when his direct appeal was affirmed by Mississippi Supreme Court, where new decision circumvents MaGee’s ability to seek collateral relief from a sentence in which MaGee has no hope of ever fully completing under Mississippi law.

2. Whether Joshua MaGee’s claims that the indictment was defective for failing to inform him that § 97-3-2 classifies his offenses as violent crimes and also whether claims that § 97-3-2’s omission from the — indictment affected his sentences, resulted in equal-protection and due process violations. Miss. Code Ann. Sec. 97-3-2 (2014).

2

Whether the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals misconstrued the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement and the Fifth Amendment due process mandate, when it refused to consider critical facts regarding the flawed original change of plea proceedings and subsequent court proceedings, and the consequences of the confusing and unclear advisement Mr. Sandiford was given by the Magistrate Judge about the consequences of his plea on his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence, exacerbated by the District Court’s repeated discussion of Mr. Sandiford’s arguments being reviewed on appeal, and then misconstrued the law when the Court of Appeals refused to consider the important Fourth Amendment search and seizure issues raised by Mr. Sandiford’s challenge to the seizure of digital data from distant on- line platforms connected to his cell phones without a proper warrant authorizing the seizure of such information and data, instead relying on a roaming general search warrant authorizing the search and seizure of Mr. Sandiford’s cell phone wherever it may be located and the unbounded search of the entirety of the internet and universe of cloud-based storage platforms and applications that may be connected to the seized cell phone, and upheld the denial of Mr. Sandiford’s meritorious motions to suppress electronic digital evidence illegally seized by the government.

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The Sentencing Guidelines remain “the starting point and the initial benchmark” for all federal sentencing proceedings. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007). A district court’s failure to calculate the applicable Guidelines range constitutes procedural error. Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 537 (2018); Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. 129, 134 (2018).

In this case, the district court imposed a 24-month supervised release revocation sentence—more than double the high end of the correct range—without ever calculating or identifying the applicable Guidelines range. The court of appeals nonetheless affirmed in an unpublished memorandum decision.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether a court of appeals may affirm a sentence when the district court never calculated or identified the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, notwithstanding this Court’s repeated holdings that Guidelines calculation is the mandatory starting point for sentencing and that failure to do so constitutes procedural error.

2. Whether a sentence may be affirmed on plain-error review where the district court imposed a sentence more than double the high end of the applicable Guidelines range without any explanation tethered to a calculated range.

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I. Having already expressly denied consent for police to enter the residence, does the occupant’s “okay” in response to the officer’s statement that police “almost need” to enter the residence amount to voluntary consent for police to enter the residence?

II. Having already expressly denied general consent for police to enter the residence, does the occupant’s “okay” in response to the officer’s statement that police “almost need” to enter the residence to check on the welfare of the children limit the scope of consent to checking on the welfare of the children?

18 U.S.C. § 2252A criminalizes the receipt of child pornography. A depiction counts as child pornography if its “production . . . involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(A). “Sexually explicit conduct” includes a “lascivious exhibition of the anus, genitals, or pubic area of any person.” 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A)(v).

Congress pinned punishment to objectively lascivious exhibitions, not depictions that are subjectively lascivious “in [a defendant’s] estimation|.|” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 301 (2008). Yet some Circuits graft subjective intent and desire onto this scheme by telling factfinders, when deciding if a depiction shows a lascivious exhibition, to consult subjective factors from a forty-year-old judicial opinion. See United States v. Dost, 636 F.Supp. §28 (S.D.Cal. 1986), affd sub nom. United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1987)).

The question presented 1s:

How, if it all, may courts direct factfinders to rely on the “Dost factors” 1n deciding whether a depiction includes a “lascivious exhibition of the anus, genitals, or pubic area of any person?”

1

Where a defendant pleads guilty to the crime of carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 USC § 924(c)(1)(A), 1s it a violate of the Fifth Amendment, Double Jeopardy Clause not to allow such a defendant the “safety valve” reduction for the underlying drug trafficking offense pursuant to USSG §5C1.2 and 18 USC § 3553(f) in cases where the same firearm resulted in the § 924(c)(1)(A) conviction?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner, James Dorelus was the Defendant in the District Court for the Southern District of Florida (District Court), and the Appellant before the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The United States of America, was the Plaintiff in the District Court for the Southern District of Florida, and the Appellee before the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

The Petitioner has complied with the requirements set forth in Rule 33 of the Supreme Court. In particular, Petitioner certifies that a 14-point Times Roman font was used in this petition, and pursuant to Supreme Court Rule the petition for certiorari contains 5895 words or less excluding, the questions presented, list of parties and corporate disclosure statement, the table of content, the table of cited authorities, the listing of counsel at the end of document, or any appendix.

1

Whether a district court can infer that unseized methamphetamine has similar purity to seized methamphetamine. If so, what specific evidence must support such an inference, i.e., the source of the drugs, the pricing of the drugs, and/or the purity of other drugs from the same supplier at the same or a comparable price. Under any standard, the District Court, the Government, and the PSR failed to offer sufficient evidence to support such an assumption by a preponderance of the evidence.

A decision by this Court could further the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3553 and the Sentencing Guidelines, assuring district courts impose uniform reasonable and individualized sentences regardless of the location of the federal courthouse in which a defendant is prosecuted. This Court should grant a writ of certiorar1, address this error, and provide guidance for a situation (1) likely to recur and to further unduly burden some defendants with constitutionally excessive sentences; and (2) that will unduly burden all citizens by imposing unnecessary costs related to excessive incarceration.

_j-

Whether the Sentencing Guidelines’ static Criminal History Categories and excessive offense levels for methamphetamine actual/Ice fail to propose a reasonable and individualized range of imprisonment for defendants, such as Mr. Orlanda Travon Sloan, whose crimes have been driven by youth, mental health issues, and resulting drug addictions?

To impose a reasonable and individualized sentence on defendants such as Mr. Sloan, the Criminal History Categories and excessive offense levels for methamphetamine actual/Ice proposed by the Sentencing Guidelines must be adjusted to avoid punishing an individual defendant too severely for crimes driven by youth, mental health issues, and resulting drug addictions.

A decision by this Court could further the purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines, assuring district courts impose uniform reasonable and individualized sentences regardless of the location of the federal courthouse in which a defendant is prosecuted. This Court should grant a writ of certiorari, address this error, and provide guidance for a situation (1) likely to recur and to further unduly burden some defendants with constitutionally excessive sentences; and (2) that will unduly burden all citizens by imposing unnecessary costs related to excessive incarceration.

_j-

Whether Petitioner was derived of his right, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, to a trial by a 12-person jury when the defendant is charged with a serious felony?

There are two other petitions raising the same question presented. See Parada v. United States, No. 25-166; Minor v. Florida, No. 24-7489. This case should at least be held pending resolution of those petitions.

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