Congress has enacted several statutes that collec- tively provide for the involuntary civil commitment of certain individuals in “the custody” of the federal gov- ernment. See 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a); see also §§ 4241- 4248.

In United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010), this Court examined the statutory scheme and con- cluded that Congress did not trespass constitutional limits in enacting the scheme because “[a]s the Solici- tor General repeatedly confirmed at oral argument,” the statutes’ “reach is limited to individuals already ‘in the custody of the’ Federal Government.” Id. at 148. All parties thus agreed that, unless a person is “either charged with or convicted of” a federal offense, the federal government cannot commit him. Id. at 138. Anything more would “confer[] on Congress a general ‘police power, which the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the States.” Id. at 148.

Petitioner Duane Letroy Berry stands neither charged with nor convicted of a federal offense. Yet the federal government sought and obtained his com- mitment. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the commit- ment order because Berry had previously been charged with a crime, and despite the charge’s dismis- sal months prior to his commitment, Berry remained in the federal government’s physical custody.

The question presented is:

Whether 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a) exceeds the constitu- tional limits of Congress’s powers insofar as it permits the federal government to civilly commit a person who

(i)

This Court has emphasized that a previous court’s judgment bars any claims between the parties or their privies that “involve a common nucleus of operative facts.” Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Grp., Inc., 590 U.S. 405, 412 (2020) (quotation marks omitted). Respondents filed an action against Petitioner that pleaded the same claim, based on the same legal theory and the same unchanged operative facts, as those pleaded in earlier suits that resulted in multiple adverse final judgments. In an effort to avoid the preclusive effect of those prior judgments, Respondents purported to limit their challenge to Petitioner’s identical ongoing, continuing conduct in 2019 and 2020—years that post- dated the earlier suits. Respondents did not allege any material change in fact. The district court that had adjudicated those prior actions held _ that Respondents’ claims here were precluded. But, in conflict with this Court’s precedents and multiple other circuits’ decisions, the Third Circuit held that Respondents had escaped preclusion simply by alleging that the same previously adjudicated conduct continued into additional years.

The question presented 1s:

When a plaintiff challenges the same ongoing, continuing conduct that was fully adjudicated in an earlier suit, does the mere passage of time foreclose claim and issue preclusion?

Whether 18 U.S.C. §922(n) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment

framework of New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen. IT.

Whether 18 U.S.C. §922(n) should be construed to require a more substantial connection to interstate commerce than the mere passage of a firearm across state lines in an unspecified way, and if not, whether it exceeds Congress’s power to enact?

1

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which categorically prohibits all persons with felony convictions from possessing firearms or ammunition, is facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment.

2. Whether a criminal defendant waives the right to challenge the exclusion of evidence proffered during cross-examination of government witnesses by subsequently declining to introduce that same evidence during his case-in-chief.

3. Whether law enforcement officers who did not witness the commission of a crime may offer lay opinion testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 701 identifying the defendant as the perpetrator based solely on a post-hoc review of surveillance footage and prior encounters with the defendant.

1

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) comports with the Second Amendment.

2. Whether Congress may criminalize intrastate firearm possession based solely on the firearm crossing state lines at some point before the defendant came to possess 1t.

1

the FiCth and Foorckeenkh Amendmenk is offered when a Onited Dtotes

Loork of ALeeals denies an aneusedis applicakion fora ceckiFieake of aPrealabilitt, the aerpsedk Sackiehes he Prerewisites Sekcth in 28 U.S.A. S2zeacer?

Lhether the arrlicakio of 28 0.5.4. 226400) 15 unconatibukiowl fan areveed 15 ack offorsed an evikentior’ hearina ko overcome khe burdén of’ Presenkina nleac ankcemineina evidence if Khe claim is ack conclosiveld refokec buthe earl? i .

I. Texas robbery may be committed by a reckless use of force merely incidental to the taking of property. Did the Fifth Circuit misapply the categorical approach by dismissing an elemental mismatch as a mere variation in terminology and misconstruing the mens rea required in the amended definition of robbery in the Guidelines, in finding that Texas robbery is a crime of violence.

Il. Whether 18 U.S.C. §922(¢g)(1) comports with the Second Amendment?

Ill. Whether 18 U.S.C. §922(¢g) permits conviction for the possession of any firearm that has ever crossed state lines at any time in the indefinite past, and, if so, if it is facially unconstitutional?

1

1. Whether the government breaches a plea agreement, and violates due process under Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), when it enters into an agreement containing a section labeled “Sentencing Stipulations” specifying certain Sentencing Guidelines adjustments, but later endorses additional Guidelines enhancements not listed in those stipulations at sentencing based on generalized disclaimer language elsewhere in the agreement—thereby substantially increasing the defendant’s sentencing exposure beyond what the plea reasonably conveyed and the defendant reasonably understood

1

(2) Whether i+ iS shuctual evwor when Judae seoloviaht ordered Sullivans psycho therapist“ pahent medical recovds er Sultdeun’s ogechons wher

| Judge Sealeight velease alll of those records to Assistant United States

Attorney ( Piantiff) 1s a stuctuval ewor and grounds for reversal undev TJatlee vy. Redmond, SIB US. 4 (19416)?

(d) Whether cticinct court erred mi orden SUA Sponte acumunal defendants treating psychiamst without any waiver ov consent from defendant ( Jallee Vv. Redmond, 51S U.S. 4 C\AAw)) and combinued Using daefendant vecovds agamet her ultimately lec +o the yevoca ton of her “prose Status avd defendant taking a pleadeal (violahon of SY Amendment Due Process Constitutomal Rights ‘shuchuial evroy) Mckaskle v. Wiggins , AbS U.S. I68, (43, 104-S.C4.444, FAL Ed. 2A 122 © n.3(1A8A4)?

(4) Whether Judee seabriqnt engages Wit yudicial misconduct wnen he changed Sullivans plea vargaw from We bench without Sullivans consent avid enhHed Sullivan Withdvaw ner plea barqgaw?

(5) Wihnelhner Judge Sealoig¥ nad “yuchicial vias and should have vecused lhimsel& from Sullivans Case when he vead Cece No.44) an Ex Parte Submission aS to me whale crux of Govemnments Case AGAINST Sullivan?

(6) Whether Judge Sealoniant Violated Sullivans Sidh Amendment Covstituhonal Rights to self_-vepresemtahon when tt was vevoked by Judge Senloviqht Wi the heavy of Febnay 4, 2022 7

| (+) Wvetver there \s prosecutorial miscorduct when Assistant Unrred States Attorney C”AUSA”) Releecca Ann Rerimutter and LRS Agent Mare Mac Pierson loy faleely represenhng Hat over 100 trial court sulopaenas posued boy Sudge Seaborignt were Grand jury subpoenas Was an alouse Of pr0cess, Violahon of Fed. 2 Cum. P Rule It; 25U-S.C.8 455 | and Fifth Amendment Due Process Right=*

(8) Whether there ls 4 iclathon of Speedy Tial Ack and 1s U.S C.& 3283, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments do the United States Constituhon when Plant Government added new Charges and broaden the Md Superseding, adictment on December 25,2014 ( Eck nio 1428 1651)?

(a) Whether distict court evwed tn keeping defense counsel on as ieqal vepresentahon Atter loth Counsel Barvee- and Sullivan Filed numerous mohons to withdraw counsel as there was a conflict of interest AS Gillivan sued counsel in ciwil case no. Cv- 22-O0OASA-IMe -R@T (OR (1-104, ECE Nos. \4%6, ISIS, 151% 1514, 1523)?

1. Whether the prosecution can use an arbitrary and fictitious list of 442 unknown individuals during sentencing all of whom never testified during trial nor testified during sentencing when the superseding indictment listed three (3) charged victims. See, Andrew vs. White, 604 US 86 (2025).

2. Whether the prosecution can arbitrarily deny a defendant the constitutional right to confront the three (3) witnesses against him. See, Hemphill vs. New York, 595 US 140 (2022). , |

3. Whether the prosecution can call a defendant to the stand during trial to testify against himself violating the Fifth Constitutional Provision against self-

| incrimination.

4. Whether an indictment can be filed 49 days after arrest and a defendant who had never before been in trouble with the law be held in pre-trial detention without bond for 122 days prior to a federal criminal trial when there was a warrantless | arrest and defendant pled not guilty. See, The Speedy Trial Act of 1974.

5. Whether a coerced confession can be used after the FBI repeatedly told a 20-year old

° defendant without counsel he would not be arrested. See, United States vs. Lall 607 | F.3d 1277, 1284 (11% Cir. 2010).

6. Whether the prosecution can use contents of falsified documents that were “created” by the FBI in an attempt to build a case around a coerced confession. See, Pope v. Fed. Express Corp. (974 F.2d 982, 8th Cir. 1992).

7. Whether illegally seized electronic equipment can be used at trial. See, Mapp vs. Ohio, 347 US 643 (1961) and Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine.

: 8

1. This Court recently explained that, “In the usual course, state courts apply state law when placing children in foster or adoptive homes,” however “when the child is an Indian, a federal statute—the Indian Child Welfare Act—governs.” Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 US 255, 263-64 (2023). Does the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, preclude a state from enacting a state law to determine the foster care or adoptive placement of an Indian child?

2. Under the Oregon Indian Child Welfare Act, the Oregon juvenile court may change the permanency plan for a dependent Oregon Indian child to Tribal Customary Adoption if the Oregon Indian child’s tribe consents to the Oregon juvenile court doing so. Thereafter, the Oregon Indian child’s tribe must decide the terms of the Tribal Customary Adoption by employing its own procedures (or simply by decree) and must reduce those determinations to writing in the form of a proposed order or judgment. The Oregon Indian Child Welfare Act then requires the Oregon juvenile court to accept the tribe’s proposed order or judgment—without regard to whether the parents of the Indian child were provided any procedural protections at all—and requires the Oregon juvenile court to sign an Oregon adoption judgment and enter the Oregon adoption judgment in the Oregon juvenile court’s case register. When the terms of the tribe’s Tribal Customary Adoption order or judgment include changing the child’s name and reserving for the parent only the single “right” to request an annual